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The Re-evaluation of William Jennings Bryan In Woodrow Wilson 's 
Administration is a study of the relationships of William Jennings 
Bryan, Secretary of State, Edward M. House, uncomrnissioned agent of 
Woodrow Wilson, Walter Hines Page, United States .Ambassador to England, 
and Woodrow Wils0n, President of the United States. The aut hor 's 
purpose in writing this thesis is to throw l i ght upon the machinat i ons 
that were carried on behind the back of William Jenni ngs Bryan, as 
Secretary of State in Woodrow Wilson's Administration. This i nvesti-
gation gives to Bryan a higher and more reputable positi on i n Amer ican 
history than he is usually accorded. In order to accompl i sh t his task 
it was necessary to re-evaluate The Intimate Papers of Col onel House 
which covers the Colonel's early youth up to t he end of World War I . 
The period 1912-1915 was given special attenti on . The author does 
not contend that Bryan should have been given t he appointment , nor 
does he contend that there were not others who coul d have s erved in 
the capacity of Secretary 0f State with more abilit y than Bryan. The 
author does contend that with all the handicaps that Bryan faced, the 
Commoner performed his duty to t he American peopl e ad.mirably o 
The problem is very important because of t he ef fec t t hese men 
had on the early policy of t he Uni ted States in World War I . The 
basic conflict in early World War I .Amer i can di plomacy seems to be 
between such men as Edward M. House and Walter Hi nes Page , and 
2 
Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan. When House and Page 
succeeded in bringing Wilson over to their side and in opposition 
to Bryan I s views, American policy changed with marked subsequent 
effect on the course of the European War. The policy which House, 
Page, and the English themselves followed was the policy of delay. 
Bryan vigorously opposed this policy. 
The author found it extremely difficult to divide the thesis 
into chapters. This difficulty arises from the fact that there is 
no clear-cut line to draw between the events that occurred. There-
fore, in order not to interrupt the clarity of the presentation, as 
few chapter headings as possible were employed. Some preliminary 
details were included in order to better understand the subject. 
This material prior to the Baltimore Convention, as well as the 
Convention itself, and the making up of the cabinet have been in-
cluded in the second chapter. The thi rd chapter deals with the domes-
tic and foreign issues confronting Bryan and the administration before 
World War I. The fourth chapter deals with Bryan and the American 
position during World War I. This chapter ends with the resignation 
of William Jennings Bryan as Secretary of State. Cfiapter five is 
the Conclusion. 
The author has tried to get at the basis of the problem by 
using as sources principally the memoirs and letters of the more 
important men involved. He has also noted material from the Foreign 
Relations of the United States. Other material not specifically used 
or noted in the thesis were speeches on British fll:!lreign policies and 
3 
a discussion of the German problem in Turkey by Ambassador Henry 
Morgenthau. Several secondary sources were used by the author at 
the beginning in order to better understand conditions of the early 
1900 1s. 
There are certain limitations in the thesis which must be 
cited. Several works which might have proved valuable in writing 
the thesis were not available to the author. The most important 
of these works not obtained was the War Memoirs of Robert Lansing. 
No satisfaction was given the author by the National Archives in 
trying to obtain a step by step procedure of the drafting of the 
Second Lusitania Note. Since no thorough study has been made and 
based upon the Bryan papers, the author again wrote the National. 
Archives to obtain information especially on the ratification of 
the Bryan Treaties. The archivist replied that no information on 
the ratification of the Bryan treaties existed in their files .• Thus 
the author has had to work with what facts were obtainable and draw 
as logical conclusions as possible from the data. 
CIW>TER II 
BRYAN BRINGS VICTORY TO WOODROW WIISON 
AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
4 
William Jennings Bryan had devoted his life to progressive 
principles. Among the principles which were followed by progressives 
of all parties were: that special, minority, and corrupt influence 
in government be removed; t hat the machinery of government be changed 
so that control by the few will pass to control by the many; and, 
that the functions of government be extended to relieve social and 
economic distress. The Commoner had been a candidate for the Presi-
dent of the United States in 1896, 1900, and 1908 in or der to accom-
plish these progressive principles, but he had been defeated due 
principally to his vigorous stand on the silver question. Not onzy 
was Bryan discredited by his stand on bimetallism, but also direct 
legislation, control of corporations, the income tax and many other 
of his excellent measures all had to -be~ab-hlldo_ped;. 
By 1912, Governor Wilson of New Jersey had secured a great 
deal of the support of the Democratic Party. However, Wilson had 
many issues to solve. It is not too much to say t hat Wilson's 
greatest single problem during his political beginnings was William 
Jennings Bryan. Bryan was not onzy the outstanding man of t he 
Democratic Party but also an outstanding progressive in t he country . 
Because of Bryan's position Wilson was confronted with a seri es of 
problems that called for adroit management. In order to ac hi eve 
5 
a position of leadership in the Democratic Party Wilson had to step 
into Bryan's place -- with or without his consent. He had t o accom-
plish this feat without agreeing wholly to Bryan' s progr am or his 
methods. Wilson could not afford to alienate t he East which was 
suspicious of Bryan. Above all Wilson had to stri ve for a united 
party. 
The Commoner remained aloof from Wilson and was not very in-
terested in t he Governor of New Jersey as a candidate, even as l ate 
as the Baltimore Convention. The Commoner would not sacrific e pro-
gressive principles in order to be elected Presi dent himself, and he 
meant to see that no other candidate should be selected by t he Demo-
cratic Party who was not progressive. Prob ably t he pr i mary r eason 
Bryan regarded Wilson with so little interest was that he felt Wil son 
was backed by t he "big interests"'. 
Wilson contributed to Bryan's belief t hat t he 11big interes t s " 
were backing him by apparently as s oc i ating with Colonel George Harvey, 
editor of Harper's Weekly, which was a J.P. Morgan f i r m. The aims 
of Harvey and the 11big interests II were stated to Josephus Daniels , 
later Secretary of Navy under Wilson, by Harvey i n the winter of 
1911: 
It was an interesting account of how against t heir 
inclination he Orarvey) had won the support of James 
Smith, boss of the Democratic Party, Robert Davis, boss 
of Jersey City, and James R. Nugent -- the big t hree 
who were in control of the Democratic machine in New 
Jersey ••• Harvey had said, 'Do you (Robert Davis) 
think Wilson would make a good governor?' Davis answered, 
'How in the hell do I know •••• But I do know he will 
be a good meal ticket for hungry Democrats. On his 
coattail hundreds of Democrats will be elected to small 
offices and the party will win a victory, something it 
needs if it is to live. 11 
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Wilson was not in ignorance of what the 11machine 111 was doing 
nor of its intentions. It was particularly disturbing to Wilson to 
find Hearst's New York papers publishing such news as: 
Wall St. To Put 
Up w. Wilson 
For President. 2 
Wilson was particularly confused as to why the "machine" had gone 
outside of its ~ ranks of recognized politicians to nominate him. 
He concluded that the machine had recognized that a new day in 
.American politics had come and that they must act accordingly. 
Wilson evidently did not understand that the 11machine 11 had been 
convinced by Harvey that he, Wilson, could be controlled. 
Shortly after the Governor of New Jersey openzy became a 
candidate for the Presidency, he was confronted with a serious 
problem -- a split with Harvey, which occurred on December 18, 1911. 
Harvey had asked Wilson if there was any talk left concerning his 
advocating the governor on behalf of the interests. Wilson replied 
that there was, and that these rum0rs were having a serious effect, 
1 Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era (Chapel Hill: The 
University 0f North Carolina Press, 194TT; p. 15. 
2 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters 
(Garden City, New York: Doubledey, Page & Company, 1931), III, 
61. 
7 
especially in the West.3 Harvey asked Wilson if he had thought of any 
way to counteract this harmful effect. Wilson replied: 
'I have not. In fact, I am greatly perplexed to know 
how to do it. I have been able to satisfy those I can 
reach, but there are thousands, of course, who we cannot 
reach -- I have not yet been able to devise a way to meet 
the situation. 1 
Harvey asked: 1 Is there anything I can do except, of 
course, to stop advocating your nomination? 1· 
Governor Wilson answered: 'I think not. At leas4.i~ I 
can I t think of anything. 1 4 
Thus,Harvey discontinued his support for Wilson. 
The split between Harvey and Wilson at first brought grievous 
effects to Wilson. It appeared to many that Wilson had deserted a 
friend who had long supported him. However, due to quick action on 
the part of Tom Pence, Washington correspondent for the News and 
Observer, Wilson's dark day indeed turned very bright. Mr. Pence 
quickly pointed out that Wilson's action was a deliberate and 
purposeful break with Wall Street. This report brought Wilson's 
action to the attention of the Progressive Democrats of the West 
who had considered him a friend of Wall Street. 
Thus, it appeared to many of the friends of Wilson that even 
3 Daniels had noted in the early fall of 1911 that he feared 
the backing of Harvey was causing men who had supported Bryan to 
distrust Wilson as a true progressive. Daniels, cit., p. 23. 
4 Wilson considered this question and answer as between 
friends and answered accordingly. Daniels,~• cit., p. 24. 
8 
the support of Bryan might cone to the Governor of New Jersey. 
However, Wilson's troubles were not over, for shortly after the 
Harvey episode had passed even a greater sensation was created by 
the publication of the Joline Letter. The full text of the letter 
appears as follows: 
April 29, 1907 
l'{y" dear Mr. Joline: 
Thank you very much for sending me your address at 
Parsons, Kansas, before the Board of Directors, of the 
Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad Compacy. I have · 
read it with relish, and am in entire agreement. Would 
that we could do something, at once, dignified and 
effective, knock Mr. Bryan, once for all, into a cocked 
hat. 
Cordially and sincerely yours, 
Woodrow Wilson.5 
The letter was published on January 7, 1912, the day before t he 
all-important Jackson Day Dinner. At t his dinner all the notables 
of the Democratic Party were to be present, as were members of the 
National Committee from all the states. Possibly even more signifi-
cant -- Bryan and Wilson were to be at the dinner! Bryan had followed 
Wilson's cweer as the New Jersey Governor but had never met Wilson. 
Their relations from this time forward were direct. 
The immediate problem that faced the Wilson forces was the 
forming of a reply. 11Mr. Mc Combs suggested that the governor address 
5 Baker,~• cit., III, 98. 
an open letter to Mr. Bryan, voicing his regret over the publication 
of this letter and assuring him of his present kindly feelings to-
d h . 116 war im. • • • Mr. Daniels, as an old friend and supporter of 
Bryan, was sent to observe the reactions 0f Bryan to the "cocked hat 
incident". While he was there a New York Sun reporter arrived to 
show Bryan the letter. 
The C0rmnoner read it slowly as if he had heard nothing 
about it until that minute. 'What have you to say?' the 
correspondent asked. 'You represent the New York S~, do 
you not?• Bryan asked. When he replied, 'Yes', Bryan 
said, 'In that case, you may just sqy- that if l'-1r. Wilson 
wanted to knock me into a cocked hat, he and the Sun are 
on the same platform.~ That's what the Sun has beer1trying 
to do me since 1896. 1 ( 
It was finally agreed upon by Wilson I s friends that the idea of 
Tumulty should be followed. This suggestion was for Wilson to pqy 
a tribute to Bryan's unselfish service to the Democratic Party and 
that the gesture should be made during he Jackson Day Dinner.8 
6 Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him 
Doubled;zy-, Page & Company, 1921), pp. 96-97.~Combs 
makes it appear that he had at first suggested a reply 
but then he considered Daniels the man to see Bryan. 
7 
Daniels, ~• cit., P• 32. 
(New York: 
in this book 
such as this 
9 
8 In main Governor Wilson paid a tribute to the great Commoner 
by saying, as he turned to Mr. Bryan: 'I, for my part, never want to 
forget this: That while we have differed from Mr. Bryan upon this 
occasion and upon that in regard to the specific things to be done, he 
has gone serenely on pointing out to a more and more convinced people 
what it was that was the matter. He has had the steadfast visions 
all along of what it was that was the matter and he has, not any more 
than Andrew Jackson did, not based his career upon calculation, but 
has based it upon principles.' Baker,~• cit., III, 264. 
' 'When others were faint-hearted, Colonel Bryan carried the Democratic 
Standard. He kept the I fires burning I which have heartened and 
encouraged the democracy of the country.' Tumulty, EE_• cit., P• 97. 
1G 
Mr. Tumulty considered Wilson's speech a great triumph, for the Bryan.-
Joline crisis was safely passed. In the presence of newspapermen 
Bryan put his arm very affectionately around the shoulder of Wilson. 
On his return from Washington Wilson confided in Tumulty that Bryan 
had told him not to worry about the publication of the Joline Letter 
saying: 
I Q3ryari), of course, knew that you were not with me in 
my position on the currency, and Woodrow Wilson replied: 
'All I can say, Mr. Bryan, is that you are a great, big 
man. 19 
It ma,y be well to pause and consider the relations of Bryan, 
House, and Page with Wilson before the Baltimore Convention. 
The two men -- Wilson and Bryan -- presented interesting 
contrasts. Wilson was intellectual; Bryan was emotional. Wilson 
was sensitive and shy and did not enjoy to a great extent speaking 
before crowds; Bryan was a great lover of crowds. Wilson was care-
ful and exact; Bryan was swift and careless. Wilson was a thorough 
and a deep reader; Bryan was not. However, the two men did have 
attitudes in common. Ray Stannard Baker said: 
••• Both were men of faith, deeply religious; both 
believe profoundly in the pe0ple, Bryan instinctively 
by heritage, because he was one of them, Wilson by 
reason, by historical uRderstanding, by virtue of his 
Scotch-Presbyterian conviction that 'all men rank the 
same with God. 1 Botk men were gifted orators with the 
power of leading and iniiliuencing the masses; and both, 
underneath, deep down, were sincere in their objectives. 
9 Ibid., P• 97. 
It was this sense of fundamental agreements as to the 
rights of people, and the iniquity of 'privilege,' that 
gradually brought the two men together.lo 
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Wilson was convinced that Bryan was sincere an~ trying t0 express t he 
wishes of tre people but that he had no direction in which to l ead t he 
people. 
On the other hand while Bryan had l<:mg been an irritant to 
Wilson, Bryan lmew nothing of Wilson until 1910. Bryan began taki ng 
notice when a rank outsider appeared in politics am was elected 
Governor of New Jersey. On the day after the election, Bryan tele-
graphed to Governor Wilson the first direct communication between 
them on November 9, 1910: "May your administr ation be crowned wit h 
signal success. 1111 From this time on both men became keenly interested 
in each other.12 Bryan became even more interested when he l earned 
from Thomas B. Love13 that the Texas elegation was going to 
organiz·e in favor of Wilson for President. However, Bryan's support 
10 Baker, .s2• cit., III, 200-01. 
ll Ibid., III, 207. 
12 Bryan. particularly noted Wilson I s stand i n favor of J im 
Martine for United States Senator as elected by the people and 
opposed by Jim Smith, the big interest's candidateo 
13 One 0f the earliest supporters of Wilson for President was 
Thomas B. Love from Texas. The conversation was carried on between 
Bryan and Love in Janua:ry, 1911. Love had been active since 1910. 
It is interesting to note that House takes the credit for the 
organization of Texas in Wilson's favor. House as of January 21, 
1911, was supporting Mayor Gaynor of New York for the presidency. 
Baker,~• cit., III, 297. 
12 
still seems to have been for Champ Clark. Concerning Clark, Bryan 
records his election to the Speakership of the House in 1911: 
I regarded him as an available man for the nomination. 
Governor Wilson was being talked of more and more , but I 
felt that Clark was more in sympathy with the policies of 
the party and, therefore, better suited to lead our forces 
in the corning presidential campaign .14 
During his own birthdey banquet, on March 19, 1911, Bryan 
first began to doubt Clark as a candidate. 
Clark crune but I (}3ryan) learned from him afterwards 
that it was with some reluctance. This surprised me and 
I was surprised still more when, as the campaign proceeded, 
I found that his friends were tying up with the Harmon 
forces whenever5a combination was necessary to defeat the Wilson forces. 1 
Bryan would not declare himself in favor of either candidate. He 
found Wilson an equally acceptable candidate o 
While the relations between Bryan and Wilson before the 
Baltimore Convention are open and clear, matters between House and 
Wilson are badly muddled. That House did not trust the masses as 
did Bryan and Wi1son is evidenced by the following : 
The trouble with getting a candidate for President 
is that the man that is best flitted for the place can-
not be nominated and, if nominated, could probably not 
be elected. The people seldom take the man best fitted 
for the job; therefore it is necessary to work for the 
best man who can be nominated
6
and elected, and just now 




Jennings Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings 
The John c. Winston Company-;-1925) , p. 159. 
16 Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920), I,43. --
13 
It has already been noted that at le ast as late as January 21, 
1911, House had supported Ma,yor Gaynor of New York. 17 Ac cording to 
the accounts of House, the Colonel had become inter ested in Wilson 
as a candidate in November, 1911, as was shown by a l etter to Senator 
Culberson: 
The more I see of Governor Wi lson t he better I l i ke 
him, and I think he is get ting to be a man one can ad-
vise with some degree of satisf act i Qn . This , you know, 
you could never do with Mr . Bryan.ltj 
House also informed t he world i n hi s f).apers that it was he m.o had 
advi sed Wilson to stress the t ariff probl em i n his speech of J anuary 
3, 1912. The Colonel also asked D. F. Houston , Chancellor of Wash-
ington University, to talk ab out t he quest i on of t he tariff with 
Wilson. Furthermore: 
The Governer agreed t o t he advi sabili-cy of this move , 
and Houston came. I gave a di nner at Gotham (December 7, 
1911). The others present besides Gover nor Wilson were 
Houston, Walter Pagel9 Mccombs, and Edward s . Martin . 20 
••• This data was afterwards given t o Governor Wilson, who 
based his tariff speeches largely on i t. 21 
17 House had been i ntroduced to Gaynor by Bryan and had at 
fir st becorrB an enthusiastic supporter of Gaynor . The split between 
the two men came when House i nvited Gaynor to speak before the Texas 
State Conventi on and Gqynor refused. House was infuriated over this 
action. 
18 Seymour,~• ci t., I, 46 . House was indeed happy over his 
opinion that Wilson could be advi sed for t his was to be his source 
of power with Wilson in later years. 
19 Later under Wilson's administration Ambassador to England 
and an early supporter of Wilson. 
20 Editor of Life magazine. 
21 Seymour,~• cit., I, 47. 
14 
William F. McCombs who had attended t he dinner given by House notes 
the following: 
Mr. House said, incidentally, t hat Mr. Houston had made 
a special study of the tariff, and that the two men (}rouston 
and Wilsori) might meet on common ground on that issue, 
especially since the governor was to make his t ariff speech 
on January 3, 1912.22 
The dinner passed off qu i t e pleasantl y . There was general 
conversation. President Houst on i ntimated a desire to discuss 
the tariff. Governor Wilson caromed of f the i s sue and there 
was nothing further heard of that. The conversation was then 
resumed along conversati onal l i nes, Colonel House not 
participating. 
I went later to see Col onel Hous e on the very practical 
matter of his contribution. He s ai d he could make none, then 
disappeared. 23 
Shortly after t his diillil.er, House, according to his own papers, 24 
began the quick mobilization and organiz ation of the Texas delegates 
in order to swing t heir s olid support behind Wilson. He was able, by 
the beginning of March, 1912, to express the expectation of a solid 
22 Note the words '' especially since the Governor was to make 
his tariff speech on January 3, 191211 • House as we have seen had gone 
to Wilson and stressed t he point of the tariff in Wilson's forih-
eoming S]1)eech. 
23 William F. Mccomb s , Making Woodrow Wilson President 
(New York: Fairview Publishing Comp any, 1921) , pp . 230-31 . 
Probably the best analysis of House's means and methods are deseribed 
in Baker, £E.• cit., III, 296. 11 He (Hous0 shrank from the ordinary 
hurly-burly contacts. He was 'inspired by the desire t o improve 
political conditions', but he avoided, always , any personal respon-
sibility whether for the i nfluence of hi s i deas or the resul ts of 
his acts. If things went wrong some one else must take the punishment : 
public opinion could not reach him . 11 
24 Seymour,~• cit., I , 57. 
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wilson delegation from Texas. Actually long before House and Wilson 
met a vigorous movement had begun in Texas to advance Wilson's candidacy. 
The principal enthusiasts were: Thomas B. Love, George D. Armistead, 
Thomas w. Gregory, and Albert Sidney Burleson. Love had been active 
from the time that Wilson had been elected Governor of New Jersey in 
1910. 25 McCornbs himself readily states that: 
I can positively state that Colonel House had nothing 
to do with carrying the State of Texas in the primaries 
for Woodrow Wilson except as he told me himself, he had 
written a few letters. I think no responsible person who 
took part in that difficult primary would contradict me 
for an instant.26 
House who had taken it upon himself to influence Bryan to join 
on the side of Wilson, he likewise took some credit for accomplishing 
this purpose as is shown by the following letter to William F. McCombs on 
February 10, 1912: 
I sent him Q3ryanJ some clippings favorable to Governor 
Wilson, which he promises to use and asks for more. If 
you could think to have sent things that you would like 
to have used in the Commoner, 1 I am sure that I can 
arrange it. 
I agree with you that Mr. Bryan's support is absolutely 
essential, not only for nominating, but for the election 
25 Baker, .£E,• cit., III, 297-98. 
26 McCombs, .£E• cit., p. 231. Also note Baker, op. cit., I I I, 
322-63. This information is corroborated by Josephus Daniels who 
said that at the time of the Baltimore Convention, House did not 
control the Texas delegation and further more was not even present. 
Daniels,~• cit., P• 41. 
27 The newspaper of W. a. Bryan was published in Lincoln, 
Nebraska. 
afterward; and I shall make it .av particular province 
to keep in touch w.i. th him and endeavour to influence him 
along the lines desired. 
He has evolved considerably in our direction, for when 
I first talked to hi,8in October he did not have Governor Wilson much in mind. 
Thus, we have seen that House, contrary to what he might want us to 
believe in his papers, contributed next to nothing in advancing the 
candidacy of Woodrow Wilson. 
16 
Woodrow W~lson did have a strong advocate in Colonel House's 
later cohort, Walter Hines Page. Page had known Wilson for some 
thirty years and had met him at Atlanta when Wilson was a struggling 
young lawyer. He felt that with the coming of Wilson a new era in 
politics would also be reached. Page wrote to Henrf Wallace, 29 
editor of 'Wallace's Farmer and ardent admirer of Theodore Roosevelt, 
shortly before the campaign of 1912: 
I see you are coming around to Wilson ••• and in 
pretty rapid fashion. I assure you that that is the 
solution of the problem. I have known him since we were 
boys, and I have _oeen studying him lately with a great 
28 Seymour, .£12• cit., I, 56. It must also be stated that House's 
tactics did not prove to be so greatly valuable because Bryan remained 
a Clark supporter until the release of the Bryan-Parker telegrams, 
with which House had no connection. House's particular plan to influ-
ence Bryan was te lay special weight upon the fact that the reactionary 
forces in tre Democratic Party were fighting both Bryan an:i Wilson. 
29 Henry Wallace was the father of Henry A. Wallace, later 
Secretary of Agriculture under Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
deal ef care. I haven't any doubt but that is tre way 
out. The old label 'Democrat' and 'Republican' have 
ceased to have any meaning, not only in nzy- mind and in 
yours, but I think in tRe minds of nearly all people ••• 30 
17 
Mr. Hendrick, author of The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page, 
suggests that Page was quite valuable in presenting Wilson and House 
to one another due to the fact that because of House the important 
state of Texas came over to Wilson's side. Since we have already 
seen that House's contribution in securing Texas' delegates far 
Wilson was certainly not large, Page's worth in this connection does 
not seem to be very great. It must be remembered that Mr. Hendrick 
studied the letters of Page, of which a great number were from 
House. Therefore, Mr. Hendrick must have assumed that what House 
wrote was the truth. 
Page did, however, make positive contr ibutions to aid the 
election of Wilson. Page was not a collector of delegates to the 
nominating convention, nor a manipulator of assemblies to favour 
Wilson. His talent lay in e:xposition. He took upon himself the 
task of spreading Wilson's fame. He sat forth the achievements of Wilson 
in his magazine, in books published by his firm, in letters to friends, 
and in personal conferences. Page also aided in helping persuade 
Wilson to make his famous speechmaking trip through the western states 
in 1911. This trip aided Wilson greatly for it brought him out into 
the open before the masses. 
30 Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of w-alter Hines 
Page (Garden City, New York: Doubledey,Page & Company, 192~ 
I, 10$. 
Wilson's attitude toward the enthusiasm of such men as Page 
and McCombs concerning his candidacy is recorded by Ray Stannard 
B~er as follows: 
All these men are strangely interested in the enter-
prise of making IJB President of the United States. I 
cannot help them in the least •••• I think every man 
instinctively likes to play the role of kingmaker. I 
am at present, apparently, suitable material for their 
favourite sport, and so the gaire is on the boards. I 
do not mean that they are not gener0usly interested in 
me, personally; but I must, for the working of my own 
mind, have something in addition to that to e:xplain 
their enthusiasm •••• 31 
18 
Possibly the actions of one other man should be studied 
before entering into the subject of the Baltimore Convention itself. 
This man is William F. Mccombs, Wilson's campaign manager. He 
sought to modify Wd..lso·n I s attitude towards "machine politics" and 
thus secure their support as well as the votes of the New York 
delegation. McCombs felt that without t hi s delegation's support, 
Wilson could not win. No other candidate in the past had been able 
to overcome this deficiency. 11He urged Wilson to modify his attitude 
toward the bosses -- bosses were after all only local leaders -- and 
he sought to minimize Wilson's growing understanding with Bryan --
though he sought Bryan's help in certain Western states -- because it 
31 Baker, ~• cit., III, 193. Mr. Wilson early seems to have 
drawn an astute conclusion for William F. McCornbs later wrote a book 
entitled Making Woodrow Wilson President. Page does no t seem to take 
such a great glory in the kingmaker's role as shown in The Life and 
Letters of Walter Hines Page. 
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was offensive to som of the powerful Eastern organizations, especially 
Tammany Hall. 1132 Mccombs and the practical p0liticians seemed to be 
right for in the primaries, despite Wilson's tremendous appeal to the 
people, one state after another went against him. 
The old established leadership, based so largely upon 
personal acquaintance, favours given and received -- the 
'vast inertia of organization' -- in most cases prevailed • 
• • • Wilson's attitude toward 'Jim' Smith's machine in 
New Jersey, however much as it might please the people, 33 did not help him with the leaders in other states ••.• 
At the close of the. primaries and state conventions, the situation, 
with regards to the standing of the delegates, stood as follows: 
Pledged to Clark 436 
Pledged to Wilson 248 
Pledged to Underwood 84 
Pledged to favourite sons, 
Harmon, Marshall and others 102 
Undertain 224 
Total Delegates 1094 34 
Majority 548 
Two thirds, necessary f or choice 729 35 
House wrote to Senator C. A. Culberson Mey 1, 1912, that Wilson's 
best chance to win lay in the fact that many people feared that if 
32 Baker,~• cit., III, 278. 
33 Ibid., III, 283-84. 
34 The total number of delegates after the Credentials 
Committee made it~s report was 1088. 
35 Baker,~• cit., III, 323. 
Bryan were nominated and elected, Hearst would succeed in landing 
Champ Clark in the cdministration as the dominating figure. 
In early June, 1912, the Democratic National Committee met 
and selected Judge Alton B. Parker36 from New York to be the 
temporary chairman for the Baltimore Convention. This was partic-
ularly galling to Bryan for Parker was an open conservative. Bryan 
saw that the Baltimore Convention, since its candidates were pro-
gressive as well as its platform, must in all ways be progressive 
20 
in order to match or better the Republican candidate, Taft, and the 
Progressive candidate, Roosevelt. Roosevelt had split from the 
Republican and had formed his Bull Moose party. The Commoner, still 
a supporter of Clark, had written to Clark to be a leader and to 
fight for progressive principles or Wilson would beat him. Wilson 
was a leader as well as a fighter. 37 Shortly after the selection 
of Parker by the National Committee, Bryan drew up a telegram which 
was to have perhaps more influence on the nomination of Wilson and 
the rejection of Clark than any other factor. The telegram stated: 
In the interest of harmony I suggest to the sub-
committee of the Democratic National Committee the 
advisability of recommending as temporary chairman 
some progressive acceptable to the leading progressive 
36 Parker was the Democratic candidate for President in 1904. 
37 Bryan especially hoped Clark would be favorable. After 
seeing the Republican Party's candidate elected by the influence of 
big interests, Bryan perhaps feared Clark might also be swayed by 
Wall Street. 
candidates for the presidential nomination. I took it 
for granted that no committeeman interested in Democratic 
success "WOuld desire to offend the members of a conven-
tion overwhelmingly progressive by naming a reactionary 
to sound the keynote of the campaign. Ei ght members of 
the sub-committee, however, have, over the protest of the 
remaining eight, agreed upon not only a reactionary, but 
upon the one Democrat, who, among these not candidates 
for the presidential nomination is, in the eyes of the 
public, most conspicuously identified with the reactionary 
element of the party. I shall be pleased to join you and 
your friends in opposing this selection by the full com-
mittee or by the convention. Kindly answer hereo38 
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It was clear from the Bryan-Parker telegram sent to all the 
candidates, that the Connnoner wanted to fin:i out just how the candi-
dates stood. It appeared to Mr. Bryan that the efforts of bot h the 
New York delegation, led by the Tammany boss, Charlie Murphy, and 
the conservative element of the Democratic party in the East, were 
try-ing to extend their control over the convention and giving to the 
convention the most conservative and standpat appearance by controlling 
the preliminary organization and nominating .Alton B. Parker as tempo-
rary chairman. It was also rumored t hat by doing this the New York 
delegation as well as other conservative elements were striving to 
dig a political grave for Mr. Bryan and bury him in it for all time. 
Ironically enough, the conservatives dug their own grave and gave 
Bryan a chance to regenerate his political popularity and power • 
.All of the candidates, with the exception of Wilson, replied 
unfavorably to t he telegram of Bryan. 39 .Although House takes the 
38 Bryan, EE• cit., p. 164. 
39 Ibid., PP• 164-65. 
22 
credit~for turning Bryan to Wilson,40 it appears that the replies 
received by Bryan concerning tre telegram actually caused Bryan to 
turn to Wilson. The fact that the Wilson delegates voted f or t he Bryan 
resolution later in the convention served to strengthen Bryan's shift. 
The resolution was against supporting any candidate backed by t he 
11big interests 11 • 
Wilson, because of t he telegram, was placed in a peculiar 
~ituation. His campaign manager, Mccombs was doing everything in 
his power t0 bring Tammany into the camp of Wilson. Certainly his 
thought on the subject would be influenced by the Eastern environment. 
On the other side, Tumulty, the Governor's secretary, was trying to 
impress upon Wilson that an unfavorable reply would be taking the 
side of the Eastern conservatives as opposed to the Western progres-
sives. Tumulty wanted to answer Bryan's telegram favorably. Wilson 
would not answer until he had heard the opinion of McCombs. McCombs 
suggested on June 21, 1912, the following reply: 
Hon. William J. Bryan 
Lincoln, Nebraska 
I quite agree with you that the temporary chairman of 
the Convention should voice the sentiments of the democracy 
of the nation which I am convinced is distinctly progressive. 
However, before receiving your telegr am I had given out t he 
following statement for publi cation in the Baltimore Eveni ng 
Sun: :r,zy- friends in Baltimore are on the people's side in 
everything that affects the organization of th e convention. 
They are certain not to forget their standards as they have 
already shown. It is not necessary that I should remind 
40 
Seymour, .£12• cit., I, 67. 
them of these standards from New Jersey and I have 
neither the right nor the desire to direct the organi-
zation of a convention of which I am not even a member . 
(Signed) McCombs. 41 
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Tumulty greatly feared the consequences should the Mccombs 
reply be sent. It was clearly a rebuke to Mr . Bryan and a bid f or 
the Eastern delegates in the convention. After long discussion 
Wilson discarded the McCombs reply and f ormed the following: 
You are right. Before hearing of your message I 
clearly stated my position in answer to a question 
from the Baltimore Evening Sun. The Baltimore Conven-
tion is to be the convention of progressives -- the men 
who are progressive in principle and by conviction. It 
must if it is not to be put in a wrong light before the 
country, express its convictions in its organization and 
its choice of the men who are to speak for it. You are 
entirely within your rights in doing everything within 
your power to bring that result about. No one will doubt 
where my sympathies lie, and you wi 11, I am sure, find my 
friends in the convention acting upon a clear conviction 
and always in the interest of the people I s cause. I am 
happy in the confidence that they need no suggestion 
from me. 
(signed) Woodrow Wilson. 42 
Although the statement of Wilson 's was not as direct as Bryan would 
have liked it, the Commoner was satisfied, for a t least Wilson 
opposed Parker I s candidacy. 11Wilson I s telegram to Bryan fixed 
4l Tumulty, ~• cit., P• 1100 
42 Ibid., p. 111. Also note Bryan,~• cit . , pp. 164-65. 
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him in the mind of the country as a militant progressive who was not 
afraid, and that action was a long step towards his nominat i on.43 
Although tre Wilson and Bryan forces had combined to a gr eat 
extent, Alton -Parker still was able to defeat Bryan i n a vote of 
579-508. Parker had won the right to make the key speech. H0wever, 
it was noticed by Bryan that the Wilson forces almost to a man had 
voted for him. The selection of Parker had such a bad ef fect on 
public opinion t hat Clark again44 asked Bryan to take the chai r man-
ship . but Bryan refused "telling the messengers t hat t hose wh o owned 
a ship should furnish the crew. 1145 
The Wilson forces again wooed Bryan by suggesting for the 
office of permanent chairman of the convention , Ollie M. James of 
Kentucky. This action delighted Mr. Bryan very much. Although 
James was a Clark man, the Wilson forces felt he woul d be f air 
towards them. Tumulty states this was also an i mportant contri-
bution for: 
From Mr. Bryan's subsequent conversations over the 
telephone it clearly appeared that he was delighted at 
the suggestion of his own i ntimate f riend, and i t was 
plain that he was being convinced from moves of this kind 
by the New Jersey Governar- that Woodrow Wilson was willing 
43 Daniels.,~• cit., p. 52. 
44 Bryan had been the first to be asked t o become temporary 
chairman. 
45 B ·t l~(O. ryan, ~• ~•, P• Bryan obvi ously refers to Clark's 
control over the convention. 
to stand or fall with him in attempting to organize 
the Convention along progressive lines.46 
Shortly after the convention had passed through the Bryan-
Parker episode, another event occurred that was more shocking if 
not more important -- the Bryan resolution. In Bryan I s own words: 
••• I learned of the activity of the same element 
that had controlled the Republican Convention at Chicago. 
I flound ~hat the representatives of Morgan, Belmont, and 
Ryan were at work. Belmont and Ryan were themselves 
delegates, the former from Chicago and the latter from 
Virginia. Being convinced of the intimate relationship 
between these financiers and Mr. Murphy, I became increas-
ingly alarmed lest they should be able by the control of 
the New York delegation to make the nomination. The ninety 
delegates from New York were bound by the unit(\ rule and 
Charles P. Murphy, the Tammany leader, had enough delegates 
to enable him to vote the entire delegation at his w.i..11 . 47 
In order to combat this force Bryan proposed a solution 
suggested to him by his brother Charles W. Bryan. The resolution 
contained two paragraphs, the first adopted substantially by the 
convention; the second, was withdrawn by Bryan. The complete 
resolution is as follows: 
Resolved, That in this crisis in our party's 
career and in our country's history this convention 
sends greeting to the people of the United States, 
and assures them that the party of Jefferson and of 
Jackson is still the champion of popular government 
and equality before the law. As proof of our fidelity 
to the people, we hereby declare ourselves opposed to 
the nominatien of any candidate for President who is 
the representative of or under obligation to J. Pier-
pont Morgan , Thomas F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any 
other member of the privilege-hunting and favor seeking 
class. 
46 Tumulty, 9£• cit., P• 115. 
47 B ·t 1~3 ~4 ryan, 2£• ~-, pp. t - ( o 
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Be It Further Resolvec,t, That we demand the wi thd.rawal 
from this convention of any delegate or delegates 8onsti-tuting or representing the above-named interests.4 
26 
The effect of the resolution on the convention was immediate 
and vehement. The convention was uproarious, many on their feet 
shouting denunciation. Even old politicians accustomed to surprises 
were dazed. 
One member of the Congress rushed to the platform, and 
gesticulating violently, denounced me Q3rya.n) until he 
frothed at the mouth, and almost hysterical he was carried 
away by friends.49 
Another delegate offered a great sum of money for arry man that would 
shoot Bryan. 11 The uproar went on, and every minute I (Daniels) 
feared Bryan would be killed. Never have I seen such hate. 
Finally order was restored. Thomas Ryan had gone so far as to 
try to leave the hall, but the Virginians held him back. 
After a heated debate, in which it wrn argued that the con-
vention had no right to expel delegates chosen by the sovereign 
states, Bryan withdrew the latter part of his resolution, but he 
would not wi thd.raw the whole resolution. Although the Commoner 
perhaps did not secure all that he wanted from tre resolution, he did 
secure his aim for: 
48 Ibid., pp. 174-75. It was for tunate for Bryan that Ollie 
James was permanent chairman or Bryan probably would not have even 
been recognized. It was fortunate for the Wilson forces because this 
resolution in effect brought Bryan and his Western progressives on 
the side of Wilson . Further information on Bryan I s change to Wilson 
is found in Appendix A. 
49 
50 
Bryan, ~• cit., p. 177. 
Daniels,~• cit., P• 57. 
1-zy" Q3ryan) aim was to get a roll call, because I 
felt that whichever way the convention voted it would 
be difficult to nominate a man who had the support of 
the New York delegation. If they passed the resolu-
tion it excluded anyone who was the representative of 
Morgan, Belmont, or Ryan or under their influence; if 
they voted it down, the rebuke from the country would 
make it impossible for New York to select a candidate.51 
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Polls were taken in nearly all the delegations with some of 
them changing from a solid vote against the resolution to a solid 
vote in favor of it . As frenzy overtook the delegates, they jumped 
on the bandwag~n 1with the result that the resolution carried by a 
vote of about 4½ to 1. Even New York voted for the resolution. 
As the vote of New York was recorded for tre Bryan 
resolution., with grim humour M'l:lI'phy said to Belmont, 
'Now Augie, list~n to yourself vote yourself out of 
the corrvention•./2 
Nearly all of the Wilson delegates voted 11yes 11 while maey of the 
Clark delegates voted 11 no 11 and in so doing greatly lessened the 
political chances of their candidate. Bryan feared that a candi-
date supported by Wall Street would become a target for Theodore 
Roosevelt . There was the possibility that Roosevelt might step in 
and claim that both parties had elected W.all Street candidates, thus 
drawing away progressives from both parties and securing his own 
nomination. Bryan, convinced that the convention was safe against 
the nomination of anyone by Wall Street influence, retired from the 
convention while delegates were being named for candidacy. 
5l Bryan,~• cit., p. 177. 
52 c Daniels,~• cit., p. /7 . 
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On the first day of balloting Clark was decidedly in the lead. 
The ninety votes of New York went to Governor Harmon. Underwood had 









Bryan 1 53 
On the fourth day of balloting New York gave her ninety votes to 
Clark. Up to this time McConbs felt that he could secure the New 
York block for Wilson . Wilson was very annoyed with Mccombs and 
told Tumulty: 
• • • that their principal discussion was the attempt 
by Mccombs and his friends at Baltimore to exact from him 
a promise that in case of his nominati on William Jennings 
Bryan should not be named for tre post of Secretary of 
State; that a great deal in the way of delegate I s votes 
from the Eastern states depended upon his giving this 
promiseo The Governor then said to me: 'I will not 
bargain far this office. It would be foolish for me 
at this time to decide upon a cabinet officer, and it 
would be outrageous to eliminate anybody from consider-
ation now, particularly Mr . Bryan, who has rendered such 
fine service to the party in all seasons.54 
Wilson had not yet decided upon any one nor had he ruled out any 
one for the post of Secretmy of State in his oabinet. 
53 Baker , EE• cit., III, 347 . 
54 Tumulty, 2£• cit., P• 118. 
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However, after the New York block went to Clark Mccombs 
gave up. McCombs says that Wilson phoned him and begged him to 
withdraw his name as a candidate to which Mccombs replied, "You 
(Wilson) bet your life I won 't. 11 55 Both Tumulty and Daniels56 
agree that Mccombs made no such statement: 
I CfumultyJ afterward learned that Mccombs ~as about 
to release the delegates when Roger Sullivan,5t who had 
been informed of Mccombs' message to the New Jersey 
Governor, rushed over to Mccombs and said to him, 'Damn 
you, don't you do that . Sit steady in the boat. 159 
With the grant of votes to Clark there was still no stampede as 
was expected, but the result of the ballot showed that Clark had 
eleven more votes than a majority. However, Wilson 's lines held 
firm and he lost only two votes from the former ballot. The vote 






Kern 1 59 Brya1 1 
55 McCornbs, ~· cit., P• 144. 
56 Danmels, ££· cit., P• 60. 
57 Sullivan had discovered that McCombs was ready to with-
draw Wilson's name from the c onvention. McCombs stated the exact 
opposite in that he was t he one -who urged Sullivan on. Mccombs, 
,£E• cit., P• 157. 
5B Tumulty, .£E• cit., P• 121. Sullivan had also told Wilson 
after the Jackson Day Dinner that the Governor could count on his, 
Sullivan, support. 
59 
Baker, ,£E• cit., III, 349. 
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This was the last serious effort by Clark. Willson had been gaining 
on him all along and final]y passed him. 
When he CBryan) threw his tremendous influence to Wilson, 
the struggle was over. Indiana jumped to Wilson, then 
Illinois, and the fight was won. Wilson received the 
necesi§.I'Y two-thirds vote and was proclaimed the candi-
date. O 
In retrospect we must keep in mind that House was the man who 
took major credit in making Woodrow Wilson President. House's 
activities during the convention are best summed up by Daniels 
saying: 
••• House went to Texas, 61 and contributed three 
hundred dollars to the Wilson campaign. He afterwards 
put himself at Wilson's service and made contacts that 
he thought would help him. But he did not control a 
delegate to the Baltimore Convention. 
After Wilson lost most of the states in the primaries 
in the spring of 1912, House gave up, and was in Europe62 
when the critical fight was on at Balti more. Before sail-
ing he wrote to Senator Culberson (}'ray 1, 1912,): 'It 
looks to me as if the opposing candidates might again be 
Bryan arrl Roosevelt', and wrote Wilson, 'the fight seems 
to be going against us•, adding, 'I shall not abate my 
efforts•, though he was abandoning the ship, leaving the 
country while the contest called for the presence of all 
Wilson supporters at Baltimore, where the fight was won 
over great odds by those on the ground. House came back 63 in time to aid in a behind-the-scene way in the campaign. 
60 Tumulty, ~- cit., p . 122. Wilson was proclaimed candi-
date on Tuesday morning, June 28, 1912. 
61 House arrived in Texas shortly before the Baltimore 
Convention. 
62 House explained his cause for leaving was due to ill-
health. 
63 6 Daniels,~• cit., P• 7 • 
To refute the convictions of such men as House, Page and 
Mccombs who were so apparently convinced that Bryan was working 
devious methods in the convention to obtain his own nomination, 
the Commoner recorded: 
1 This may be the year for a Democrat to win. The 
other boys have been making their plans. I would not 
step in now.' And he went to Baltimore with only the 
future of 'the other boys' in his mind.64 
From the day Bryan started his fight against Parker, he had one 
dominating purpose and that was to make the Democratic Party 
thoroughly progressive, both in candidates as well as its plat-
form. He would never have swung his support to Wilson if Wilson 
had listened to McCombs. It was Bryan's conviction that Wilson 
was truly progressive and courageous that attracted the Commoner 
and finally made Wilson's nomination possible. Bryan believed 
that he, himself, could be elected except for his stand on pro-
hibition which could possibly beat him and the party. Daniels 
concludes: " • • • I did not doubt that Bryan • • • had given up 
ambition for the presidency and would not permit the use of his 
name at the Baltimore Convention. 1165 
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Since the actual election of Woodrow Wilson is not pertinent 
to this study, for Bryan had little to do with the actual campaign-
ing, let it suffice to say that Wilson won the election by an 
64 Bryan, EE• cit., p. 335. 
65 Daniels,~• cit ., P• 33. 
overwhelming majority over Roosevelt and Taf't . Wilson got 442 
electoral votes out of 531 with Roosevelt receiving 77, and Taf't, 
12. Wilson's popular plurality was up to that time the greatest 
in American history. The total vote was 14,720,037. Wilson 
received a total of 6,292,718 votes, Roosevelt, 4,057,429, and 
66 Taf't, 3,369,221. 
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The first problem to face the president-elect was to make 
up his cabinet. Probably the greatest problem was that of finding 
a post for Bryan. It was through the powerful support of Bryan that 
Wilson secured the nomination, and yet, Wilson did not agree in all 
respects with Bryan. It was through House that Wilson appointed 
Bryan Secretary of State . House stated that Wilson had accepted 
his argument that 11 i t would be best to make him Q3ryan) Secretary 
of State, in order to have him at Washington and in harmony with the 
Administration, rather than outside and possib]y in a critical 
67 attitude . 11 House continued to say that Wilson did not want Bryan 
in his cabinet and did not think him fitted for the Secretaryship of 
State . However, there was no question but that the new administra-
tion could carry through its service, its reform programme more 
effective]y with Bryan in it . House records on December 19, 1912: 
66 
Mccombs, ~ - cit . , p. 206. 
67 Seymour, _££ . cit . , I, 68. 
I Qfouse) called up Governor Wilson to talk things 
over, and he asked if I still held to my advice about 
Mr . Bryan, and I answered 1yes 1 • This is the third or 
fourth time he has asked me this. It shows how di9 -
trustful he is of having Mr . Bryan in his cabinet.b8 
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There is little question but that House suggested Bryan for 
Secretary of State far the primary reason of getting him out of the 
way . House had long mourned over the fact that Bryan could not be 
advised. Thus, he could not hope to control Bryan. On the other 
hand if Bryan were on the outside he might stir up opposition which 
might stop the plans of Wilson as well as House. House had early 
made his plans to secure power by advising the President . He would 
be able to work around the Secretary of State! 
It also appears that House perhaps was stretching the truth 
concerning Wilson's convictions on Bryan as Secretary of State . There 
is no doubt that they were not completely in accord. Tumulty states 
that Wilson told him he would not keep Bryan out of his cabinet to 
secure his nomination at Baltimore . Furthe1"more, Wilson had several 
good 11 outs 11 if he had wanted to take them. Bryan himself did nothing 
to further his int erests. He even advised Wilson through the 
Commoner to avoid appointments based on past service: 
The men selected by Mr. Wilson far the Cabinet should 
be selected, not because of personal service rendered to 
him, nor even because of past service rendered to the 
party. The individual counts for little; the cause counts 
for much . 69 
68 
Ibid . , p . 98 . Also note Baker , ,£E• cit., III, 437-43. 
69 Baker, .9£• cit . , III, 441. 
Finally, Bryan I s acceptance was conditional in that Wilson would 
make the Bryan treaties an integral part of the foreign policy • 
.After reading a draft of the proposed treaties of Bryan, Wilson 
found they were in accorq with his own views and approved them. 
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It was a natural thing for Bryan to be ask~d into the Wilson 
administration for Wilson hoped to create a situation looking toward 
peace and progressive domestic policies. Bryan's devotion to peace 
was lmown by all. Daniels concludes that: 
If he Wilson had not known Bryan was sound and in 'sympathy 
with him on foreign policies looking toward world peace, 
on the tariff, and on currency reform, he would not have 
made the tender. And Bryan would not have accepted it if 
he had not felt that his mind and Wilson 's ran together 
on the main policies •••• 70 
Two other appointments, McAdoo and Daniels, seem to have been 
determined in Wilson's mind before he left for Bermuda, although he 
had not decided regarding the posts they should fill. Wilson conferred 
with Bryan on December 21, 1912, about his intention to bring McAdoo 
into his cabinet, probably in the treasury. There were several other 
outstanding candidates for the treasury, notably McCombs and Henry 
Morgenthau. On the evening of the election McCombs remarked 11If I 
cannot be Secretary of the Treasury I wi 11 take nothing. 1171 However, 
Wilson thought Mccombs unfit both tempermentally and physically for 
a cabinet position. Morgenthau was later made .Ambassador to Turkey. 
70 Daniels, ~• cit., pp. 113-ll4. 
71 Baker, ~• cit., III, 443-44. 
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Josephus Daniels was much harder to place. He had made a 
definite contribution in Wilson's election and had been a God-send 
in the 11 cocked- hat incident". Finally on February 23, 1913, he was 
asked to serve as Secretary of the Navy. When Page learned of 
Daniels appointment he was astonished. 
1Wby, don't you think he is cabinet timber?' asked 
House . 
1 Timber! 1 exclaimed Page. 1 He isn I t, a splinter! 1 72 
Walter Hines Page was considered as a possibility for Wilson 1s 
Cabinet,73 but did not receive a pest. After Wilson was elected 
President, it was generally thought that Page would be asked to be 
in the Cabinet. He was, perhaps, best qualified for the post of 
Secretary of Agriculture . However, he himself, suggested that 
David Houston would be the man best qualified for the position. 
Possibly another reason Page suggested Hous +on was that he, Page, 
72 Ibid., III, 445-46. 
73 The entire Cabinet was as follows: 
Secretary of State 
Secretary of Treasury 
Secretary of War 
Attorney General 
Postmaster General 
Secretary of Navy 
Secretary of Interior 
Secretary of Agriculture 
Secretary of Commerce 
Secretary of Labor 
William Jennings Bryan 
William Gibbs McAdoo 
Lindley M. Garrison 
J.C. McReynolds 
Albert S. Burleson 
Josephus Daniels 
Franklin K. Lane 
David F. Houston 
William C. Redfield 
William B. Wilson 
Not e Daniels, ££• cit., pp . 115-17,; Hendrick, ~ • cit., I, 114-15;· 
Seymour, .QE• cit . , I, 76; and Baker, ~• cit., III, 449 . 
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detested office seekers and did not want to become one himself. Wilson 
still wanted him in his Cabinet and decided Page should become the 
Secretary of Interior. Page did not assume this position primarily 
because he was in North Carolina when the important positions were 
being filled. In between the time Wilson asked House to contact Page 
for the position and the arrival of Page, certain opposition arose 
which possibly convinced Wilson himself that it would be a mistake to 
give Page the appointment. According to Mr. Hendrick, there were 
objections against Page. 
Page was a Southerner; the Interior Department has super-
vision over the pension bureau, with its hundreds of 
thousands of Civil War veterans as pensioners; moreover, 
Page was an outspoken enenzy- of the whole pension system 
and had led several •~1;111Paigns' against it. The appointment 
would never do1 ••• , 
Although Page did not receive a cabinet post, he was made 
Ambassador to England. This was a very import ant appointment due 
to the outbreak of war in Europe. 75 
Comment on Wilson I s Cabinet was generally favorable. Frank 
Cobb pointed out in the New York World on March 4, 1913, the follow-
ing: 
Whether strong or weak in its various elements, this 
is no cabinet of political trade and barter. It was 
74 Hendirek, ~· cit., I, 119. 
75 Page's work in England is considered in Chapters III and 
IV of this thesis. 
fashioned by no political boss . It was fashioned to 
placate neither sordid political interest nor sordid 
financial interests. Every member stands on~gis own 
merits, as Woodrow Wilson sees these merits .f 
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In retrospect it appears th at the Cabinet of Woodrow Wilson 
was ill-chosen, if not in ability, at least by methods. Bryan was 
not an especially good appointment as Secreta:ry of State. The 
Commoner probably stood the test on domestic issues, but he was 
ill-informed on foreign proble:m.s. Bryan did not push Wilson for 
the position, and in fact, as we have seen, urged Wilson not to 
appoint anyone because he felt he owed the position due to a 
political favor. McAdoo was given the Treasury Post probably 
because Wilson lmew him best. Houston was probably best fitted 
for the Treasury Post but instead received the office of Secretary 
of Agriculture. Daniels had no qualifications far the office of 
Secretary of Navy and if qualified for any Cabinet position, it 
would be the post of Secretary of Agriculture. Garrison clearly 
informed Wilson that he lmew nothing about the post of Secretary 
of War. Although Wilson could not secure some of tre men he had 
wanted due primarily either to the opposition of House or their 
unavailability, even the Colonel recorded: 
The thing that impresses me most is the casual wey 
in which the President-elect is making up his cabinet. 
I can see no end of trouble for him in the future unless 
76 Baker, op. cit., III, 457-58. Also note Daniels, op . cit., 
P• ll7. 
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he proceeds with more care . 77 
Finally, Wilson did little to acquaint himself w:i.. th his Cabinet 
before their appointments . Rey Stannard Baker, who knew the President 
and later after the war accompanied him to Paris, records: 
With no member of the new cabinet can it be said that 
Wilson was truly intimate . He knew McAdoo, perhaps the 
best personally; Houston was a familiar spirit intellec-
tually . He liked and dreaded Bryan. Daniels was com-
f ortable and dev oted . He knew Garrison and McReynolds 
and Wilson scarcely at all and had never met Lane until 
Inauguration Day . It was a cabinet largely made up of 
unknown and untried men. Bryan was the only member with 
a national reputation : and he was looked upon with 
doubt by a large part of the country. But Wilson's own 
pres tige was s o great, he was so widely trusted, that 
the comment upon his appointments was not unfavorable. 
It was felt that in any event he would himself dominate; 
and th~ temper of the nation was tolerant . 'Wait and 
s ee . 1 71:l 
77 Baker,~• cit . , III, 455 . 
78 Ibid . , PP • 456-57 . 
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CHAPTER III 
SECRET.ARY OF STATE BRYAN BEFORE WORLD WAR I 
Although England presented problems to the American foreign 
policy, the immediate problems that faced Wilson and his Cabinet were 
those of the disturbed conditions in Mexico and the recognition of 
Huerta. Houston records that on Friday and Tuesday-, March 7th and 
11th, 1913, this matter came up before the Cabinet for discussion. 
The President read a statement1 which opposed the illegal practice 
of Huerta I s Goverrmert.t ,. About this statement Houston remarked: 11 This 
interested me at the time particularly because it clearly indicated that 
the President was going to be his own Secretary of State ••• ~2 
Again on Mclf 23, 1913, the problem, uglier than ever, loomed up 
in the Cabinet. Wilson and Bryan were firmly convinced that it would be 
wrong from every consideration to recognize the usurper. They were 
confident that the masses of Mexicans were opposed to Huerta. Garri-
son saw no other way except recognition, and Lane 
who had been in Mexico and thought he knew most about it, 
felt if Huerta were not recognized Wilson should back some 
other Mexican for President •••• 3 
1 This statement read by Wilson probably formed the back 
ground of his message to Congress, August 27, 1913. Note Appendix 
B for the full message. 
2 David F . Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1926), I, 43. 
3 Daniels,~• cit., p . 182. 
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Daniels held a like view. Houston emphatically opposed recognition 
as innnoral . The President after studying the problem stated: "I have 
to pause and remind myself that I am President of the United States 
and not of a small group of Americans with vested interests in Mexico.114 
To those who urged recognition of Huerta, Bryan replied: 
'You believe, do you, that Diaz was the kind of man needed 
to preserve order in Mexico?' They always answered, ' Yes.' 
'Do you think that Huerta would imitate the methods and 
reestablish his regime?' 
'Yes . 1 
, 1 If, after thirty years of experiment with his policy , 
Diaz, with world-wide prestige and splendid credit, could 
not maintain himself against Madero, but saw his Govern-
ment crushed like an eggshell, what reason have y ou to 
believe that Huerta, not only without prestige and credit, 
but guilty of high treason and blamed fof the death of 
Madero, will be able to succeed where Diaz failed?' 
No answer was attempted. 5 
Since the majority of the Cabinet was against recognition, it 
was agreed that Bryan should sound the English and French .Ambassadors, 
to see if their governments were behind a loan to Huerta and to warn 
them that they could not enforce a loan guaranteed by a pledge of 
customs duties . 6 The policy of the United States was set down on March 
4 Ibid., P• 182. 
oil interests in Mexico . 
page 43 . 
Presumably Wilson meant the control of the 
For further evidence on this subject see 
S Bryan, ~• cit . , P• 358 . 
6 Houston feared that if the United States recognized Huert~, 
it would make the United States indirectly responsible for a foreign 
loan which would than fasten the General upon the Mexican people. 
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12, 1913, in a statement by the President. It was decided in late 
May to f ollow this policy. The policy as stated by Wilson in full 
was as follows : 
One of the chief objects of my administration will be 
to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of 
our sister republics in Central and South America, and to 
promote in every proper and honorable way the interests 
which are common to the peoples of the two continents. I 
earnestly desire the most cordial understanding and co-
operation between the peoples and leaders of America, and 
therefore, deem it my duty to make this brief statement: 
Cooperation is possible only when supported at every 
turn by the order]y processes of just government based upon 
law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold, as I 
am sure all thoughtful leaders of republican governments 
everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon 
t ~e consemt of the governed, and that there can be no 
freedom without order based upon law and upon the public 
conscience and approval. We shall look to make these 
principles the bases of mutual intercourse, respect, and 
helpfulness between our sister republics and ourselves • 
• • • We can have no sympathy with t hose who seek to 
seize the power of government to advance their own personal 
interests or ambition . t 
Two forces primarily formulated the President's Mexican policy: one, 
that all nations have the right to control their internal affairs; 
two, that Mexico could never become a peaceful nation as well as law 
abiding until she was permitted to achieve a permanent and basic 
settlement of her troubles without outside interference. 
A new Latin American policy was issued by Wilson before the 
Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile, Alabama, October 27, 1913 . 8 
7 Tumulty, _££. cit., p. 145. 
8 This address appears in Appendix C. Also see Woodrow Wilson, 
The New Democracy (New York : Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1926), 
I, 1-21. 
With this speec~ Bryan heartily agreed as is shown in a letter to 
,Wilson on October 28, 1913: 
Your utterance in regard to conquest was timely. We must be 
relieved of suspicion as to our motives. We must be found in 
advance not to turn to our own advantage any power we employ. 
It will be impossible for us to win the confidence of the 
people of Latin America, unless they know that we do not seek 
their territory or ourselves desire to exercise political 
authority over them. If we have occasion to go into arw 
country, it must be as we went into Cuba, at the invitation 
of the Government, or with assurances that will leave no 
doubt as to the temporary character of our intervention. Our 
only object must be to secure to the people an opportunity 
to vote, that they may them~elves select their ruleFs and 
establish their government. 
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The activities of the British as well as Page, the Ambassador to 
England, round out the picture of the Mexican question even further: 
It was clear that, as the United States Government had made 
up their minds to eliminate Huerta, he would have to go . He 
could not stand against th~t influence, as well as against his 
enemies in. Mexico.10 
The Conversations between Grey and Page were ot always very sympathetic. 
Great Britain's policy was to look on passively with acquiescence in 
whatever policy the ~nited States thought fit to pursue in Mexico. 
Page saw an ideal in the Mexican policy of President Wilson. 
I was ready to sympathize with the ideal, and to believe in 
the moral purpose of this policy; but I did not believe that 
9 Bryan, ~• cit., pp. 360-361. 
10 Sir Edward Grey, Twenty Five Years, 1892-1916 (New York: 
Frederick A. Stokes- Company, 1937),----ri, 100. 
morally there was much to choose between Huerta and his 
opponents. That was the difference between us.11 
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The British, according to Grey, had no intention •of interfer-
ing or attempting to influence the situation in Mexico. They would 
merely wait for the Mexicans to settle their own government and then 
make arrangements with that government . Page accepted the assurances 
of the British Government of having not interfered to support Huerta; 
but Page believed that British commercial interests were doing so. 
Grey replied t hat he had no knowledge of these interests doing so. 
Further.truD.r.e~ - Grey stated that since the British Government could not 
interfere with the Mexican problem, it was only fair for t hese interests 
to make whatever terms they could with whoever could protect them or 
might destroy them. 
Page also disagreed violently with Wilson, for the President 
believed the constitutionalists would and ould be trusted to handle 
the Government of Mexico. Page's imperialism can be sho'Wll by the 
following letter to House on April 27, 1914: 
And, as for war with Mexico -- I confess I 've no 
confidence in the Mexican leaders -- none of 'em. We 
shall have to Cuba-ize the country, -which means thrashing 
'em first •••• All England believes we've got to fight 
it out.12 
The President and Bryan were pretty well persuaded that the 
oil concessionaries were dictating British-Mexican policy. Page's 
ll Ibid., II, 100. 
12 . Hendrick, op. cit., I, 230. 
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letters, such as the following, no doubt contributed greatly to this 
feeling: 
Deep down at the bottom, they (jhe Britis~) don't lmow what 
Democracy means. Their Empire is in the way. Their centuries 
of landstealing are in the wey. Their unsleeping watchfulness 
of British commerce is in the way.13 
The appointment of Sir Lionel Carden14 as British minister seemed to 
uphold their convictions. The attitude of the Cabinet was very bitter 
towards Great Britain for it appeared that Great Britain was determined 
to seat Huerta against the wishes of the United States . Secretary Lane 
wrote Page, 11There is a feeling here • • • that England is playing a 
game unworthy of her. 1115 
Although Carden was co~elled by the British Government to 
harmonize himself with American policy, Page still felt that his 
presence in Mexico was a menace to British-American relations. He 
therefore set himself to accomplish the Mi ister's removal, Sir Edward 
Grey, like Page, would sacrifice much for the cause of Anglo-.Amerigan 
relations. Page occasionally expressed to Grey his regret that Carden 
did not understand the situation between the United States and Mexico . 
13 Ibid., I, 211. 
l4 Page wrote of Carden in November, 1913, 11He's a slow-
minded, unimaginative, commercial Briton., with as much nimbleness 
as an elephant. British commerce is his deity., British advantage 
his duty and mission; and he g-oes about his work with blunt dullness 
and ineptitude. That's his mental calibre as I read him -- a dull 
c0mmercial man. 11 Note Hendrick, ~• cit • ., I, 215. 
15 Ibid., I, 220. 
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He· left the impression that the problem could better llr.e solved if a 
more congenial person represented British interests in Mexico. This 
evidently produced results for in early January, 1914, Page learned 
that Carden was being recalled to London and probab]y would not return 
to Mexico. 
Secretary of State Bryan was f or the most part ignorant of 
British sentiment as well as the sentiments of Page. The memoranda of 
Pag~ went thro~gh House and then to Wilson. House enlightened many on 
the method of communication in a letter to Page on December 12, 1913: 
Of course you knew that I only read your letters to him 
C}lilson). Mr. Bryan was my guest on Wednesday and I returned 
to Washington with him but I made no mention of our correspond-
ence and I ~ -have. The President' ~ to likl; way of 
doing things and further than that I do not care~l6 
Mexican-American relations were further entangled when the 
11 Tampico incident" took place. On April 9, 1914, a paymaster of t he 
United States steamship Dolphin landed at the Iturbide bridge at 
Tampico with a whaleboat and boat I s crew to obtain supplies needed 
aboard the Dolphin. While loading these supplies the paymaster and 
his crew were arrested by an officer and squad of the arnw of General 
Huerta. Neither the paymaster nor any of the crew were armed. Two of 
the men were arrested while in the boat and hence were t aken from United 
States "soil". Release was ordered, after the paymaster and the sailors 
16 Ibid., I, 19. The underlining is my own to show that Page 
and House werelinked together. The statement shows no outright and 
apparent approval of Wilson. 
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had been detained about an hour, by Admiral Meyo commander of the 
American fleet in Mexican waters. Furthermore, Mayo sent an ultimatum 
to General Zaragoya. Before the ultimatum had been sent Zaragoya had 
said that the Colonel who had ordered the arrest lrnew nothing of the 
laws of war and only carried out his orders to allow no boats whatever 
at the warehouse dock. However, Mayo wanted a more formal apology and 
a disavowal of the act, together with as surances that the officer in 
charge would be punished. He also demanded a twenty-one gun salute be 
given the .American flag which would be returned by .American guns. 
Huerta replied that the officer in charge would be punished, if he 
were found. Huerta also asked that the ultimatum be withdrawn. 
Bryan was not satisfied with t he reply of Huerta. He insisted 
the demands be ITBt but extended the time to .April 13. However, Huerta 
would not be moved . Wilson, Bryan, and Daniels all agreed that Mayo 
must be backed or Huerta's position would be strengthened. To further 
complicate the situation, it was learned by the United States Govern-
ment t hat the German ship, Ypiranga,17 was on its wey to Veracruz with 
arms for Huerta. 
Bryan was the first to recommend to Wilson that the Ypiranga be 
stopped. Daniels also agreed. A note was prepared and sent to Admiral 
Fletcher, Commander of the fleet near Vera Cruz, although Admiral Badger 
was actually sent into Vera Cruz: 
17 The Ypiranga was to arrive on April 21, 1914, with 200 
machine guna and 15,000,000 cartridges. 
Fletcher, 
Vera Cruz, Mexico. 
Washington, D.C. 
April 21, 1914. 
Seize custom house. Do not permit war supplies to be 
delivered to Huerta government or to any other party. 
Daniels.18 
The customs houses were taken while the Ypiranga was stopped from 
unloading its cargo. The clash that ensued resulted in the death 
of 126 and the wounding of 195 Mexicans while 19 Americans were 
killed and 71 wounded. The trouble was not settled among Mexico 
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and themselves for there was still civil war between Carranza, Villa, 
and Zjapata; but Wilson did not want to i ntervene. To conclude the 
Mexican incident Tumulty said: 
Wilson, Bryan, and Daniels are pacifists no longer, 19 
but plain, simple men, bent upon dischargi ng the duty they 
owe to their country and utterly disregarding their own 
personal feelings of antagonism to every phase of war . 20 
18 Daniels,££• cit., p . 193. 
19 Although Bryan let his nationalist .feelings get away with 
him, he still wanted no bloodshed. Earlier he had declared : 
11 ••• on February 3, 1914, the embargo on arms and munitions 
was withdrawn in order that Huerta's enemies might be better enabled 
' to put him down. Bryan, it is true, objected to t his in a very 
pointed memorandum, in which he clearly demonstrated t hat by sending 
arms into Mexico we invited further bloodshed, increased t he risk 
to .Americans residing there, and thus paved the way for our inter-
vention. But he did not insist, and our munitions went to Mexico." 
Note Curti, ~• cit., XVI, 212. 
20 Tumulty, 91?.• cit ., p. 152. 
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During the Mexican crises, the administration had to solve the 
question of the Panama tolls. The issue over the exemption of tolls 
between the United States and England dates back at least to the Hey--
Pauncefote Treaty in 1901. By this treaty all nations were to be 
treated equally on the basis of tolls. However, the United States 
announced the interpretation that since it was up to her to build the 
canal, fortify and protect it, she should be exempted from tolls for 
coastwise shipping . This exemption would aid did, of course, give 
the American shippers a great advantage . British ships could not 
engage in coastwise trade • .Anything which affected Br itish shipping 
adversely touched Great Britain in a sensitive sp9t. Page early in 
his career as Ambassador noted the British feeling concerning this 
problem. Page wrote to Wilson in June, 1913: 11 ••• The English 
Government and the English people without r egard to party - - I hear it 
and feel it everywhere -- are in one mind about this: they think we 
have acted dishonorably . 1121 Page went on to state that this problem 
was one of the reasons why England distrusted American foreign policy . 
Wilson took little notice of Page's analysis for he was engrossed i n 
the Mex:i.c an question. .Although Wilson did nothing openly on t he 
Panama Tolls, one t hing was certain: 
Wilson believed that exemption of tolls was in violation 
of a treaty we had made an:l t hat we were in honor bound 
21 D · 1 ·t 209 anie s, op. ci ., P• • 
to live up to our contract. He felt this so strongly 
that he declined to be bound by the declaration in the 
platform of the Convention22 which nominated him •••• 23 
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The British had recognized Huerta as a de facto government. Wilson 
had changed .American policy and had refused this type of recognition . 
Suddenly, the British reversed their policy toward recognition of 
Huerta. Many people felt that the act taken by Britian was done be-
cause it was believed Wilson could not win a fight to repeal the toll 
provision if Britain continued recognition of Huerta. Daniels be-
lieved that Page possibly influenced Grey in that direction. Another 
possibility was tbe British influence on Bryan to favor the Canal 
Tolls Exemption Act, for his influence was bound to be important in 
the question of its repeal. 
Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British ambassador in Washing-
ton, was not slow to see that Bryan 's pet treaty (the 
cooling-off treaties) might be used s a lever to win his 
support for t he repeal of the Tolls Exemption Act. Speaking 
of the .American secretary of state's p~efound and haunting 
desire to get his treaties consumated, the British ambassador 
counselled his government: 'If you want to gain him (for a 
time ), help them on, and you will have your reward. 1 On 
February 17, Spring-Rice went even further in urging London 
to exploit the connection between the peace treaties and the 
canal tolls affair. Although he had no great faith in the 
22 Houston records t hat Bryan was opposed to repeal of the 
tolls provision . Note Houston, £E• cit., I, 113. Bryan was a 
great believer in following what had been promised in the platform. 
He also felt the big int erest who controlled the Panama Railway 
favored its repeal for financial reasons of their own. 
23 Daniels, ~• cit., P• 209 . 
value of the Bryan treaty, he continued to advise his 
government to begin negotiations. In London, Page, our 
ambassador, likewise reminded Grey as frequently as he 
thought it ccrurteous of Bryan I s eagerness to have such 
a treaty with England.24 
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By the end of March, 1914, Bryan was thought to have changed his 
position. On March 28, he was q'\,Ioted in Congress as favoring repeal. 
On March 31 the House rep le aled the act and the Senate of June 11 like-
wise did so. Bryan's influence in the repeal was felt. Thus the 
Bryan "cooling-off" treaties for the promotion of world peace might 
possibly have been used by England as a diplomatic pawn to secure 
trade advantages. 
Wilson possibly did not make a deal with my foreign power 
during the Panama Tolls controversy. The fa.ct remains that there was 
a close tie-up, at least on the part of the British, between tolls 
exemption, the Mexican question, an the Bryan treaties. There is 
one other possibility that might have occur~ed to Wilson concerning 
tolls. Wilson was preparing to send House to Europe in an appeal to 
get all of the big powers to outlaw war. This plan was not related 
to the Bryan treaties. Repeal of the canal tolls could have been 
preliminary action on the part of Wilson. Be that as it may, the British 
renounced recognition of Huerta in Noveinbler, 1913, and the canal tolls 
repeal bill was introduced January 4, 1914. The United States did not 
vote repeal until Britain had withdrawn support from Huerta. The 
actual repeal law did not p.ass until June 11, 1914. 
24 Merle Eugene Cui:ti, Bryan and World Peace (Northhampton, Mass .: 
Smith College, 1913), XVI, 158 0-- -- -- --
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The British were greatly relieved to see the repe al pass. Sir 
Edward Grey noted: 
President Wilson's decision in this matter of the Panama 
tolls was an independent arrl unqualified example of putting 
the sanctity of a treaty above immediate self-interest. /w 
such it was noted at the tiroo and ought still to be remembered. 25 
Although Bryan had not been in comple te accord with Wilson on the 
tolls controversy, he was in complete accord with Wilson in repudiating 
11dollar diplomacy". In October, 1913, Wilson made a speech repudiating 
"dollar diplomacy"·, and Bryan listened with a smile on his face and 
nodded approval as tre President read. The Commoner quickly acted by 
sending a representative of an American corporation to Ecuador who was 
more impartial than the man he ·replaced. Honduras was also gratified 
by the administration's refusal to support a loan which would have bound 
her boszy and soul. The Commorer also brought to the President I s 
attention the exploitation of our southern neighbors by .American 
bankers. It did not take t he Secre)ary of State long to see through 
the banker's practice of lending money .f or large securities and high 
interest rates, and then demanding that their government eliminate 
the risk they had assumed by backing them in emergencies. Bryan saw 
that on t he one hand the Lat.in American states needed our money for 
internal development, an:l that, failing to get it from us, they would 
turn to Europe . That might involve United States' intervention to 
' 
def end the Monroe Doctrine as had occurred in the past . On the other 
26 Grey,~• cit., II, 97. 
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hand, it did not seem fair for our bankers to charge such high rates. 
In the summer of 1913 Bryan hit upon a plan that he thought would 
meet the problem. He suggested that the United States Government itself 
step in and lend the money. He conferred with the President about his 
plan and in July forwarded to him a memorandum as to its chief advantages. 
In this he stated: 
They (the Latin .American republics] are now compelled to 
pay a high rate of interest and to sell their bonds at a 
discount •••• If the United States offers to loan them its 
credit to the extent that such a loan is safe, the bonds 
could be made to draw four and a half per cent., which would 
be an immediate savings to them in the way of interest and 
the difference of a (per) cent. and a half between their bonds 
and ours could go into a sinking fund which would, in a reason-
able time at compound interest, pay off the debt and le ave them 
free. We could, in this way, relieve them of the de]:Jts which 
erihm-ass them, and enable them to construct such railroads as 
are imperatively necessary for tre development of their 
countries. 
The second advantage would be t hat the plan would give our 
country such an increased influence ••• that we could pre-
vent revolutions, promote education, and advance stable and 
just government •••• 
• • • we would in the end profit, negatively, by not having 
to incur expense in guarding our own and other foreign inter-
ests there, and, positively, by the increase of trade that 
would come from development and from the friendshi~~which 
would follow the conferring of the benefits named . f 
Br yan thought by his plan the United States could furnish the 
modern expmple of the 11Good Samaritan". He proposed to try out the 
plan in Ecuador, Nicaragua., and finally in early 1914, in Panama. 
2-, Baker,~• cit., IV, 433-340 
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Wilson lis t,.ened, but was very dubious • On March 20, 1914, he wrote 
Bryan: 
Frankly, I am afraid to propose that we directly assist 
the Panama Government in their loan by giving them the use 
of the credit of the United States, because so maey matters 
of difficulty and aelicacy are pending that I feel that this 
is not the right time to inject something that would have to 
be a long time c<anvassed and would strike the whole country, 
I am afraid, as a novel and radical proposal. I think that 
for the present there are enough difficult questions on the 
carpet, particularly with regard to our foreign relations, 
but I am heartily in favor of assisting Panama in my way that 
is possible in the matter of her loan, and I have arery con-
fidence because of your past admirable management of these 
things that we can secure for her much more favorable condi-
tions than she could otherwise secure for herself.28 
Something had to be done about the situation in Nicaragua. 
The country was in a state of crisis both politically and financially. 
There had been a fierce revolution in 1912 against the conservative 
I 
President Adolfo Diaz of Nicaragua with whom both the bankers and the 
United States Government had been worki g toward economic stabiliza-
., 
tion. The opposition t0 Diaz was sharpened by his favorable attitude 
toward .American business and American capital. President Taft had 
interfered in the revolution by sending eight warships and a consider-
I 
able body of marines to aid Diaz in keeping his power. The revolution 
had left the country almost bankrupt and desperately in need of new 
funds • .American bankers expressed their willingness, in the last 
months of Taft 1 s regime, to supply the money to Nicaragua but on 
I 
terms that even Diaz regarded as too severe. 
28 Ib1.·d., IV 434 , . 
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Thus, Wilson came into office in a situation of distrust. The 
bankers were suspicious of the new administration, and a strong minority 
of the Senate was suspicious of the bankers. 
Just before Wilson was inaugurated, the .American minister in 
Nicaragua reported that Brown Brothers, one of the two New York banking 
firms most active in Nicaraguan affairs, would not invest another dollar 
until they had become certain of the new administration's policy. This 
I was disappointing to Diaz who wanted to reach a definite settlement on 
the financial question while the old administration was in office. 29 
The attitude of the Democrats in the Senate was one of opposing 
the Knox-Castrillo treaty30 because they thought it provided a basis 
for our interfering in Nicaraguan affairs. 
It became plain that mere opposition to the bankers was not 
enough for the goverrurent had already become deeply involved. There 
had to be a decision on the next step to be taken. Wilson believed 
that the bankers might be influenced to gr ant easier terms. Bryan 
tried it but without success. 
The Commoner began considering another way out of the diffi-
culty. As he saw it, Nicaragua could be refinanced, at least partially, 
and on the other hand, the United States could serve a far-sighted 
29 Note Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913, ~• cit., 
P• 1035. 
30 The treaty of June, 1911,_provided for a new $15,000,000 
loan on terms so severe that the United States Senate had refused to 
approve it despite Taft's constant urging for its passage. 
interest. This was through the purchase of the canal r oute across 
.Nicaragua. On Mey 24th, he wrote Wilson: 
I am inclined to think that the purchase of the canal 
option might give suffici ent encouragement t> the bankers 
to loan without the conditions -which were, at their request, 
put into the other (Knox-Castrillo) treaty in regard to a 
loan.31 
A canal treaty was before the Senate, having been signed on 
February 8, 1913. This was revised and approved by Wilson: 
The proposed Nicaraguan treaty has my entir e approval 
and I sincerely hope that the Senate may approve it, as 
well as our friends, the Nicaraguan Government. I have 
read it very carefully.32 
When the treaty was laid before the Senate Committee 0n Foreign 
Relations, a strong minority opposed the clause providing for a 
protectorate similar in its ternw to the Platt amendment in the 
Cuban treaty. The Senate was against any extension of United 
States authority over these countries. 
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Central American states feared this might be another advance 
upon them by the 11Giant of the North" . El Salvador even proposed a 
united action by a league of Central .American nations. Wilson agr eed 
with Bryan that steps had to be taken to quiet the fears of these 
countries that a protectorat e was being consi dered. In a letter of 
September 25, 1913, he approved of the United States Minister's 
explanation and added: "They can, I think, convey conclusive 
31 Baker, op.~., IV, 436. 
32 Ibid., IV, 436. 
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assurances that no protectorate is contemplated. 1133 In any event 
it became clear that tre treaty in the form presented to the Senate 
would not pass during the special session. Yet something had to be 
done. 
Bryan then went back to his proposal for a government loan 
to Nicaragua, arguing that the sum could later be applieq upon the 
pa;vment fo:r_- the canal option and joint naval base which the United 
States had hopes of obtaining. 
Bryan continued in a letter to Wilson on August 16, 1913: 
••• it is pathetic to see Nicaragua struggling in 
the grip of oppressive financial agreement ••• we see 
these transactions a perfect picture of dollar diplomacy. 
The financiers charge excessive rates on the ground that 
they must be paid for the risk that they take and as soon 
as they collect their pay for the risk they then proceed 
to d,emand of the respective governments that the risk shall 
be eliminated by governmental coercion. No wonder the 
people of these little republics are aroused to revolution 
by what they regard as a sacrifice of their interests.3 
Since Bryan was unable to make progress on this plan, he was 
finally driven back to the bankers. In October, 19l3, a loan was 
arranged, stiff in its terms, and not completely pleasing to Bryan, 
but acceptable to the government of Nicaragua because of its needs. 
I 
Pres~dent Diaz who, of course, was more or less the creature 
of the United States government, sent his 'heartfelt thanks' 
to Bryan f or his 'beneficient and efficient cooperation' in 
the arr §Ilging of the new loan. The Assembly also approved 
of it.3~ 
33 Ibid., IV, 437. 
34 Ibid., Iw, 438. 
35 Ibid. 
57 
It is significant to note the forces existing and determining 
the foreign policies of states that drove both Bryan and Wilson, al-
though strongly opposing anything that approached dollar diplomacy, 
into a situation that did not differ greatly, especially in the case 
of Nicaragua, from actions of Taft and Knox. There were some modifi-
cations in the loan arrangement, as a special adviser was to be 
appointed by the State Department to see that the provisions of the 
loan were adhered to. 
It should be the function of this watcher 1to keep the 
administration informed of the manner in which the busi-
rm.ss is conducted so that we would be in a position to 
advise against aeything that would be to the injury of 
Nicaragua and muld also be in a position to advise the 
government in favgur of the .American Company whenever its 
claim was just. 1 3 
It is interesting to note that the salary of the special adviser was 
to be paid by Brown BFothersl 
It appears that Wilson, in the beginning at least, left the 
conduct of Latin American and Caribbean affairs except for Mexico 
and the Panama Tolls problem -- largely to Bryan. Wilson was con-
sulted but did not give these problems his full consideration. On 
January 20, 1914, Wilson wrote Bryan: 
••• I would be interested to know how much of the 
talk in the newspapers recently has been founded in 
fact. It is true that Nicaragua's neighbors have been 
showing themselves to be very much upset by these pro-
posals ahd that they have made anything like a joint 
36 Ibid., IV, 438-39. 
protest against them? Just now when we are trying to gai. n 
a certain moral prestige in Central America, I should like 
t o know how you think the pressing of the Nicaraguan treaty 
would affect opinion towards us in the rest of that region.37 
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The new loan arrangements of October served at least temporarily 
to quiet the situation in Nicaragua although the settlement was not 
wholly acceptable to that country. 
Although the Latin American situation posed a difficult problem 
for the Wilson Administration, an even greater problem arose between 
Japan and the United States. In early May , 1913, the Japanese 
Ambassador, Chim.~, delivered a note in which Japan declared the 
California law38 obnoxious, discriminary, unfair, unfriendly, and in 
violation of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation39 ratified on 
February 21, 1911 between the two countries. The Japanese thought 
that our Federal Government should overrule the state law. The 
Japanese further stated: 
It has been suggested that the power to deal with the 
question of alien real estate ownership in the United States 
bel ongs exclusively to the several States. Controlling 
decisions of the courts of the United States might be cited 
in refutation of that suggestion . But it is sufficient to 
ppint out that the United States accepted the first and third 
clauses of Article I of the existing Japanese -American treaty, 
37 Baker, op . cit., IV, 439-40. 
38 The California Legislature forbade the Japanese to own or 
lease land in that state. In short, the Japanese felt they were the 
-ones who were being discriminated against and they were right . National 
pride played an important part in the protest. For the full text of the 
California Law see .Appendix D. 
39 For Articles I and XIV of the Treaty of Commerce and Navi-
gation see .Appendix E. 
as well as Article I of the treaty of 1894, and that she can 
not have given her consent to those stipulations if the power 
to regulate t he question of ownership of real property by aliens 
was reserved exclusively to the States.40 
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There was little doubt that the purpose behind the law concerned the 
Japanese economic ability. There was also little doubt but t hat Cali-
fornia had the power to make land laws affecting natives and aliens. 
It was agreed in the Cabinet that Bryan should talk with 
.Ambassador Chinda to find out how serious the note was. He found 
that the .Ambassador was very serious. Bryan had been told by Wilson 
that the problem might be turned over to the courts. 
The President asked Bryan to go to California to see if he 
could solve the situation. Bryan did not want to go for he saw little 
hope, but in April, 1913, he left to present the administration's 
views to the California Legislature. Wilson t hought that even if 
Bryan's trip failed, it would show Japan t hat the Federal Government 
was trying to help solve the problem. Bryan made a very favorable 
impression on the legislators by showing them that he understood the 
situation and also by not swinging a big club of the Federal Government. 
He sought a method of doing what Californians were set 
on doing, without singling out Japan, which was over-
wrought and whose people were talking militantly. In the 
end, while it did not satisfy the Japanese Government, the 
40 Papers Relating To The Foreign Relation of the United 
States, 1913 (Washington:-United States Government Printing 
Office, 1922), p . 639. 
law that Governor Johnson signed served to keep the dispute 
in diplomatic channels. The gesture of tre Washington 
Government in trying to adjust matterp assuaged the war 
party in Japan and gave cooling time)J.l 
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Bryan also was very diplomatic in handling Chinda while relations were 
quite strained:. 
The .Ambassador arose and said, 'I suppose, Mr. Secretary, 
. this decision is final.' 
The Secretary advanced, extended his hand, and with his 
winning smile said, 'There is nothing final between friends.• 
The .Ambassador was touched, resumed his seat and an 
agreement was reached.'42 ·' 
The situation, somewhat tempered, flared again when on May 13, 
1913, a Joint Commission Board of the Army and Navy reported that it 
favored building up the Arrey and Navy and also having ships sent to 
the Philippines. 43 This action was publicc,i z:ed in the New York papers 
and was taken to counteract the Japan se notes which were becoming more 
and more insistent. Wilson was very angered at the publicity given tha 
board I s action and irnm.ediate]y dissolved the board. Bryan was more 
indignant if possible than the President at the action of the Joint 
board and its publication. 
41 D . 1 anie s, ~• 
refused to incorporate 
federal government, it 
The Webb Act did allow 
for citizenship. Note 
cit., p. 162. u • • • .Al though the legislature 
the most important modifications urged by the 
did, tp.anks to Bryan, make some minor concessions • 11; 
a three year lease of land to aliens ineligible 
Curti, £E.• cit., P• 185. 
42 Bryan, ~• cit., p. 367. 
43 General Wood was the instigator of the action of the board . 
It also included Admiral Fiske and Admiral Dewey. 
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Coupled with the J0int Board's action came the second Japanese 
note on June 6, 1913. The note contended that the courts would not 
satisfactorily settle the land problem in California; that the law 
violated the treaty and was adverse to good relations; that California 
could not confiscate property; that the objection did not rest wholly 
on economic gr0unds; that Japanese were not natu.ralizable; and that 
the situation was mortifying to the Japanese. The Japanese land laws 
forbade any foreigner owning land in Japan. Wilson again replied t hat 
if necessary the matter would be taken to the courts and if the 
Japanese had suffered damage, the United States might make good the 
amount. 
If the Japanese were mortified over the land question, they 
were frantic over the United States' possible action as recommended by 
the Joint Board in the Philippines question. The latter question 
appears to be the one which Japan would have probably have gone to 
war. Again Bryan appe:ars to have been the factor that brought about 
a better understanding for: 
(HeJ acquainted the Japanese Ambassador with the President I s 
feeling about the r ecommendations of the Joint Board and in-
formed him it had hot been approved by the Secretary of the Navy . 
The Japanese Government was thereby assured that the administra-
tion had no thought of war arrl no intention of moving any of its 
ships in the Far East while negotiations for peace were pending . 
This assurance was given so promptly that the Japanese Govern-
ment was ftble to quiet superheated demonstrations in their 
country.4 
44 Ibid., PP• 167-68. 
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The Wilson Administration had to face .another problem in the 
Far East -- a loan to China. On March 9, 1913, members45 of the big 
Margan banking house called on Bryan and raised a question of inter-
national consequence. They wanted to find out if the new administra-
tion would carry out the Taft approval of the Six-Power loan to the 
new Republic of China. Holdover State Department 0fficials sent a 
memorandum to Wilson fav0ring the bankers participation. The money 
was designed to pa.,v the Chinese army and other indebtedness. The 
money was to be disbursed by or under the direction of foreign 
governments. One of the stipulations of those offering to make the 
loan was that if China wished to borrow more money it could be 
borrowed only from those making the loan. A group of .American bankers 
wished to join ino 
Bryan was against the loan because: 
First, ••• it gave the monopoly of this nation's 
interest in China's finances to a small group of American 
bankers to the exclusion of all other Arrerican financiers. 
Second, because it gave to the six groups interested in 
this loan a monopoly of China's financial affairs. Third, 
the security contemplated might interfere seriously with 
the p0litical independence of China. Fourth, it linked our 
country with other countries and deprived it of any independ-
ence in dealing w.i.th China. The A.~erican group, being only 
one of six groups, could not have a controlling voice in 
matters connected with the collection of the loan, and this 
government, being only one of six goverrunents interested 
through representatives, could not have a contr~lling voice 46 in determining methods to be employed in enforcing t he loan. 
45 Mr. S. P. Davidson and Mr. Willard Straight. 
46 Bryan, op. cit., PP• 362-63. 
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McAdoo and Lane both agreed w.i.th Bryan, and Daniels feared that the 
new Republic would be one in name only if it had to begin its existence 
with obligations to a grottp of international bankers. Secretary of 
of Commerce Redfield, however, feared that if the United States failed 
to approve the loan, it would be made by other nations, and America 
would lose in building up a large trade with China. 
Wilson asserted47 that the condition of the loan would 
'touch very nearly the administrative independence of 
China itself' and that the governmental responsibility 
involved 'might conceivably be to the length of forcible 
interference.' He declared participation in the loan to 
be 'obnoxious to the principles upon which the government 
of our people rests.' He concluded by saying that ways 
would be found to promote trade with China, but that we 
would continue to stand for tng Open Door -- 'the only 
door we care to enter.' ••• 4 
Thus, Wilson refused to sanction the loan to Ohina in April, 
1913. Furthermore, the United States followed the lead of Russia 
and recognized the new Republic of China in early May, 1913. Both 
Wilson and Bryan had initiated again a new policy f or the United 
States -- the end of dollar diplomacy, although as will be shown 
later House and Page strongly resisted this policy. Unfortunately, 
even Wilson and Bryan were not able to steer a straight course on this 
point. 
47 The President gave his Chinese Loan statement to the press, 
instead of sending it through the State Department to foreign govern-
ments . At the meeting on March 25, 1913, he viewed this as a mistake~ 
Note Houston,~• cit., I, 4So 
48 Daniels, EE• cit., ppo 226-27. 
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The Wilson Administration had to face domestic issues as well 
as foreign problems. One of the· immediate domestic issues facing 
the Administration was currency reform. Bryan had long been interested 
in currency reform. The Commoner recorded: 
I broke with Cleveland on the money question and for 
sixteen years our party platform has comrni tted us to t he 
principle that the issue of money is a function of govern-
ment and should not be surrendered to banks. I am also 
opposed to that feature of the measure which permits the 
bankers to name some members of the Federal Reserve Board. 
They ought all to be appointed by the President and the 
government have both complete and undisputed authority over 
the istue of the government notes and the persoI1Rel of the 
board. 9 
Bryan was in a mood to withdr aw from the Cabinet i f the pro-
visions he opposed were insisted upon. Tumulty, as well as Senator s 
Glass and Owen and Secretary of Treasury McAdoo, were largely respon-
sible in bringing better understanding between Wilson and Bryan. The 
Commoner freely discussed his differences with the President over t he 
Federal Reserve Act , and then asked Tumulty: "Who from Wall Street 
has been discussing this bill with the President? I am afraid t hat 
some of the President 's friends have been emphasizing too much t he 
views 0f Wall Street in their conferences with the President on this 
bill. n:50 However, Wilson assented to not allowing bankers choose 
representatives on the Federal Reserve Board, Bryan said: 1'Y.II' . 
49 Daniels, op. cit., pp. 226-27 
50 Tumulty, ~. cit. , p. 179. Tumulty informed Bryan that only 
McAdoo, Glass and Owen were the President's intimate advisers . 
6.5 
President, we have settled our differences and you may rely upon me 
to remain with you to the end of the fight. u.5l 
Colonel Edward M. House again steps into the picture during 
the currency reform. House is (l1.lot ed by Mr . Seymour as having taken 
a great interest in the currency bill and was the unseen guardian 
angel of the bill. However, House evidently favored the Aldrich 
scheme for a central bank for he wrote to Bryan : 
He (Wilson) is also opposed to the Aldrich plan, but I 
think you are both wrong there. You will have to con-
vert me the next time I see you . I am inclined to think 
that Aldrich is trying to give the country a more reason-
able and stable system.52 
Thus, it appears to the author t hat again Colonel House had 
interjected himself into a situation of glory while again he con-
tributed nothing. The arguments of such men as Tumulty, Owen, 
Daniels, and Glass are too much f or House and his author, Y.tr . Seymour, 
to honestly refute. If House was trying to destroy the confidence 
between Bryan and Wilson in this instance, he failed, for Bryan, 
through his letters, influenced a good many of his political followers 
to vote for the passage of the bill. 
Although the problem of currency reform was always dear to the 
.5l Ibid., p. 181 • 
.52 Baker, ..2£• cit., IV, 142. House was closel~ associated with 
with Mr. Warburg, a sympathizer of the scheme of Aldrich. Note Seymour , 
.2E.• cit., I, 16.5-66. For Glass's account note Carter Glass, .An 
Adventure in Constructive Finance (Garden City, New York: Double-
day, Page &Company, 1927), pp. 1-.57. 
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heart of Bryan, probably the main reason Bryan entered Wilson I s 
Cabinet was to push through his 11 cooling-off 11 treaties. Winston 
Churchill, First Lord of the British Admiralty, had approached 
Germany concerning a naval holiday. However, the Germans were not 
receptive because England would still be twice as strong on the seas. 
The United States also did not receive the proposal favorably. The 
United States favored the policy suggested by Josephus Daniels, Sec-
retary of Navy, who thought that the size of navies could not be 
determined by a council of nations having large navies, and that 
they should agree not upon a holiday but a permanent policy which 
would end naval competition. 
The suggestion met wi. th popular approval in the Cabinet. Bryan 
agreed with the suggestion in principle but had even a greater contri-
bution to add. The Commoner had brought forth a draft of his peace 
treatiesSJ which appears as follows: 
The parties hereto agree that all questions of what-
ever character and nature, in dispute between them, shall, 
when diplomatic efforts fail, be submitted for investi-
gation and report to an international commission (the 
composition to be agreed upon); and the contracting parties 
agree not to declare war or begin hostilities until such 
investigation is made and report submitted. 
The investigation shall be conducted as a matter of course 
upon the initiative of the commission, without the formality 
of a request from either party; the report shall be submitted 
SJ Note page 50 of this chapter for the relation between 
Bryan 11 cooling-off 11 treaties and the Panama Tolls controversy. 
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within (time to be agreed upon) from the date of the sub-
mission of the dispute, but the parties hereto reserve the 
right to act independently on the subject matter in dis-
pute after the report is submitted.54 
The composition of the International Commission was to be agreed upon 
but Bryan suggested: 
1. That the International Commission be of five members, 
to be composed as follows: one member from each of the 
contracting countries, to be chosen by the Government; one 
member to be chosen by each of the contracting countries 
from some other country, and the fifth member of the commiss-
ion to be agreed upon by t he two governments, the commission 
to be appointed as s oon as convenient. after the making of the 
treaty, vacancies to be filled accordi ng to the original 
appointment. 
2. The time also is to be agreed upon, and it is suggested 
that that time be one year. If a year is considered too long 
or too short, this Government will consider either a greater or 
a less period. 
3. This Government is prepared to consider the question 
of maintaining the status quo as to military and naval pre-
paration during this period of i nvestigation, if the con-
tracting nation desires to include this, and this Government 
suggests tentatively that the parties agree that there shall 
be no change in the military and naval program during the 
period of investigation unless danger to one of the contracting 
parties from a third power compels a change in said progr am , in 
which case the party feeling itself menaced by a third power, 
shall confidently communicate the matter in writing to the other 
contracting party and it shall thereupon be released from the 
obligation not to change its military or naval program, and 
this release will at the same time operate as a release of 
the other contracting party . 
All of these suggestions, however, are presented for consider-
ation, and not with the intention of imposing any fixed conditions. 
The principle of investigation being acce~~ed, the details are 
matters for conference and consideration. 
54 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1913, ~. cit. , p • 8 • 
55 Ibid., PP• 10-llo 
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Bryan argued that nations, as individuals, usually fought when they were 
angry and did not sit down and reasonably think out the problem. Wilson, 
as did all of the Cabinet, heartily agreed -w.i..th Bryan's peace treaties 
and made them part of the New Freedom program. 
As a result of cabinet discussion, certain minor changes were 
made in the draft which Bryan had drawn up .. Determined not 
to encounter the hostility of the Senate, he went to its56 committee on foreign affairs and won its approval •••• 
How was Bryan able to secure the ratification of his arbitration 
treaties from a usually jealous Senate? The reason appears to stem 
from the fact that many Senators were not interested enough to attend 
the session in which the treaties were discussed. 
Ironically the outbreak of the greatest of wars may- have 
saved these treaties for the preservation of peace. When, 
on August 13, 1914, the Senate ratified the first group of 
eighteen Bryan treaties difficulty was experienced in ob-
taining a quorum. Had more senators been present, as they 
would have been if the treaties had been considered impor-
tant, a two-thirds majority might have been impossibleo 
As it was, the voting revealed partisan bias, for on the 
first and decisive test the forty-four votes to approve the 
treaty were cast by thirty-two Democrats and twelve Republi-
cans, while all five negative votes crune from Republicans . 
Certainly inconspicuousness saved the treaties from the 
experienced and skillful opposition of Senator Lodge who 
was so little interested~in them that he stayed away from 
Washington that summer.St 
~m Curti, EE• cit., p . 150. The author wrote the Archives in 
Washington and learned there was no correspondence between Bryan and 
the Senate Foreign Relation Committee or with the ~enate . Note 
Appendix F. for the entire letter. 
57 W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated By The Senate (Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 2fa5. For theroll call vote on the 
first arbitration treaty, note Appendix Go 
Partly owing to the objection of t he Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, and partly to fear that foreign powers mi ght be 
opposed, the provision that the period of investigation should not 
be used for a change in the naval or military program of the con-
tracting parties, was omtted. The treaties differed in detail, 
although they were alike in their main features. Bryan dealt with 
each government separately. 
On August 17, 1913, the first treaty was signed, with 
Salvador; the Netherlands was the first European country 
to come into the arrangement. Altogether thirty treaties 
were negotiated, and twenty ratifications exchanged. Bryan 
showed much greater skill in handling the senate t han his 
predecessors: he submitted a statement in advance to the 
committee on foreign affairs, setting forth the interpretation 
that all disputed questions could be submitted directly to 
international commissions without previous consent of the 
senate. • • • He took great pride in his achievement, and 
even after the world war broke out, pursued his course with-
out any less energy or, so far as could be seen, any less 
optimism. H~
8
regarded t his as his greatest contribution to 
world peace. 
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Many pacifists found little in the Bryan treaties to cause optimism. 
Some felt the treaties were essentially superficial in that they 
neglected the idea of international federation, which, they thought, 
could alone prevent war. Others, as Jacques Dumas, pointed out more 
practical difficulties. 
If all the states made treaties w~th all other states, 
he urged, there would be 1806 commissions, and this 
might be somewhat confusing! In case of a dispute between 
one government and two or three others, just what commission 
58 Ib.d 151 i •' P• • The Senate ratified the treaties with little 
or no opposition. 
would function? Others realized that certain categories 
of disputes involved far too complex issues, emotions and 
prejudices for investigation by a commission, disputes 
which even a year's delay- could not prevent from festering 
into war. Even if tre facts could be agreed upon, each 
disputant might still insist on the correctness of its 
own interpretation of the facts. With nationalism what it 
was, could one be at all certain that governments would 
voluntaril.,v submit a postponement of hostilities during 
an investigation, or accept tbe findings of the comrnission?59 
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Outside the circle of the peace movement, t he Bryan treaties 
were not take·n so seriously, partly because Bryan sponsored 
them, partly because the majority of tram were signed .after 
the world war hag0a1ready defied the sanctity of international agreement& ••• 
Although there are many points in the treaties that might be criticized 
with justification, the author believes that they were defi nitely a 
step in the right directicn. The treaties were superficial in many 
respects but one does not state dogmatic rules and regulations in such 
a momentous step as the treaties defined. 
The Commorer received little aid even f rom his own di plomatic 
colleagues. Walter Hines Pages stated: 
The outstanding feature of the Bryan treaty was the clause 
which pledged the high contracting parties not to go to war 
without taking a breathing spell of one year in which to 
think the matter over. Had Germany adopted this treaty, t he 
United States, in April, 1917, after Germany had presented a 
casus belli by resuming unrestricted warfare, could not have 
gone to war. We should have been obliged to wait a year, or 
until April, 1918, before engaging in hostilities. That is, 
59 Ibid., P• 153. 
60 Ibid., P• 153. 
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an honorable observance of this Bryan treaty by the 
United States would have meant that Germany would have 
starved Great Britain into surrender, and crushed 
EUI10pe and her arrey-•••• 61 
It appears to the author that Page was either trying to confuse the 
issue or was confused on the issue himself. Several dEiscrepancies 
might be noted in his analysis of Bryan 's peace plan. First, the 
United States was not pledged to take a breathing spell for one year . 
This was only a suggestion by Bryan. Bryan said the period may either 
be extended or lessened as the contracting nations themselves saw fit . 
Second, Bryan certainly did not mean that if one of the contracting 
parties refused to abide by the treaty, the other party was to con-
tinue abiding by the plan. The peace plan was sent in April, 1913, 
and the purpose was to get as many to ratify the plan as possible 
before an outbreak of tr0uble, or at least at the early outbreak 
of a war .. 
Generally the comment in the United States on the Bryan 
peace plan was favorable. James B. Scott, head of the Carnegie 
Peace Foundation, wrote: 
Only the services of an international nature which he 
rendered as Secretary of State can properly be considered 
here, and they will probably be found to be much more 
important than commonly supposed; so important indeed, 
that Mr. Bryan is likely to hold a more prominent place 
among those who have striven for peace among nations, than 
among political leaders in the United States, who have held 
61 dr. k ·t I 294 Hen ic , ~. £:!:_. , , • 
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the attention of their co~trymen, and aspired to the 
highest offices of State. 2 
Unfortunately for Bryan's reputation as Secretary of State, the 
esteem that Mr. Scott thought Bryan would enjoy never came . The 
submission of all disputes to arbitration, embodted in Article 1263 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is more closely associated 
with Woodrow Wilson than with William Jennings Bryan. The wording 
of Article 12 and Bryan I s 11 cooling-off11 treaties are not the same, but 
the ideas of both are very closely associated. 
While Secreta:ry of State Bryan was bearing the heavy responsi-
bility of the Department of State, there arose the curious conditions 
surrounding Mr . E. M. House's unofficial connection with the President 
and his voyage abroad on affairs of state. Wilson had tbe idea that 
if the United States, England, France, and Germany would agree not to 
make war on each other, these big nations could compel all other nations 
to stop wars . It was with this idea in mind, which Bryan heartily 
62 Bryan, 9,£• cit., pp. 374-75. 
63 Article 12 of the Covenant of the League reads as follows: 
"The members of the League agree that if there should arise between 
them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the 
matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they 
agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award 
by the arbitrators or the report by the Council. 
"In any case, under this article the award of the arbitrators 
shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council 
shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute." 
Note Bryan, .9£.• cit . , PP • 373- 74. 
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agreed to, that House was sent on his first mission to Europe in 
May, 1914. House, after reaching Europe, found not opposition to 
Wilson's plan, but instead met indifference which was much worse. 
Both England and France feared the intentions of Germany, but neither 
would do anything constructive about the situation. British statesmen 
gave the impression that the mission on which Colonel House was engaged 
was an unnecessary one -- a preparation for a danger that did not exist . 
Another thing th at House had to corrb at, al though he knew nothing about 
them, were the secret alliances that existed between the Allies as well 
as the Central Powers . The attempt of House to :p3rsuade Sir Edward Grey 
to visit t he Kiel regatta to see the Kaiser came tomught for the 
English government feared that such a visit would be very disturbing 
to France and Russia. 
The European idea was to distinguish the .American people from 
the American Government . They considered the American Government as 
one laeking both good manners and good faith. 64 Thus, it may be assured 
they would believe there was little good in the Department of State, 
for example. House fed fuel to the flames when in Germany speald.ng 
to Titpiz he said, 
••• I sppke of the courage and character of the President . 
I drew clearly the distinction between the President 
and Mr . Bryan. I wanted official Germany to know that if any 
international complications arose between our two countries, 
they woulq have to deal with a man of iron courage and inflex-
ible will . 65 
64 Hendrick, EE.• cit., I, 145-46. 
65 Seymour, .£1?.• cit . , I, 250. 
House spread the word through Europe that Mr. Bryan could not be 
taken seriously. 
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It was probably in early July that House thought of his plan 
to get the big powers of the world to stop spending their money on 
wars and use the money instead to develop the waste areas of the 
world. Page sympathized with House I s plan but thought it would not 
work for each power distrusted the other's motives. It is worth-
while to mention that Woodrow Wilson knew nothing of this idea of 
House's before he went to Europe. In all probability Wilson would 
have been against it for it would have resulted in nothing more than 
dollar diplomacy. As we have seen, Wilson, expressed himself as very 
much against dollar diplomacy in his speech concerning Latin American 
affairso On August 28, 1913, Page wrote to House himself on House's 
plan, the following: 
I wonder if we couldn't serve notice that landstealing 
game is forever ended and that the cleaning up of backward 
lands is now in order -- for the people that live there; 
and then invite Europe 1g6help to make the tropics as health-ful as the Panama Zone? 
Despite the fact that the plan of House and Page was as 
visionary as almost any yet designed, they continued to view Bryan 
as lacking prestige. This is shown by the following letter from 
House to Wilson, August 1, 1914: 
Please let me suggest that you do not let Mr o Bryan make 
any overtures to any of the powers involved. They look upon 
him as an abs0lute visionary, and it would lessen the weight 
66 Hendrick,~- cit., I, 271. 
of your infli~nce if you desire to use it yourself 
later •••• I 
At any rate House failed in his mission. He had not brought 
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the big powers together. Possibly one reason for House's failure if 
success were possible -- stemmed from the fact that House did not 
believe in the missi0n as is sho~m in a letter to Wilson May 29, 1914: 
The best chance for peace is an understanding between 
England and Germ.any in regard to naval armaments, and 
yet there ia some disadvantage to us by these two getting 
too closeo 
The only thing House did accomplish was to see and have a chance to 
study the European situation at first hand. 
Bryan had planned to go to Europe shortly before House left for 
the continent. When Page learned of tre proposed trip he wrote House: 
Mrs. Page has learned something more about Secretary 
Bryan's proposed visit here in the spring . He's coming to 
talk his peace plan which, y ou know, is a sort of grape 
juice arbitration -- a distinct step b ackward from a real 
arbitration treaty. Well, if he co:rre s with that, when you 
come to talk about reducing armaments, you'll wish you'd 
never been born. Get your ingenuity together, then, and 
prevent that visit.69 
House did succeed in preventing Bryan from going for it was he who 
took the place of the man who should have gone. It was Bryan who 
had taken a large step forward in his co~ling-off treaties. It was 
67 Seymour, ~. cit. , I, 229. 
68 Ibid., I, 249. 
69 Hendrick, op . cit., I, 226. 
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Bryan who, as Secretary of State, would shoulder the blame to a 
large extent if .American policies did not worko It appears to the 
auth0r that House again usurped the power due Bryan and, with nothing 
to lose and everything to gain for himself, proceeded to Europe . If 
Bryan did not like the idea, he expressed no dissent. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SECRETJIRY OF STATE BRYAN DURING WORLD WJIR I 
It is indeed a strange fact that the man who had worked tire-
lessly for the cause of peace should have been the Secretary of State 
at the outbreak of World War I. The Commoner had strongly advocated 
his 11 cooling-off11 treaties only to find their value nullified by war . 
However, most analysts of existing conditions of that time agree that 
no man nor any nation could have stopped the conflict. Among the 
primary causes of the war were the commercial competition between 
England and Germany; the historical hatred between the French and the 
Germans; the Russian interest in the Slavs and in a warm water sea-
port on the Mediterranean. Above all one must remember that all of the 
big powers of Europe were pledged to come to one another's aid if 
attacked. 
The United States, as the only great power not directly engaged 
in the war, found it necessary to define her position with regard to 
the war. Wilson felt very deeply that the neutrality of the United 
States must be preserved. On August 5, 1914, House wrote Wilson: 
• • • If a statement is made, let roo suggest that you 
make it clear that what you have done was at your own 
instance. If the public either here or in Europe thought 
that Mr-. Bryan instigated it, they would conclude it was 
done in an impracticable way and was doomed to failure from 
the start.l 
1 Seymour,~• cit., I, 282. 
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It may be concluded from this letter that the Colonel was trying 
to shake the President's confidence in Bryan concerning foreign 
relations as well as domestic issues. This was House I s as well 
as Page's policy throughout the time Bryan served as Secretary of 
State. In August, House had written to the President that if 
Germ~ succeeded it ultimately would mean trouble for the United 
States. Furthermore, Grey said: 
House left me in no doubt from the first that he held 
German militarism responsible for the war, and that he 
regarded the struggle as one between democracy and something 
that was undemocratic and antipathetic t .o American ideals.2 
This was a stranger role for a 11peacemaker 11 for a neutral country to 
play. 
However, House's suggestions were not followed by Wilson. The 
President made his neutrality speech to the Senate on August 19, 1914.3 
The President's attitude was that the Uni ted States and its peoples 
should be neutral in both thought and action. As evidence of Wilson's 
refusal to be influenced by such men as House and Roosevelt: 
(Wilson) said in a Cabinet meeting that he had informed 
Ambassador Spring-Rice that if Prussian military prowess 
overcame the Allies, it might be necessary for the United 
States to 'give up its present ideals and devote all its 
energies to defense, which would mean the end of its pre-
sent system of government • 1 He also related a conver-
sation with others to the effect that if Britain should 
decy American rights he would be forced to hold it to 
'strict accountability. 14 · 
2 Grey,.££· cit., II, 124. 
3 For the entire speech see Appendix H. 
4 Daniels, -9£• cit., P• 570. 
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Page cannot be said to have be n neutral in any s nse of th 
word. The evidence f or this statem nt resides in Pa own lett r 
to Wilson . Page felt that there was no such word a neutrality; a 
government either must go in or stay out . It could not maint n a 
position in the middle. A government could be neutral , ut rtainly 
no man could be. Page 's l etters became mor and mor outspoken to 
the Presi dent.5 Even Colonel House did not maintain such an un-
neutral position openly . House bec ame so worri dover the convictions 
of Page t hat he wrote P e on December 4, 1914: 
The President wished me to ask you pl ase to be c e -
ful not t o express any unneutral feeling , e ther by word 
of mouth, or by letter, and not even to the State De art-
ment . He said t hat both Mr. Bryan and Mr . Lansing had 
remarked upon y our leanings in that direction, and he 
thought it would materially lessen y our influenc .8 
The neutrality qu estion brought the fir t break in the r la-
tions between Wilson and Bryan . The Conuuoner t ook the p i tion that 
if we were neutral, all belligerent should receive exa tly th same 
treatment . To those people who considered Bryan a complete pacifi t 
may be noted the following statement by Bryan : 11 If w are to take 
place with either warring factor, let us do it -- but if w ar to 
pose as being neutral, let us be neutral. 11 7 The Commoner found it 
easy to be absolutely neutral, for be felt that in any stru gl of 
5 Not Hendrick, .91?.• ci t . , I , 362. 
6 Seymour, .91?.• cit . , I , 373 . 
7 Bryan, .91?. • cit., p. 395 . 
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such intensity no nation was capable of calm reasoning and each of the 
warring factions would do anything that would promote its own cause. 
Even as neutral as Bryan was, he was accused of being prejudiced to 
the .Allies for he had a son-in-law in the British Army. Bryan's 
reply was: 
Ties of relationship do not always bind. The Kaiser has 
a cousin on the throne of England and another on thB throne 
of Russia, but it does not seem to bias him at all. 
Efforts for mediation on the part of the United States took 
place early in the war. On July 28, 1914, Bryan cabled Page asking 
if the good offices of the United States under Article III of the 
Hague Convention9 would be acceptable. "Page and House, each on 
his own discouraged the suggestion. Page cabled, 'There is not the 
slightest chance' , and House advised twice: 1 Do not let Mr-. Bryan 
10 make any overtures 1 • 11 The Cabinet, however, agreed with Wilson and 
Bryan, and Wilson,ignoring the advise of Page and House, cabled 
England and Germany tendering his good offices. There were no 
acceptances of Wilson's offers for mediation. Each side claimed to 
be fighting in self-defense. The English point of view toward media-
tion was expressed by Sir Edward Grey on August 7, 1914: 
B Ibid., P• 428. 
9 Article III of t ~e Ha~e Convention dealt with the 
methods employed in settling disputes am ong nations. 
lO Daniels,.££• cit., P• 569. 
I lmew that President Wilson wished to mediate, and when-
ever there appeared a fair opportunity of stopping the war 
by mediation, we should, I felt sure, throw our influence 
on the side of it, and, having taken part in the war, our 
influence would be stronger than if we had stood outside.11 
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Probably what Grey more nearly meant was that England had to delay in 
order to get her war machine running. After she appeared to be on the 
offensive, then and only then would England turn to mediation. She 
could then more easily wrangle concessions out of Germany. Thus, the 
President faced an extremely difficult situation. 
The first glimmer of an opportunity for mediation cmne on 
September 6, 1914. Bernstorff, German Ambassador to the United 
States, mentioned tha:t his government muld accept an offer of 
mediation. Bryan received this information through Oscar Straus, 
former United States .Ambassador to Turkey. The President not o~ 
approved of Bryan I s prompt action in calling on Spring-Rice and 
Jusserand, the British and French Ambassadors, but also expressed 
the thought 11 ••• this war is so horrible from every aspect that 
no one can afford to take the responsibility for continuing it a 
single hour.n12 But the Straus proposal was received coldly by both 
sides. The proposal leaked to the press as did nearly all the so-
called secret communications at that time were doing. No government 
would then, publicly., _. admit a readiness to discuss peace lest it be 
11 Grey, E£• cit., II, 165. 
12 Baker, E£• cit., V, 275. 
construed as a sign of wealmess. Neither Page nor Herrick, the 
American .Ambassador to France, formally presented the Straus pro-
posal. 
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This eager attempt at mediation was entirely the work of 
Wilson and Bryan. Most of t heir advisers, particularly Page, but 
including House and Herrick, were opposed to any such move.13 Page 
thought that it was the hope of the English that neither the American 
Goverrunent nor its people regarded a proposed peace as worth while 
that stopped short of a final blow to bureaucracy. Since Page 
supported this belief, he dwelt upon atrocity stories and the 
Zeppelin raids. Page and Grey appear to have been anxious, after 
Grey's complete rejection of the Straus proposal, for they feared that 
both the President and .American opinion might think that Great Britain 
was opposed to peace, as Bernstorff was asserting. 
(Thus) on September 19, 0.914), Wilson received a defensive 
explanation from Grey, in which the whole argument turned 
upon the statement that •Germany planned t he war, and chose 
her own time for forcing it on Europe.• Grant this, and it 
naturally followed that the Allies must have reparation 
and security against the menace of repetitions in t~ future 
-- even to the extent of crushing Germany entirely. 
However, Wilson was not willing, yet, to grant the first premise. 
Bryan drew from the Straus incident the lesson that, since 
none of the belligerents were willing to take tbe initiative toward 
13 Seymour, EE• cit., I, 333-34. 
14 Ibid., PP• 283-84. 
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peace, it should be taken by the United States. 
Both sides seem to entertain the old idea that fear 
is the only basis upon which peace can rest •••• And so, 
the Kaiser sees peace in a victory which will insure the 
supremacy of Germany, while the Allies see peace only in 
a success so signal as to crush the German war machine. 
It is not likely that either side will win eo complete 
a victory as to be able to dictate terms and if either 
side does win such a victory, it will probably mean pre-
paration for another war. It would seem better to look 
for a more rational basis f or peace.15 
Bryan's idea of the proper step towards peace was presented to the 
President on September 19, 1914: 
Would it not be worth while for you to address a note to 
all the combatants reciting the awf.ul horrors of this con-
flict, and pointing out --
First, that all deny responsibility for the war and that 
all express a desire for peace; 
Second, that responsibility for a continuance of such a 
war is as undesirable as responsibility for beginning it, 
and that as such responsibility attaches to this nation as 
well as to participants, my suggesti on is that you earnestly 
appeal to them to meet together and exchange views as to t he 
terms upon which permaneht peace can be insured . 
They could be reminded that, while mediation can not be 
asked or accepted with conditions, the parties are under no 
compulsion to accept unsatisfactory terms; also that while 
an armistice during mediation ...-ould, on general principles, 
be desirable, it might operate unequally upon the combatants 
and is not therefore essential to mediation . 16 
Again Bryan had proposed broad, sound ideas on the subject of mediation. 
15 Baker, .£E• cit., V, 285. This was a sound statesmanlike case 
based upon ideas which Wilson later used in his message to the belliger-
ent governments on December 18, 1916, when he called for their war aims. 
16 Bryan, .£E• cit., PP• 390-92. Wilson was to profit later by Bryan's 
suggestion in that the proposal that 'nations shall enter into an agreement 
to respect present boundaries', found its way into .Article X of the Covenant 
of the League of ations. Note Baker, .£E• cit., V. 286. 
In all of Bryan's proposals may be seen the basic principle of good 
diplomacy -- leaving the door open for further diplomacy. On the 
subject of Bryan's proposal, Ray Stannard Baker, surely not biased 
in favor of Bryan, records : 
Here was broad, sound t hought -- with constructive ideas • 
• • • If Bryan I s proposals had been tried at that time --
before capitulations of October,17 while ye t the United 
States possessed the mighty power of placing an embargo on 
munitions and of challenging the Br~tish blockade -- something 
might possibly have _been effected.l 
Bryan I s work was to come to nought for at the elbow of the 
President, constantly urging him to do nothing, was Colonel House . 
Through a conscious or unconscious effort, House played right into 
the hands of the Allies. Because of his pro-Ally feeling, House 
fell into the policy of hesitation and delay, which was just what 
the .Allies wanted. House's policy of delay was to be exploited 
further in the Colonel's second mission to Europe.19 He bad talked 
with the Ambassadors of both sides and had asked them to explain 
their bases f or settling the War : 
The suggestions of both sides were of the vaguest and 
most general nature. The 'end of militarism' -- what did 
it mean? •General disarmament', or 'other effective 
measures 1 , 1 and indeilll'lity for Belgium.' One cannot avoid 
the impression that the Allied diplomats were playing for 
17 By the capitulations of October, the United States no 
longer demanded that the Declaration of London be followed •. 
18 Baker , op. cit., V, 286. 
19 House's second mission to Europe may be found on page 99 
of this chapter. 
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time, using House to keep Wilson inactive. Deley was at 
that time the chief article in their policy .20 
House definitely feared the influence of Bryan on both the 
President and .American public opinion as is shown in a let ter to 
Page on October 3, 1914: 
I have always counselled him (the President] to remain 
quiet for the moment and let matters unfold themselves 
further •••• I do not think there is any danger of any-
one on the outside injecting himself into it unless Mr . 
Bryan does something on his own initiative.21 
Rank outsider -- the Secret ary of State. 22 
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The President, against the wishes of Bryan, decided to wait 
for a better opportunity to offer mediation. He was probably 
greatly influenced in his decision by Page's accidental or designed 
prophesy concerning the conflict as being a long and drawn out affair. 
20 Baker, .£Eo cit., V, 287. 
21 Ray Stannard Baker states further: "In this letter House 
went on t o indicate some bases for a durable peace, as for example, 
'every nation in Europe guaranteeing the territorial integrity of 
every other nation' which Mr . Hendrick regards as an •astonishing ' 
example of House's foresight, since this idea, embodied in Article 
X, became the chief point of controversy in the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. But it had already been presented to the 
President in Bryan 's letter of September 19th which House had no 
doubt seen, the phrase there being, 'that nations shall enter into 
an agreement to respect present boundaries 1 • Note Baker, !?£. cit ., 
V,288. Also note Seymour,~• cit., I, 318-19. 
22 Baker , op. cit., V, 288. This letter is certainly in-
dicative of House Ts regard both for his own position and for the 
position of Bryan . 
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After awhile, said Page, neutral nations will rise up and say war 
must end. The combatahts~3 will also be more receptive. Thus ended 
the first and probably the only really hopeful opportunity for a 
direct and vigorous effort at mediation. 
On October 22, 1914, the United States abandoned the Dec-
laration of London, which dealt with rules of contraband and non-
contraband and rights of search, thus taking away its greatest 
negotiating power. American commercial interests became more and 
more closely connected with the Allies thus making it extremely 
difficult , if not impossible, to be considered a neutral nation. 
The issue of Latin Anerica relative to neutrality proved 
very difficult for the Wilson Ad.ministration. The iITilllediate pro-
blem was that if some of the Latin American countries became 
4 
involved in the war, the Monroe Doctrine might easily involve the 
United States. While Bryan and Lansing, Assistant Secretary of 
State, were struggling with these problems, Colonel House arrived 
in Washington on December 16, 1914. House proposed a plan to the 
President which would do away with the Monroe Doctrine and set up 
a status of equality of states. This plan, the Pan-American Plan, 
was as follows: 
1st. Mutual guaranties of political independence under 
republic an form of government and mutual guaranties of 
territorial integrity. 
2nd. Mutual agreement that the government of each of the 
contracting parties acquire complete control within its ~uris-
diction of the manufacture and sale of munitions of war. 3 
23 Seymour,~• cit., I, 209-10. 
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House further recorded that this plan was his own as formulated on 
December 16, 1914. The first of trese ideas, as we have seen, had 
originated with Bryan in his letter to Wilson on September 19th. 
The second idea was Wilson's own, 24 and was discussed with Bryan 
in September.25 
Haus~ began eagerly talking 11his 11 plan over the the South 
.American Ambassadors. However, he did not invite Bryan to par-
ticipate in the magotiations. House became somewhat irritated by 
Bryan I s insistence upon applying the scheme to the immediate and 
difficult problems of the moment -- 11 a convention ••• for the 
purpose of securi~ the rights of neutrals.n26 It seems that 
House had proposed a meeting of both belligerents and neutrals. 
Bryan was very much interested in a meeting of this kind, hoping 
that it might open the way to mediation. Bryan knew that House had 
the President's ear, so he thought, probably, the President might 
24 Note Baker, ~• ··cit., V, 74. 
25 The author did not find the discussion on this point 
but Bryan's reply to Wilson may be found in Bryan, ~• cit, PP• 
390-92. For Bryan I s note of September 19th see p. 97 of this 
thesis. 
26 Baker, .£E.• cit., V, 299-JGO. 
88 
come nearer approving a proposal of House. 27 
27 The letter Bryan wrote to Wilson on December 17, 1911 is as 
follows: 
Mc House will call your attention to a suggestion which was made 
to me by one of the South American representatives and I am inclined 
to think there is some force in it. You have not failed to notice 
the increasing urgency with which the neutral nations are presenting 
the idea of mediation or of some form of protection from the burdens 
of war . The sentiment is unanimous among the South ( and) Central 
Americap countries that something ought to be done to protect the 
neutral nations of Europe. A recent dispatch says that the kinds 
of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark are to meet for the purpose of con-
sidering what can be done to lessen these burdens. The Venezuelan 
minister yesterday handed me a suggestion to the effect that you 
call a meeting of all the neutral nations to be held in Washington 
for the purpose ofconsidering a proposition to be submitted later 
to a convention iR which all the nations, neutral and belligerent, 
will be represented. I think, however, that tm i dea of Mr. House, 
which I have mentioned, is the most feasible one, namely that you 
invite all the nations, belligerent and neutral, to send represent-
atives to a conference to be held in Washington for the purpose 
of considering ways and means by which the burdens borne by the 
neutral nations may be minimized with e consent and agreement of 
the belligerent nations. The belligerents could not take exception 
of (sic) it, were it understood that the changes were to be made 
through agreement with the belligerents, and I am sure it would 
appeal to all the neutral nations. The one who suggested this 
plan had in mind tre possibility of its opening the way to media-
t mon. He thinks it would give you an opportunity to make an 
address of welcome which might be helpful in advancing the 
cause of mediation wi. thout directly referring to it. He thinks 
that the coming together of these representatives, even for consider-
ation of questions growing out of war and yet not involving the 
subject of mediation, might lay the foundation for some coming 
t ogether of the belligerent nations. I am very much impressed 
with the idea and with its possibilities for good. It seemed to 
commend itself to Mr. House also although he only had time to 
think of it for a moment. It is at his suggestion that I bring 
the matter up this evening in order that you may talk with him 
about it more fully and let me lmow your impressions. 
Baker , •. cit • , V, 300 . 
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This letter written by Bryan on December 17, 1914, seems to 
refute the statements of House conoerning Bryan's apparent lack of 
interest in his plan. 28 Nothing came out of House's plan, through 
no fault of Bryan, but because of a number of other factors. House 
apparently lost his interest in Latin America and began more and more 
turning his complete attention to Europe. He also was never able to 
get all of tbe South American ministers to agree to his proposal. At 
this time, House became convinced that real pe ace would be obtained 
only when Germany was thoroughly crushed. Naturally, a conference 
and arbitration would not accomplish this purpose. Finally, House pro-
posed taking another trip to Europe in late January, 1915, arrl Wilson 
agreed. From 1915 on, House's entire attention was turned to Europe . 
In order to understand the American problem of shipping during 
the war and the apparent failures of both of House's missions, it is 
necessary to sum up in a few sentences the allied diplomacy, especially 
English diplomacy. 29 
Sir Edward Grey states that there were two chief objects in 
allied diplomacy: the first, was to preserve solidarity among the 
Allies. Grey considered this object completely and successfully 
28 Seymour, ,9.E• cit., I, 210-11. 
29 A more intense study of English diplomacy will be presented 
in connection with each specific problems as .American shipping and the 
Declaration of London. 
achieved. The second, was the most important object of allied 
relations with neutrals, allied relations with the United States . 
Likewise, to understand allied diplomacy, one must realize 
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that a constant policy was impossible. Circwnstances were always 
changing. Thus, a policy that was designed when Allied armies were 
winning was not suitable when Germany seemed to be winning. Diplomacy 
had to adapt itself to whatever happened at the battle front, and in 
these adaptations Allied ministers sometimes got out of step. 
Sometimes there was a tendency in one quarter to make 
diplomacy more active, 'When the Allies were having military 
reverses; as if a more copious use of words in the form of 
threats or promises could COJ'!IPensate for the effect of 
defeats on the battle field.JO 
Always the .illies had in mind the policy of delay with regard to the 
United States. They needed delay to build up their war machine to 
defeat Germany and best wrangle concessions ou of the Hun. They 
needed delay to tie up the economic forces of the United States and 
the Allies. Neutrality on the part of the United States made little 
difference to the Allies, for they intended to carry on trade with 
.America while at the same time blocking off German-American trade. 
They executed this policy very successfully with the aid of House 
and Page in keeping Wilson in a stage of inactivity. 
Early in the war the United States developed its policies 
concerning the trade of neutrals along the lines established by 
30 Grey, 2.E,• cit., II, 158. 
7~55J 
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the Declaration of London in 1909. On August 7, 1914, Bryan with 
the approval of the President, asked Germany and the other belliger-
ents to accept the Declaration as a code of law. This proposal sent 
out by the State Department was met very coldly by the Allies, 
especially the British. Page explains this coldness in the following 
manner: 
They (the British) had long regarded our goverrurent as 
ignorant of European -affairs and amateurish in its 
cockiness •••• Mr. Bryan was looked on as a joke. 
They forgot him -- rather, they never todc serious 
notice of him.31 
When Mr. Bryan, therefore, blandly asked Great Britain 
to accept the Declaration as its code of maritime warfare, 
he was asking that country to accept a document which 
Great Britain, in peace time, had repudiated and which 
would, in all probability, have caused that country to 
lose the war. The substance of this request was bad 
enough, but the language in which it was phrased made 
matters much worse. It appears that only the interven-
tion of Colonel House prevented the whole thing from 
becoming a tragedy.32 
This letter by Page illustrates the fact that he understood 
neither the British policies, nor the .American situation. It is 
true that Great Britain had never ratified the Declaration of 
3l Hendrick, EE• cit., I, 374. 
32 Ibid., PP• 377-78. 
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London, and its rules played little part in the war.33 The Declaration 
had not been the work of the Foreign Office alone for the Adrairalty had 
been present and had approved when it was drawn up. Sir Edward Grey 
had supported it am was the minister specially responsible for it. 
The Declaration passed tre House of Commons, but its rejecti0n by 
the House of Lords prevented its ratification. This is about the 
only truth in Page's letter. Grey stated that if the Declaration had 
been followed, it would have saved England from her greatest peril 
during the war-- the submarine. However, he also stated: 
The question is not worth pursuing: if the Declaration 
had been ratified, it would have been broken. The same 
ruthless spirit that introduced the use of poison-gas, an 
offence not only against the rules of war but against all 
humane considerations, would have made short work of the 
Declaration of London.34 
33 non August 20, 1914, the British Government announced by pro-
clamation that 'it would act in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention known as the Declaration of LondoD, so far as mey be practic-
able', but w.ith modifications which, in the opinion of the State 
Department at Washington, largely nullified the original Declaration. 
Very critical questions arose with the United States, and on October 
29, 1914, a second order was issued, the principal effect of which was 
to withdraw the general application of the doctrine of 'continuous 
voyage 1 to conditional contraband (mainly food) with the result of 
permitting some of this to pass through neutral ports into Germany. 
This was, however, subsequently supplemented and to a considerable 
extent superseded by the 'Reprisal Order 1 of March 11, 1915, which 
gave power to stop all goods of whatever description, destined for 
Ger:marzy-, leaving the Declaration of London in being only in so far as 
it governed the decision whether conditional contraband could be con-
demned as prize. 11 Grey,~• cit., II, 105-6. 
34 Ib'd 10~ _i_., P• ;}• 
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Bryan had nothing to do with formulating the statement issued 
to Great Britain concerning the Declaration. It was first thought 
that Lansing had drawn up the plan, but later it was found that Cone 
Johnson, SolicitXUP-General, had been the author. 35 
Nevertheless, the Declarati on of London was not accepted 
by the British, probably because it left among other things copper 
and rubber on the non-contraband list B!ld muld have permitted the 
importation of foodstuffs by_ Germany. Wilson hesitated to push the 
American stand due to the influence of Page and probably House. On 
October 20, 1914, Lansing arrived at the conclusion that America 
must surrender her stand. He sent the following letter to Wilson: 
It seems tone that in view of the rigid attit ude 
of the British Government further attempts to obtain 
an agreement on the Declaration of London would be 
useless. We . must, therefore, stand on the rules of 
international law which have been generally accepted 
without regard to the Declaration. In t he matter of the 
transfer of vessels this will be a decided advantage. 
The great loss is the failure to have a definite code, 
which will undoubtedly be the source of numerous 
controversies. 
It is to be regretted that in spite of all that has 
been done, the purpose of the negotiation has failed.36 
35 Johnson was from Texas and was particularly perturbed 
over great stocks of cotton lying on the docks and not being 
shipped because of British infringements upon the rights of American 
shippers. Baker,~· cit., V, 199. 
36 Ibid., pp. 217-18. 
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The memoranda collected by Lansing resulted in a distinct 
step backwards in rules and regulations of neutral trade. Wilson 
approved of Lansing's d:espatch, based on his letter, of October 22, 
1914. This withdrawal, as we have seen, greatly weakened the United 
States' powerful position as a neutral in mediation. The rules of 
intern.ational law were uncertain and debatable. The purpose of the 
London Conference in 1908 had been to strengthen these rules. Now 
all that the United States had were the weak rules of international 
law. 
Both 'Wilson and the State Department were convinced that t he 
avoidance of future trouble could best be obtained by pointing out 
clearly to the British at the very beginning that the United States 
regarded the British Admiralty policy as infringing our neutral 
rights and material interests. 
It was with some irritation that the Ambassador 
(}>ageJ discovered that in t he United States British 
seizure of ships and prizes was not tegarded as a 
1 smaller question 1 , and he did not conceal his lack of 
sympathy with the arguments drafted by the le gal ad-
visers to the State Department in protection of Ameri can 
rights on the seas.37 
Page was very unorthodox in his relations with Grey. This 
is illustrated by the following: 
One incident in particular remains i n nzy- (Grey) 
memoI'iJ. Page crone to see me at the Foreign Office 
one dey and produced a long despatch from Washington 
37 Seymour, op. cit., I, 305. 
contesting our claims to act as we were doing in 
stopping contraband going to neutral ports. 'I am 
instructed', he said, •to read this dispatch to 
you. 1 He read, and I listened. He then said: 'I 
have now read the dispatch, but I do not agree with 
it; let us consider how it should be answered1 138 
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On another occasion when .American opinion was particularly set against 
British interference, Page suggested a French ship be used to stop 
.American trading vessels. Since American regard for France had 
always been high, Page r~asoned that American sentiment would not 
rise at a French seizure. Page was correct for the issue never 
even P~ached t he newspapers. For an Ambassador from a supposedly 
neutral nation, Page is action was disgusting. 
The British first issued a small list of contraband articles. 
The three most important additions were copper , rubber, and cotton. 
However, it was felt that to include cotton would certainly provoke 
a challenge from the United States which would then impair the pros-
pect of her agreeing to a list that included copper and rubber. This 
I 
policy proved to be successful • .As time went on orders were issued 
that entitled the British to seize such things as rubber and copper 
in any ship on the high seas, if they were destined to go to a 
German port. However, this order was of little use by itself, for 
Germany imported goods as easily through Dutch, Danish, or Swedish 
I 
ports as her own. Thus, it became necessary for Britain and the 
Allies to seize goods that were going to these neutral ports as well. 
38 Grey,~• cit., II, 110. 
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It was on this point that controversy arose with the United States . 
Wilson's policy on neutrality was harshly attached from both 
sides. Mr. Munsterbert, Professor at Harvard University in a long 
letter to the President on November 19, 1914, strongly criticised 
the administration for discriminating in favour of the Allies. He 
also added: 
The policy of the administration with regard to the holding 
up, detaining and serurch of Germans a.I'ld Austrians from neutral 
and .Allerican vessels is a reversal of the American policy 
established in 1812. It has excited no end of bitterness • 
• • • the United States permitted the violation by England 
of the Hague Convention and international law in connection 
with conditional and unconditional contraband. The United 
States, for instance, has not protested against the trans-
ference of copper from the conditional to the absolute list, 
although on former occasions the United States has taken a 
spirited stand against one-sided interpretation of inter-
national agreements. In 1812, in the Russian Japanese war, 
and in the Boer war, the United States insisted that a 
neutral nation has the right to send conditional as well as 
unconditional contraband to neutral nations without permitting 
an inquiry into its ultimate destination • ••• By permitting 
this new interpretation the United States practically supports 
the starving out policy of the Allies. The nation by reversing 
its own policy thus serious;!.y" handicaps Germany and Austria in 
their fight for existence.39 
Lansing replied to the statements of Munsterberg that there was 
no Hague Convention that dealt with absolute or conditional contraband, 
and, since the Declaration of London was not in force, only international 
laws could apply, and on these laws there was no general agreement. 
Lansing defended his position with the following statement:. 
39 Baker, ,£E• cit., V, 223-24. 
In the enforcement of the laws of neutrality ••• 
this government cannot take into account the advantage 
or disadvantage which may result to any of the belligerents 
through the enforeement of neutral duties. If one bellig-
erent has by good fortune aSJ.periority in the matter of 
geographical location or of military or naval power, the 
rules of neutral conduct cannot be varied so as to favor the 
less fortunate combatant. To change such rules because of 
the relative strength of the belligerents and in order to 
equalize their opportunities would be in itself ap unneutral 
act, of which the stronger might justly complain.40 
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Bryan appeared to be even more disturbed over tre problem of 
American rights on the high seas than the President. On April 28, 
1915, he wrote a bolder appeal to Wilson than he had yet ventured. 
He argued that the Germans were not unreasonable in ~king (1) why 
Americans should travel on British ships; (2) how we could com-
plain of accidents to American ships when British ships used our 
flag; and (3) why the drowning of a few people should provoke more 
irritation than the starvation fa whole nation. 
If we are to prove our neutrality -- and unless we 
do we are likely to be drawn into the conflict by the 
growing feeling in Germany -- it seems to me we must 
prevent the misuse of our flag and warn .Americans not 
to use British vessels in the war zone unless we can 
bring pressure on Great Britain to withdraw (the)_ threat 
about making bread or food contraband.41 
Bryan I s analysis seems to be a good statement of the ca_se. Wi lson 
found himself facing a difficult decision -- a decision which he 
could not make. He had relied heavily upon the information of 
40 Ibid., PP• 227-28. 
4l Ibid., p. 271. 
98 
House, for he thought they were 11both of the same mind11 • To change 
the rules of international law would be legally unneutral; not to 
change the rules of international law would be morally or practically 
unneutral. The position of the fenee-sitter was not only uncomfortable, 
but, in this case, beyond reach • 
.A13 for the two other men most concerned with the 
diplomatic controversies of the time, we find Page, our 
most important representative 0m the firing 1.ine, actu-
ally taking the part of our chief diplomatic opponent, 
playing the game of the British; and Colonel House, 
wandering anxiously about Europe seeking peace, being 
used by the Allies as a pawn in4tbeir deliberate and most effective policy of delay. 2 
The British policy of delay meant an increasing dependence 
of .American industry, at enormous profits, upon the business of 
supplying arms and other supplies to the Allies. If deley continued 
long enough, difficulties between the United States and Germany were 
certain to develop. Delay, then, w the keynote of Grey's diplomacy . 
This policy, as we have seen, proved to be quite effective with House 
urging Wilson neither to mediate nor protest to Great Britain for 
the time was not yet opportune.43 .A13 a result, Wilson answered 
Bryan's letter of the 19th, on April 28, 1915, as follows: 
I wish I could see it as you do. But in view of what 
House writes me I cannot. It is known to every government 
concerned that we believe the war should be ended and that 
we speak for all neutral nations in that wish. It is known 
to them that we are seeking to help and that anything they 
want to say to one another which they are too prudent to 
42 Ibid., P• 261. 
43 Seymour,~• cit., I, 373-74, 378-81. 
say directly and officially they can say privately 
through us. They are at present most appreciative and 
cordial, -- ready to accept help when they can accept 
it. We know their minds and we lmow their difficulties. 
They are dependent upon their own public opinion (even 
Germany) and we .lmow what that opinion is. To insist 
now would be fu¥ile and would probably be offensive. 
We would lose such influence as we have for peace.44 
In early January, 1915, the President again sent House to 
Europe to negotiate for peace. Here again is shown the funda-
mental <defect of the relationship between Wilson and House. In 
the whole matter of peace efforts, Wilson trusted House implicitly 
without clear-cut understanding as to how House proposed to act. 
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He felt that House I s mind worked just as his own did and that under 
similar circumstances he would act just as Wilson himself would wish 
him to do.45 
41i Baker, op. cit., V, 275. Further study of House's 
activity causing delay will be found in the study of the Lusi-
tania notes and the second mission of House. 
45 Rc\Y' Stannard Baker notes the following concerning the 
relationship between House and Wilson: 11 This has recently been 
demonstrated to be a false supposition. In the address of Decem-
ber 8, 1914, -Wilson had taken a stand on preparedness (Wilson was 
against this policy) quite the opposite to that which House had 
been urging m.m to assume •••• 11 11 House also contributed to 
this impression by constant and indiscriminate praise of Wilson's 
doings. 11 This added to Wilson I s feeling that he and House 
thought alike. Baker,~• cit., V, 306-7. 
This was a fatal mistake in Wilson's policy; his 
trust in House prevented him from seeing things House 
did not see, but which he might himself have seen if 
he had looked for himself, without House in the way.46 
House, himself, quotes the following: 
Mr. House is my U'/ilson) second personality. He is 
JI\Y independent self. His thoughts and mine are one. If 
I were in his place I would do just as he suggested •••• 
If aIJY" one thin~s he is reflecting my opinion by whatever 
action he takes, they are welcome to the conclusion.47 
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Before leaving, H~use further built up his structure of 
secrecy by sending the President a list of code words which were 
to be used between them. Probably any amateur could have solved 
this. House was to be kno-wn as 11Beverly11 , Page as 11Yucca11 , Sir 
Edward Grey as ''White" and the Kaiser as "Dante". 48 This listing 
was sent only to the President and not to the State Department~ 
This structure of secrecy set by House was to characterize his 
entire miss.ion. House records a month after reaching England: 
I have succeeded in keeping my name absolutely out 
of the European press, which is a good beginning, and 
I remain in as much obscurity as is possible for one 
having such work in hand. No one, of course, not even 
Page, knows when I see the different ministers or 
personages of importance; and my comings and goings 
are as unchronicled as if I were a crossing-sweeper.49 
46 Ibid., pp. 306-7 
47 Seymour, op. cit., 1' 114. 
48 For a further listing of the code, note Baker,.££• cit., 
V, 307. 
49 Seymour,~• cit., I, 387. 
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On February- 15, 1915, Gerard, United States Ambassador to 
Germany, wrote House that Germany was ready to accept a peace pro-
posal because of a number of factors such as: the German drive to 
Paris had f ai..led; the attack on Russia had failed; and, Italy had 
decided to join the Allies. House contacted Grey and 
He (GreyJ thought after matters had quieted down upon the 
Eastern front and a deadlock had once more been arrived 
at, and the Dardanelles had been forced, it would be well 
for me (House, to go _ to Germany.50 
Grey concluded by saying that the. Germans were not sincere in wanting 
peace. On February 18, 1915, House, completely against the purpose 
of his mission, was undertaking to give Grey some military advice: 
I again urged upon him better coordination between the 
eastern and western fronts •••• It seems to me perfect 
folly not to work more in harmony; that is, when the 
Germans are attacking in the east, they sh5uld be severely pressed in the west, and visa v~rsa •••• 1 
This action by House seems to be a strange role for an impartial 
peacemaker to assume. Thus, House, under Grey's spell wrote the 
President to let matters develop somewhat further before going to 
Germany. If Grey's plans worked out, the British would go into 
peace negotiations with a string of victories behind them. Even 
Gerard's pleas that they were passing up a chance for peace went 
unheard by House. 
50 Ibid., P• 380. 
5l Ibid., P• 379. 
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Wilson undoubted]¥ was losing some of his confidence in 
House ' s purpose for on February 20, 1915, he sent a cablegrarn 
to House warning him not to be influenced by the British policy 
of deley . Wilson feared it would look to the world that House was 
a representative of England and not the represent ative of the 
President of the United ~tat es . On February 23, 1915, House com-
mented on the usual British slowness and added: 
The psychological time to have ended this war was 
around the end of November or the first of December 
when everything looked as if it had gotten into a per-
manent deadlock. You will remember we tried to impress 
this upon Sir Cecil and tried to get quicker action, but 
without success . 52 
House had evidently forgotten that in November an:l December he had 
equally been urging the President to deley . 53 
A month later House finally got to Germany . However, by this 
time it was too late, for the German campaign in the East was under-
way and the submarine campaign was started. Again House's mission 
was a failure. However , it did accomplish further deley. It was 
unfortunate that the President's faith in House prevented him from 
searching any other avenues of peace, such as those being suggested 
by his Secretary of State . Probably everything would have failed, 
but certainly not everything was tried. House arrived in New York 
on June 13, 1915, and denied that his trip to Europe was in any wey 
52 ,l. Baker, ~ • cit ., V, 3..u+ • 
53 Note Baker, op . cit ., V, 276- 294. 
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connected with a mission of peace or even that he was the personal 
representative of the President: 111 I did not talk peace, aJ!d that 
was not my mission abroad 1 , Colonel House declared . 1154 The un-
fortunate as well as ironic situation concerning Wilson's policy 
of delay was expressed on May 5, 1915, by Secretary of Interior 
Lane to Colonel House: 
After all, our one greatest asset is the confidence 
of the people in the President. They do not love him, 
because he appears to them as a man of cloister. But they 
respect him as a wise, sane leader who will keep them out 
of trouble, and whatever fool things are done they are 
willing to blame on Bryan, which is gravely unjust. I am 
growing more and more in my admiration for Bryan each day. 
He is too good a Christian to run a naughty world and he 
doesn't hate hard enough, but he certainly is a noble and 
hi~h-minded55an, and loyal to the President to the last ha.i.r. • • • 
Lansing had wanted to break relations with Germany over 
the sinking of the Cushing. · Bryan was still opposed to this type 
of thinking as the Germans had warned .Arrericans about getting on 
shi ps and sailing into the ~ar zone. Wilson took the stand that 
Americans had the right to travel on any ship they might choose. 
However, the President kept up t he protests to Britain concerning 
interference with trade in a cablegram to House on Mey 5, 1915, and 
even came near threatening to interrupt the munition traffic. vJilson 
54 House's statement appeared in the New York Times, June 14, 
1915. Baker,~• cit., V, 321. 
55 Seymour, op cit., I, 459. 
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still hoped that House might accomplish some thing when on May 7, 1915, 
the Lusitania was sunk.56 Page immediately wrote the President urging 
him to j oin the struggle on the side of the Allies else we could 
not retain the good opinion of anyone. Bryan was as shocked as any-
one over the sinking. He directed Lansing to study its cargo and 
found that the Lusitania had carried contraband. 
Wilson, without consulting the Cabinet, drew up the protest 
to Germany or the First Lusitania Note. Bryan admitted that the 
draft was a clear statement of the .American position and agreed that 
it was well to act without delay in order to give dir ect ion to 
public opinion . After making a few minor suggestions, he added: 
But, my dear Mr . President, I join in t his document 
with a heavy heart •••• I cannot bring myself to the 
belief that it is wise to reli nquish the hope of playing 
the part of a friend to both sides in t he role of peace-
maker, and I fes:£ this note will result in such a 
relinquishment . ~I 
Bryan held that the note had a one- sided bearing as being so much 
sharper than the protests directed to Great Britain. He poi nted out 
that the illegal actions we were condemning were taken as a result 
of illegal British actions which we tolerated. He added on May 12, 
1915 : 
The only way, as I see it ••• to prevent irreparable 
injury being done by the statement is to issue simultaneously 
56 It is interesting to note that House talked to King George at 
Buckingham palace in the morning of May 7th, and King George said, 
"Suppose they (Germany) should sink the Lusitania with Arrerican 
passengers on board •••• 11 Note Seymour, EE • cit, I, 432. 
57 Baker, op. cit ., V, 338 . For the full text of the Lusitania 
Note, see AppendixI.-
a protest against the objectionable conduct of the Allies 
which will keep them from rejoicing and show Germany that 
w? are5gefending our rights from aggression from both sides . 
Bryan suggested that some kind of a public statement accompany the 
note to the effect that 11 strict accountability" need not mean an 
immediate accounting until peacems restored. He also suggested 
that the United States extend to Germany the principle embodied in 
the ~•cooling- offU, treati:es with the Allies. These suggestions 
were to give rise to the f arnous supplementary statement, or npost-
script11. 
To these suggestions Wilson replied on May 13, 1915: 
After sleeping over your suggestion, I have this to pro-
pose: It would be wise, I think, to give out a direct 
statement; but I think the same purpose would be served 
by s.uch a 1tip I as the enclosed, accompanying the publi-
cation of the note . And it would be best that this tip 
should be given out from the Executive Office, while the 
note was g:_j,ven out by the Department of State. What do 
you think?::>9 
Bryan was greatly relieved and prepared to have the 11postcript11 
sent out with the note . In the rre antime, Lansing had discovered 
what was in the wind, and with Garrison, Burleson and Tumulty, 
called on the President . Whether owing to these remonstrances, 
or to his own reconsideration of the subject, Wilson wrote Bryan 
a second letter on May 13, 1915: 
5B Ibid. , V, 339 . 
59 Bryan, ££• cit., P • 400. 
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Since I expressed nzy- approval of the statement you 
suggested for the press, I have heard something, in-
directly, from the German Embassy, which convinces me 
that we would lose all chance of bringing Germany to 
reason if we in any way or degree indicated to them, 
or to our own public, that this note was merely the 
first word in a prolonged debate. I wi 11 tell you what 
I have in mind when I do not have to write it. 
In the me an time, I beg that you vd 11 pardon me for 
changing :m;r mind thus. I am sure that it is the safer 
course, the one more likely to produce the results we 
are all praying for. Please withdraw the message (the 
supplementary statement) altogether. If we say any-
thing of the kind it must be a little 1 a:ter, after the 
not(e) has had its first effect.bO 
106 
Thus on May 13, 1915, t he note, practically as drafted by 
Wilson, was transmitted to Germany. 61 It was signed by Bryan and 
went out unaccompanied by the postscript which he had counted on 
modifying it. Bryan now relied upon a compensatory protest against 
60 Ibid., pp. 401-2. Wilson further explains on October 30, 
1916: "No postscript or amendrre nt of the Lusitania note was ever 
written or contemplated by me except such changes as I nzy-self in-
serted which strengthened and emphasized the protest. It was suggested, 
after the note was ready for transmission, that an intimation be 
conveyed to the German Government that a proposal for arbitration 
would be acceptable, and one member of the Cabinet spoke to me about 
it, but it was never discussed in the Cabinet meeting, and no threat 
of any resignation was ever made, for the very good reason that I 
rejected the suggestion after giving it such consideration as I 
thought every proposal deserved which touched so grave a matter. 
It was inconsistent with the purpose of the note . The public is 
in possession of everything that was said to the German Govern-
ment." Baker, ~• cit., V, 341. 
61 See Foreign Relations of the United States, Supplementary, 
1915, PP• 393-96. Also see Appendix J. 
Great Britain's blockade measures and some action to restrain 
.Americans from travelling on British ships. On Mi:if 14, 1915, 
Bryan wrote Wilson: 
At .uzy- request he Q:.ansing) prepared a notice such as we 
discussed, warning passengers against taking these ships 
pending negotiations. Ee is doubtful about the wisdom 
of issuing the notice, fearing that it ma;y raise the 
question as to why we did not issue an earlier notice. 
While this question ma;y be asked, I think it is better 
for us to have the qµestion asked and answered, rather 
than run the risk of_ any more attacks. I believe that 
the issuance of such a notice muld not on]y be likely 
to protect the lives of some .Americans and thus lessen 
the chances of another calami11'1, but would have its 
effect upon the tone of the German reply and might point 
the wa;y to an understanding. At least it would probably 
prevent any~p-ng like a summary dismiss al of our pro-
test •••• 
Wilson replied the sane da;y: · 
?,zy- feeling is this: the request is unnecessary, if the 
object is to save lives, because the danger is already 
fully known and those who do not refrain because of the 
danger will not, in all probability, refrain because we 
request them to do so; and this is not the time to make 
it, not only for the reason Mr. Lansing suggests, but also 
because, as I urged this morning, it weakens the effect 
or our sa;ying to Germany that we mean to support our 
citizens in the exercise of their right to travel both 
on our ships and on belligerent. If I thought the 
notice necessary, or effective, to save lives, the 
second objection might be waived, but since I do not, 
I think the second objective ought to prevai1.63 
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Thu.s two of Bryan's cherished plans for modifying .American 
diplomacy had both been rejected -- postponing the accounting with 
62 4 Bryan, op. cit., p. 02. 
63 Ibid., P• 403. 
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Germany as we were doing with England, and getting our citizens out 
of the way of retaliatory processes. However, one chance remained64 
I 
that of trying to exact from England the same strict respect that we 
were exacting from Germany. To this Wilson had agreed, and to this hope 
Bryan now clung. 
Bryan again wrote Wilson on Mey 16, 1915, asking if he would 
not send a protest to Britain. However, Wilson was being persuaded 
by a letter sent by House on the same dey, intimating that Britain 
might lift the food embargo to Germany. However, by Mey 18, 1915, 
when House 1 s letters became more pessimistic, Wilson cabled House 
showing his determination to go on with the protest to Britain as 
Bryan urged. I:t was folly t0 think that even if Grey had initiated 
his proposal of lifting the food embargo Germany would have accepted, 
j 
for Germany had clearly stated th at raw materials of manufacture 
must also be permitted to come in before she would drop her sub-
marine campaign. Wilson must have perceived these difficulties for 
on t he 23rd he wrote House: 
In your conversations with Sir Edward, please make it 
plain that it is not foodstuffs only in which we are 
interested, but all non-contraband shipments t0 neutral 
ports, and that the purchase of our cotton illegally 
intercepted does not help matters because it is the 
64 This explains why Bryan signed the first note and remained 
in the Cabinet . Houston claims that Bryan I s signing of the first 
note and refusal to sign the- second note was inconsistent and, thus, 
Bryan 1 s reasons for signing were little :i:;ersonal reasons. 
principal and not the money we insist on. 
We feel that the blockade recently proclaimed has not 
been made in fact effective and the impression prevails 
here that Sir Edward Grey has not been able to fulfill his 
assurances given us at t he time of the Order in Council 
that the order would be carried out in such a way as not to 
affect our essential rights. 
There is an accumulating public opinion here upon our 
matters of which I think the ministers there should know, and 
th~ :eceg
5
t explanations do not touch the essence or meet the 
opiru.on. 
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Possibly House was being used by Britain again for the policy of delajy-. 
Wilson was undoubtedly annoyed at the inactivity of House. On ¥1.ay 28th 
came a cablegram from House stating all of Page's hopeful predictions 
of improvement of British conduct as well as House I s advice that no 
new note be sent until the British Government had answered the last 
one, and until the German answer to the United States' note of Majy-
13th was in.66 Thus the last of Brvan's hopes of a counter-balancing 
protest was frustrated, for on]y three days later, May 31st, the Ger-
man reply to the American note reached Washington. From that time on the 
break between Wilson and Bryan became inevitable. 
When t he German reply to the President's note came in on May 
31st, Bryan's anxiety greatly increased. It seemed to him that 
unless drastic changes were made in .America I s policy, war and 
possibly immediate war would occur. The note itself was argumentative 
65 Baker, 2£• cit., V, 346. 
66 See Foreign Relations of the United States, Supplement, 
1915, P• 407. 
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and unsatisfactory in that it did not directly meet the .Arrerican 
contentions and demands. It implied that the policy of the submarine 
blockade would be continued arrl that cases involving neutrals aris-
ing under it would be dealt with individually. Finally, it 
ventured to contest the American assertion that the sinking of the 
Lusitania was inexcusable and attempted to discuss the matter.67 
Wilson began at orx:e to draft a reply, working entirely alone!> 
The note seems to have been completed in one evening, May 31st, with 
possible corrections early in the morning of June 1st. The President's 
proposed note again insisted upon the principles embodied in 
acknowledged international law: 
Whatever be the other facts regarding the Lusitania, 
the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily 
and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying 
more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in 
the conduct of the war, was torp~doed and sunk without 
so nruch as a challenge or a warning, and that men, wo-
men, and children were sent to their death in circum-
stances unparalleled in modern warfare. The f act that 
more than one hundred American citizens were among 
67 There is some conjecture of thought that the Germans 
answered the note in this manner due to Bryan's talk with the 
Austrian Ambassador to the United States, Dwnba. Aft er their 
talks, Dwnba concluded that the United States did not take the 
note seriously. Actually Bryan had said nothing of the kind, 
although it was known that he was against Wilson's policies. 
Perhaps he betrayed this feeling in not what he said, but 
rather in how he said it. Nevertheless, Bryan was completely 
exonerated both by Wilson and the newspapers. Note Bryan, 
.9.E• cit., pp. 377-82, for the Dwnba episode. This incident had 
nothing directly to do with Bryaa's resignation. 
those who perished made it the duty of the Government 
of the United States to speak of these things and once 
more, with solemn emphasis, to call the at tent ion of 
the imperial German Government to the grave responsi-
bility which the Government of the United States con-
ceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, 
and to the indisputable principle upon which that 
responsibility rests. The Government of the United 
States is contending for something much greater than 
mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It 
is contending for nothing less high and sacred than 
the rights of humanity, which every government honors 
itself in respecting and which no government is justi-
fied in resigning on behalf of those under its care 
and authority.68 
ll1 
On June 2, 191.5, Bryan wrote Wilson pleading for delay 
in sending the reply, arguing that ample time should be given 
for deliberation in the spirit of the cooling-off treaties. 
He also favored judicial consideration of the allega-
tions of fact brought by the Germans, arguing that the 
preliminary requirement of acceptance of principles 
was contrary to customary procedure. He disagreed 
with Lansing on the ,rights of passengers in armed 
ships, arguing I the character of the vessel is 
determined, not by whether she resists or not, but by 
whether she is armed or not ••• the fact that she is 
armed ~aises the presumption that she will use her 
arms. ,b9 
On June .5, 191.5, Houston records that tm Cabinet thought the note 
was admirable except for slight modification: 
I suggested that it would be useless to demand flatly 
that Germany give up the use of the submarine, but that 
it was imperative that he demand that she use it in ac-
cordance with the law of :nations and the dictates of 
68 Ibid., V, 3.53. 
b9 Ibid., V, 3.54. 
humanity, and that she must not imperil or destroy our 
ships, or endanger the lives of our citizens travelling 
on ships on which they had a right to travel. I suggested 
that he lay the emphasis on our own ships and on the safety 
of our own citizens on whatever ships they were lawfully 
travelling, and that other neutral nations might be 
trusted t2 do their own protesting about their ships and 
citizens.10 
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Bryan, still opposing opinions such as those of Houston, wrote 
to Wilson again on June 5th. Although the letter contained no new 
points, it was a very he?,rtfelt plea and is therefore worth quoting: 
The fact that the note to Germany has not yet been 
completed encourages me to treapass upon your time for 
a moment to present again three matters which, to rrr:/' 
mind, are necessany to insure us against war with 
Germany. 
First, a reference to the plan embodied in our thirty 
treaties -- the principle of which has been accepted by 
Germany. Her mention of arbitration opens the way and 
makes the suggestion easy, if it does not in fact compel 
the suggestion. It will ensure a peaceful settlement of 
this controversy. 
Second, steps to prevent passenger ships from carrying 
annnunition. This is referred to by Germany. Action ought, 
in wy judgment, to be taken before the reply is sent. 
Third, before we send another note t o Germany, I think 
we should make a renewed protest to Great Britain against 
interference with our trade with neutrals. These three 
propositions have been under consideration before. The 
first was decided upon -- that is the idea was given to 
the public and communicated to Germany -- but you were 
dissuaded by something that you heard. The second is 
thought by the Attorney General to be possible -- and even 
if it could not be accompli shed as a matter of fact, the 
same end could be reached almost as well by advice such as 
was given to Americans in Mexico. The third suggestion was 
70 Houston, op. cit., II, 39, 40. 
about to be carried out but you were dissuaded by a 
message from Y.tr . House. 
If the initiative were with us I would not fear war, 
for I am sure you do not want it, but when the note is 
sent it is Germany's next move •••• If the note causes 
her to act in an unfriendly way it may cause conditions 
here that will increase the difficulties of our position. 
This may be our last chance to s~ ak for peace, for it 
will be much harder to propose investigation after some 
unfriendly act than now.71 
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Wilson, in a possible compromise attempt, wrote Bryan on 
June 5, 1915, a letter which was to spell defeat for the Commoner: 
I am inclined to think that we ought to take steps as 
you suggest, to prevent our citizens from travelling on 
ships carrying munitions of war, and I shall seek to find 
the legal way to do it. I fear that, whatever it may be 
best to do about that, it is clearly impossible to act 
before the new note goes to Germany. 
I am sorry to say that, study as I mey the way to do it 
without hopelessly weakening our protest, I cannot find a 
way to embody in our note the principle of long discussion 
of a very simple state of facts; and I think that our 
object with England can be gained better by not sending it; 
and, after all, it is our object and the relief of our trade 
that we wish to accomplish. 
I recast the note last night. I hope you wi..11 think a 
little better of it. 
I would be very much obliged if you would go over it~for 
substance, making any suggestion that may- occur to you. 1 
Thus, Bryan had seen all his hopes dashed on the rocks. He 
could not get a counter-balancing protest to England; he could not 
get the President to agree on .Americans travelling on the high seas; 
71 Curti, ~• cit., p. 212 •. 
72 r' Baker, ~• cit., V, 35.::,. 
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and finally he was unable to get the principle of long discussion or 
his cooling off treaty principle, embodied in the second note. He 
felt that as phrased, and particularly with no protest having been sent 
to England the note left Germany no chance to do anything but refuse to 
discontinue her submarine warfare. That could only mean war. Bryan 
felt that his only recourse was to resign, which he did on June 8, 
1915. 
On June 8, 1915, Wilson received the following letter of 
resignation from Bryan: 
:t,zy- dear Mr. President:. 
It is with sincere regret that I have reached the con-
clusion that I should return to you the commission of 
Secretary of State with which you honored me at the begin-
ning of your administration. 
Obedient to yo~r sense of duty and actuated by the highest 
motives,, you have prepared f r transmission to the German 
Government a note in which I cannot join wi. thout violating 
what I deem to be an obligation to rcy- country, and the issue 
involved is of such moment that to remain a member of the 
Cabinet would be as unfair to you as it would be to the cause 
wbich is nearest rrry heart, namely, the prevention of war. 
I, therefore, respectfully tender rcy- resignation, to take 
effect when the note is sent, unless you prefer an earlier 
hour. (Alike) desirous of reaching a peaceful solution of 
the problems arising out of the use of the submarines against 
merchantmen, we find ourselves differing irreconcilably as to 
the methods which should be employed. 
It falls to your lot to speak officially for the nation; 
I consider it to be none the less rrry duty to endeavor as a 
private citizen to promote the end which you have in view by 
means which you do not feel at liberty to use. 
In severing the intimate and pleasant relations which have 
existed between us during the past two years, permit me to 
acknowledge the profound satisfaction which it has given 
me to be associated with you in the important work which 
has come before the State Departoont, and to thank you 
for the courtesies extended. 
With the heartiest good wishes for your personal wel-
fare and for the success of your administration, I a.m, 
:R\Y" dear Mr. President, 
Very truly yours, 
73 W. J. Bryan. 
On the same day Wilson replied to Bryan's resignation: 
Ivty- dear Mr. Bryan: 
I accept your resignation only because you i nsist upon 
its acceptance; and I accept it with much more than deep 
regret, with a feeling of personal sorrow. Our two years 
of close association have been very delightful to me. Our 
judgments have accorded in practically every matter of 
official duty and of public policy until now; your support 
of the work and purposes of the administration has been 
generous and loyal beyond praise; your devotion to the 
duties of your great office and your eagerness to take 
advantage of eve:ry great opportunity for service it offered 
has been an example to the rest of us; you have earned our 
affectionate admiration and friendship. Even now we are not 
separated in the object we seek but only in the method by 
which we seek it. 
It is for these reasons nzy- feeling about your retirement 
from the Secretaryship of State goes so much deeper than 
regret. I sincerely deplore it. Our objects are the same 
and we ought to pursue them together. I yield to your 
desire onzy because I must and wish to bid you Godspeed 
in the parting. We shall continue to work for the same 
causes even when we do not work in the same way. 
With affectionate regard, s i ncerely yours, 
Woodrow Wilson. 74 
73 Bryan, -9£• cit., PP• 406-7 • 
74 Ibid., PP• 407-8. 
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Many people, as did Secretary Houston, held the opinion that 
Bryan had resigned to promote an active campaign on the outside 
against the policies of Wilson and, furthermore that he had quit 
under fire. 75 Houston held t hat Bryan could not logically sign the 
first note and not sign the second note. We have already seen why 
Bryan signed the first note and not the second. Bryan had drawn 
the conclusion from Wilson's letter accepting his resignation that 
both he and Wilson were working for the same ends, but that Wilson 
because he had the high of fice of presidency could not acti vely 
campaign for the method of peace as suggested by Bryan. The Commoner 
also thoughtthe people wanted what he stood for; that is, the consider-
ation of every possible opportunity for arbitration. Thus Bryan did 
not resign for petty reasons, although he had many, nor did he quit 
under fire. Daniels records a meeting between McAdoo and Bryan: 
McAdoo told Bryan, 1This will destroy you', (the resigna-
tion of Bryan) to which Bryan replied, 'I believe you are 
right; I think this w.i.11 destroy me; but whether it does 
or not, I must do my duty according to JJJiY' conscience, and 
if I am destroyed it is, after all, mereJ.y the sacrifice 
that one must make to serve God and his country. 176 
Both House and Page were greatJ.y relieved at Bryan I s resignati on. 
They both felt that Wilson could now be more sure that his Cabinet 
would support unanimously any measures that might be necessary to 
75 Houston, ~• cit., II, 146-Lr7. 
76 Daniels, 2£• cit., P• 430. 
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carry out his policies. 77 House also recorded that Bryan told Gregory 
after he had resigned that there had been inserted in the second note 
a sentence which Bryan had written. The Commoner claimed the i nser-
tion had been eliminated before his resignation, and was agai n placed 
in the note after his resignation. "Mr. Bryan evidently wished it to 
appear that he resigned because the President refused to include a 
certain sentence modifying the note, and, after he resigned, the 
sentence was used. 11 
Thus, the question arises, did Bryan know of the sentence 
placed in the note before or after he resigned? The insertion 
placed in the note was as follows: 
If the Imperial German Government should deem itself 
to be in possession of convincing evidence that the 
officials of tre Government of t he United States did not 
perform these duties with thoroughness the Government of 
the United States sincerely hopes t hat i t will submit that 
evidence for consideration.78 
In other words this addition left the door open between the United 
States and Germany for further diplomatic negotiations. Without 
this addition, the door was closed. .A5 we have seen, Iryan 
throughout the years he served as Secretary of State stood for the 
principle of mediation. If there was the slightest bit of hope 
for mediation, Bryan was in favor. Bryan resigned because he 
thought the note would le ad to war with Germany. He would not 
77 Seymour, .9.£• cit., II, 8 
78 Bryan, ~• cit., pp. 408-9. 
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have thought this in all probability if the principle of mediation had 
been contained in the note. 
We have also seen that in the letter of Wilson to Bryan on 
June 5th, the President would not consider Bryan's suggestion with 
regard to .American rights on the sea until after the note was sent . 
The President also stated he knew of no way to insert the principle 
of 11 long discussion" without destroying tm object of the note to Ger-
many. The recasting of the note was dore before the President 1s letter 
to Bryan. In other words the President stated on June 5th that he 
could not embody the principle of 11 long discussion" contained in the 
cooling-off treaties in his note to Germany. Recasting was done on 
June 5th and the principle of mediation was not in the note, but it 
did appear in the final drafting of the note on June 9th. Bryan 
must not have known of the insertion for his resignation was tendered 
on June 8th and he had not seen the note since June 5th.79 
Bryan refused to discuss the change in the note after he had 
left office. The public failed to find in the altered note an 
ultimatum to Germany and the Commoner was lashed both by the pr ess 
and the people for leaving his post and for claiming the note was 
harsher than, in its final form, it proved to be. Bryan calmly 
79 The investigator has checked with the Archives in Washing-
ton for the steps in the drafting of the note but received no satis-
faction. However, it is still logical to assume Bryan had no 
knowledge of the change at tre tire his re/Signation was tendered 
and accepted. 
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made speeches urging the people to support more strong]y the Presi-
dent in offers of mediation. However, when war was declared nearly 
two years later he offered his services to the country. Daniels 
recorded that Bryan in his support of the war declared: 
There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of 
makLng; we will not choose the path of submission and suffer 
the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be 
ign0red or violated. The ~-rongs against which we now array 
ourselves are no common wrongs: they cut to the very roots 
of human life.80 · 
Josephus Daniels quoted the following words, from Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, which best described the nature of the services of 
Bryan for his country: 
What if another sit beneath the shade 
Of the broad elm I planted by the way 
What if another heed the beacon light 
I set upon the rock that wrecked my keel, -8 Have I not done my task and served my kind? 1 
80 D · 1 ·t 433 anie s, ~- ~-, P• • 
81 Ibid., P• 115. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
As we have seen William Jennings Bryan was the man most 
responsible in securing fl.or Wilson the nomination for President 
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at the Baltimore Conventioo. Bryan, had he so desired, had many 
chances to defeat Wilson. The Commoner had first been offered the 
job as temporary chairman of the Convention, but had refused. By 
the time of the Convention Bryan was nearly convinced that Champ 
Clark was controlled by the big interests; thus, he did not want 
to accept the offer, made by Clark, of the position of temporary 
chairman. The Bryan-Parker telegram episode more clearly crys-
tallized the thinking of Bryan, for Wilson was the only candidate 
who had answered favorably to Bryan . The Bryan resolution was the 
death blow to the hopes of Clark and resulted in a Wilson victory 
for the nomination. Even against the instructions of the Nebraska 
delegation, the Commoner voted for Wilson. Bryan's choice, in 
turn, influenced a great many other delegations. Bryan threw his 
great political influence to Wilson because Wilson was an outstanding 
progressive. The C mmoner knew that an out-and-out progressive was 
0 
needed in order that the Democratic Party might gain the victory in 
November. There was little to fear from the Republican Party if a 
progressive candidate were elected. The Republican Party had split 
its loyalties between Taft and Roosevelt with the latter being th~ 
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only one to fear . If the Democrats put up a strong progressive candi-
date, even Roosevelt had little chance of winning. Thus, the Commoner 
was more than indirectly responsible for Woodrow Wilson's becoming 
President of the United States. 
The part that Colonel Edward M. House played in the conven-
tion is not definitely known. The Colonel, although 3,000 miles 
away, claimed to control the Texas delegation and a few other delegates 
which were enough to keep Clark from getting a two-thirds majority. 
Thereby, House claims a great share in Wilson's securing the nomination • 
.Actual proof is missing. No scholar seems to have checked any of the 
delegates from Texas to prove one way or another the claim of House. 
However, both the accounts of Daniels and Ray Stannard Baker take the 
view that House controlled no delegates whatsoever. Neither does 
Tumulty make any mention of House's influence in the Convention and 
Mccombs complet ely refutes t he idea. -!1 conjunction with other cl aims 
of House which appear also to be fa.J,se, the author believes t hat House 
only wanted' to take share in the glory. The Colonel did not want to 
serve in a responsible position, as in the cabinet. Actually, not 
enough study has been done on the subject tonake a positi ve s t at ement. 
House's part in securing the confidence of Wilson and the powers 
he derived from Wilson's trust have not been clearly explained. It is 
known t hat House early gave up the notion to enter politics in the 
open. He saw that only a few men in t he House and Senate practically 
ruled the country along with the President. House wanted to be the 
power behind the throne. Probably through his many letters showing 
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himself to be completely in accord with the President, he secured 
the President's confidence . The President became more and more 
convinced that House and he were of the same mind. This was a fatal 
mistake by the President, for House disagreed with many things the 
President believed in: confidence in the people, military preparation, 
dollar diplomacy, an:i the banking system. Although House disagreed 
with Wilson, he still sent Wilson letters expressing his accord, thus 
preserving the idea that · he and Wilson were of the same mind. 
Bryan was appointed Secretary of State largely by the insistence 
of House. One of the greatest faults that House found with Bryan was 
that he could not be advised. Thus, House did not urge Bryan 's 
appointment in order to advise him. Bryan was not particularly fitted, 
as no doubt others were, for filling the Secretaryship of State. 
Although Bryan understood domestic issues rather well, he was ill-
informed at the time of his appointment on foreign affairs. Thus, 
House did not urge him for the position because of his ability to 
serve in this capacity. The only reasonable explanation is that 
House urged the appointment of Bryan as Secretary of State in order 
to get him out of the way. Bryan carried, and had long enjoyed 
a large public following which could easily defeat the plans of 
not only House and Page, but even Wilson himself. House's plan, 
11ndoubtedly, was to get Bryan into the office and then work around 
him. On the outside of the Administration Bryan might have proved 
to be too difficult to handle. 
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Hardly more than a month after the inauguration the newspapers 
were full of articles to the effect that the President was ignoring 
;/I 
Bryan and his office. The Commoner reassured the country that he 
and the President were in sympathetic unity on all matters of importance 
in foreign policy. Yet Wilson constantly wrote important instructions 
which ordinarily the Secretary of State would draft; and, he kept in 
close touch with foreign countries, and with our Ambassadors abroad, 
through Colonel House, with the result that Bryan often did not knOW' 
what was going on, or what the President's real position was. In 
spite of this, as well as many efforts made to break up the relations 
Clllf Wilson and Bryan, Wilson had both confidence in, and admiration 
for Bryan. It was this attitude -which made Bryan I s position tolerable 
by giving him some opportunity to influence the adminis tr at ion. It 
is therefore important to judge Bryan's consistency to his peace 
principles in situations in which he had reasonable . freedom . Yet 
it is also important not to forget that in major policies Bryan had 
to follow rather than lead. Many who have criticized his inconsistencies 
have forgotten that. Such examples of Bryan's inconsistencies are: 
his approval of force in the Huerta crisis; and, his seemingly apparent 
approval of the use of dollar diplomacy in the Caribbean area. These 
inconsistencies show that Bryan was not a pacifist to the point of 
pea~e at any priee. 
The Commoner, like Wilson, was convinced that f orce was 
necessary in Mexico. However, in this case, he followed the ideas 
of Wilson. Wilson believed that no moral, stable government could 
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exist if it obtained its power through force and not through the 
expressed wishes of the people. Bryan deeply believed in Wilson's 
policy and felt that the intervention of the United States was for 
the benefit of the Mexican people. Bryan did not take the position 
that the_ United States had no right to interfere into the affairs of 
other governments whether for their benefit or not. 
It was an ironic fact indeed that both Bryan and Wilson 
abhorred dollar diplomacy, and yet found themselves using this 
policy, if anything even to a great extent, in the Caribbean area. 
Yet there was probably little either of the men could do . Because 
of past administration, the government was committed to its business-
men. , Bryan had proposed a plan by which the government itself should 
lend the necessary capital, but Wilson was not yet ready to flaunt 
big business. Bryan then proposed a type of protectorate over the 
Caribbean nations, for they were desperately in need of financial 
aid and something had to be done at once. The Commoner felt that 
in this case, the American goverJ111Ent would still be the controlling 
factor and could protect these nations from being exploited by big 
business. He also saw that if the United States did not do something 
at once, these nations might turn to Europe for help. This might in 
turn lead to the United States invoking the Monroe Doctrine and if 
this occurred, war might result. However, the Senate refused to 
confirm Bryan I s plan and the Commoner had no other course but to 
allow the businessmen to contiilmle their practise of dollar diplomacy. 
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The last inconsistency to keep in mind is that although Bryan was a 
pacifist, he did not allow his pacifism to extend so far as to be 
inconsistent with his principles of nationalism. Although Count 
Leo Tolstoy influenced his life, the Commoner did not believe in the 
Spanish-American War; he had authorized the use of force in Mexico 
as well as in the Caribbean states; and, when the United States 
entered World War I, he again volunteered his services immediately. 
While serving in the capacity of Secretary of State, his position 
had always been that if we were to enter on one side or the other, 
let us do it, but, if we were to remain neutral, then..J.et us do that. 
Bryan believed the greatest contribution he had made to world 
peace was embodied in his "cooling off 11 treaties. Although treaties 
of arbitration, they were intended 11-:t;o provide means for the peaceful 
solution of all questions of differen~e which it shall be found 
impossible in the future to settle by diplomacy • 11 This was a 
recognition of one of the essential ideas that Bryan had continuously 
worked for. The second article in the text provided for the creation 
of joint high commissions of inquiry, instituted for each difference, 
and committing the parties to abstain from hostilities during the 
year in which the commission maie its investigation. Recommendations 
of the commission were not to be binding. 
A month after Bryan took office as Secretary of State, he began 
taking carefully planned steps for the negotiation of his arbitration 
treaties. He had already secured Wilson's awroval before taking 
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office. As a result of Cabinet discussion, certain minor changes 
were made in the draft which Bryan had drawn up. The Commomr than 
went to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and won its 
approval. Partly due to the committee's objection and partly to 
fear that the larger foreign Powers might be opposed, a provision 
that the period of investigation would not be used for a change 
in the naval or military program of the contracting parties, was 
omitted. Ironically the outbreak of World War I mey have saved 
these treaties for the preservation of peace, for only a bare 
quorum voted on the treaties. The rest of the Senators did not 
take interest in the treaties. 
Bryan was not given a clear opportunity to learn the European 
situation. He did not receive the confidential despatches of Page, 
but House did. The Colonel kept himself on intimate relations with 
the Ambassadors Page, Herrick, and Gerard . Bryan received little 
information from the President, for Wilson seemed to be more worried 
over domestic issues. Wilson was content for some time to let House 
have an alm9st free rein in the European situation. Bryan had 
decided to make a trip several times to Europe to study the situation 
at first hand, but due to House I s dissuading the President, the 
Commoner was not able to realize the trip. House had contributed 
nothing to peace but he had gone to Europe both in 1914 and 1915 to 
study andrreport to the President what he saw in Europe. Although 
Wilson had decided to become his own Secretary of State, it is 
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difficult to understand why he could let a man not even commissioned 
go to Europe arrl at the same time let his ow Secretary of State who 
was bearing the heavy responsibilities of that position, remain at 
ho:roo not knowing what was happening -- but tha:t was House I s plan 
and thanks also to Page, it succeededG 
When House got to Europe in 1914, he seems to have started on 
a deliberate attempt to ruin the reputation as well as the powers of 
the Secretary of State. ·Europe as a whole seems to have trusted the 
.American people but not the Amerl.can Government. When House spread 
the words that unlike the Secretary of State, the President was 
strong, courageous and iron-willed, this only added to thei r beliefs . 
They were told many times not to take the Secretary seriously, and 
perhaps this as much as anything else explains why the Germans did 
not take the First Lusitania Note seriously. 
In both of his missions, which House termed 11·The Great Adventure", 
he succeeded in doing nothing for the United States, but on the other 
hand, became a pawn of the Allies. Both House and Page have this 
dubious distinction. Early Allied diplomacy was based on delczy-, delczy-
in order to build their war machine and delay in order to tie their 
own economic policies with those of the United States. To these 
policies House contributed a great deal for he comtantly urged Wilson 
to delay time and time againl when Wilson planned to send a note of 
protest to England concerning infringements upon American rights on 
the high seas. 
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The American policy of neutrality-, as laid down by Wilson, was 
defeated in House's policies of delclf• Bryan was constantly urging 
policies of arbitration which were very statesmanlike, but they were 
all blocked. House had become convinced that .America's only policy 
should be the complete devastation of German militarism. This 
certainJ.y was a strange position for a peacemaker to take! .Although 
Wilson had sent House on a peace mission, House in 1915 completely 
denied this as the purpose of his mission. He ha:l. succeeded in 
helping the .Allies delay the President's notes of protest; he had 
succeeded in keeping Wilson from proclaiming an armnunition embargo; 
he had succeeded in keeping Bryan from going to Europe; and, he had 
succeeded in keeping Bryan's mediation proposals from being used. 
Ambassador Page was even more pro-British, if possible, than 
House. He constantly urged Wilson that he British were engaged in a 
struggle that .America itself should be fighting. Page even went so 
far as to help Sir Edward Grey form replies to protests sent by the 
United States. It was Page who added to Wilson's hesitancy by his drawn-
line formula. He informed Wilson that the war would soon be a drawn 
line stalemate and t hat after a period of time both sides would be 
more agreeable to mediation. This policy was in accord with the 
British policy of del;zy-. 
Bryan, after seeing his last hope crushed, decided he could do 
nothing else but resign. He bad seen his mediation efforts go 
thwarted. He had stated tha:t if we were to choose sides, then we 
should do it; but, if we were to become neutral, than we should 
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be absolutely neutral. Bryan was unable to get the President to send 
a protest to England at the same time he sent the first and second 
Lusitania Notes. He had promised the people that while he was in 
office there would be no war, and he could see nothing left but war 
if the Second Note were sent to Germaey. It is probable that he 
lmew nothing of the addition -which toned down the note, but even 
this would probably not have kept him in office. Again there has 
not been enough stud.,v on. the actual drafting of the note to prove 
whether Bryan knew of the addition to the note or not. The author 
believes it likely that he had no knowledge of this insertion. 
Finally, the author would like to discuss the value of the 
Intimate Papers of Colonel House. It is understood by this author 
that this book is the generally accepted work of the period. The 
author believes that although the book is valuable in the sense that 
it shows the works of House in respect to Wilson, Bryan, and Page, 
that it is not historically true in so many places, that if used 
at all it must be used with extreme reservations. There are too 
maey inaccuracies in the book, such as: House's advising ~ilson on 
the tariff which was not true; House I s claiming to draw up the Glass-
Owen currency reform bill, which was not true; House's attempts to 
show his being in complete accordance with Wilson, which was not 
true; House I s claim that he controlled the Texas delegation thus 
making Wilson's nomination possible which appears to be false; 
and House's claim that his missions to Europe were not for the 
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purpose of making peace overtures when they were supposed to be. 
Thus it appears that House tried to claim most of the glory that 
should have been given to William Jennings Bryan. Bryan, himself, 
seems not to have noticed House's intrigue, or at least to have made 
no mention of it. The Connnoner probably would not have gone out of 
his way to claim any credit and never did so in his career except 
when confronted with false information. The Commoner had a 
record of service to the cause of democracy that could speak for 
itself. In 1890, he had stood practically alone for tlB popular 
election of United States' Senators; he had constantly urged the 
passing of an income tax since 1891. Although the bill failed to 
pass, it was in every platform on which he ran for President, and 
shortly before he became Secretary of State, the bill was made law. 
He was one of the foremost workers in the issues of woman suffrage 
and prohibition; and, he was to a great deal responsible for 
securing the passage of the Federal Reserve Act. There are many 
more policies that he stood for and aided in securing as law, but 
none stand out more than his cooling-off treaties. Thus, the Commoner 
took undeserved abuse from the publie in resigning. He was denounced 
as a coward and accused of having had to resign under pressure. None 
of these statements were true, but the Commoner did little in defend-
ing himself, for be feared that Wilson might have had to take abuse 
from the public. He resigned not because re felt antagonism towards 
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anyone, although he had plenty of reasons, but merely on a difference 
of principle . He believed that he was serving both his God and the 
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WHY BRYAN CHANGED FROM CLARK TO WILSON 
(From the Official Proceedings of the Democratic National 
Convention, 1912, page 233 . ) 
Mr . Bryan, of Nebraska: Nebraska is a progressive State . Only 
twice has she given her vote to a Democratic candidate for President, 
in 1898 and in 1908, and on both occasions her vote was cast for a 
progressive ticket, running upon a progressive platform. Between these 
two elections, in the election of 1904, she gave a Republican plurality 
of 85,000 against a Democratic reactionary. In the recent primaries 
the total vote cast for Clark and Wilson was over 34,ooo, and the vote 
cast for Harmon something over 12,000, showing that the party is now 
more than three-fourths progressive. The Republican party of Nebraska 
is progressive in about the same proportion. The situation in Nebraska 
is not materially different from the situation throughout the country 
west of the Alleghenies. In the re ent Republican primaries, fully 
two- thirds of the Republican vote was cast for candidates representing 
progressive policies . 
In this convention the progressive sentiment is overwhelming. 
Every candidate has proclaimed himself a progressive. No candidate 
would have any considerable following in this convention if he 
admitted himself out of harmony with progressive ideas . 
By your resolution, adopted night before last, you, by a vote 
of more than fo11llr to one, pledged the country that you would nominate 
for the Presidency no man who represented or was obligated to Morgan, 
Ryan, Belmont, or any other member of the privilege- seeking, favor-
hunting class. This pledge, if kept, will have more influence on the 
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result of the election than the platform or the nrure of the candi-
date . How can that pledge be made effective? There is but one way; 
namely, to nominate a candidate who is under no obligation to those 
whom these influences directly or i ndirectly control. The vote of 
the State of New York in this convention, as cast under the unit rule, 
does not represent the intelligence, the virtue, the Democracy or 
the patriotism of the ninety men who are here . It represents the 
will of one man -- Charles F. Murphy -- and he represents the influ-
ences that dominated the Republican convention at Chicago and are 
trying to dominate this convention. (Applause . ) If we nominate a 
candidate under conditions th at enable these influences to say to 
our candidate , "Remember now thy creator," we cannot hope to appeal 
to the confidence of the progressive Democrats and Republicans of the 
nation . Nebraska, or that portion of the delegation for which I am author-
ized to speak, is not willing to violate the resolution adopted by this 
convention, and to accept the high honor of the Presidential nomination 
at the hands of Mr. Murphy . ( 11,pplause . ) 
When we were instructed for Mr . Clark, the Democratic voters who 
instructed us did so with the distinct understanding that Mr. Clark 
stood for progressive Democracy . (Applause . ) Mr . Clark's representa-
tives appealed for support on no other ground . They contended that 
Mr. Clark was more progressive than Mr . Wilson, and indignantly denied 
that there was any cooperation between Mr . Clark and the reactionary 
el ement of the party . Upon no other condition could Mr . Clark have 
received a plurality of the Democratic vote of Nebraska. The thirteen 
delegates for whom I speak stand ready to carry out the instructions 
given in the spirit in which they were given, and upon the conditions 
under which they were given (applause); but sorre of t hese delegates 
-- I can not say for how many I can speak, because we have not had a 
chance to take a poll -- will not participate in the nomination of any 
man whose nomination depends upon the fate of the New York delegation. 
(Applause.) 
Speaking for myself and for any of tre delegation who may decide 
to join me, I shall withhold my vote from Mr . Clark as long as New 
York's vote is recorded for him. (Applause.) And t he position that 
I take in regard to Mr. Clark, I will take in regard to any other 
candidate whose name is now or mey be before the convention. I shall 
not be a party to the nomination of any man, no matter who he may- be, 
or from what section of the country he cones, who wi.11 not, when elected, 
be absolutely free to carry out the anti-Morgan-Ryan-Belmont resolution 
and make his administration reflect the wishes and the hopes of those 
who believe in a government of the people, by the people and for the 
people.(Applause.) 
If we nominate a candidate who is under no obligation to these 
interests which speak through Mr. Murphy, I shall offer a resolution 
authorizing and directing the presidential candidate to select a 
campaign committee to manage the campaign, in order that he may not 
be compelled to suffer the humiliation and act under the embarrassment 
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that I have, in having men participate in the management of his 
campaign who have no sympathy with the party 1 s aims, and in whose 
Democracy the general public has no confidence. 
Having explained the position taken by myself and those in the 
delegation who view the subjects from the same standpoint, I will now 
announce my vote -- Mr. Bryan was here interrupted. Continuing, he 
said: Now I am prepared to announce my vote, unless again interrupted. 
With the understanding that I shall stand ready to withdraw my vote 
from the one for whom I am going to cast it whenever New York casts 
her vote for him, I cast my vote for Nebraska 's second choice, 
Governor Wilson. (Applause .) 
Note . -- The Nebraska State Democratic Convention held soon 
after the Baltimore Convention endorsed Mr. Bryan's action. If Mr. 
Bryan's constituents approved his course, who else has the right to 
complain? 
The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan 





SPECIAL MESSAGE ON MEXICAJ.1 RELATIONS 
(Address to Congress, August 27, 1913. From the •Congressional 
~ :: 63D Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 50, pp. 3803- 3804.) 
Gentlemen of the Congress: 
It is clearly my duty to lay before you, very fully and without 
reservation, the facts concerning our present relations with the Republic 
of Mexico . The deplorable posture of affairs in Mexico I neett not 
describe, but I deem it my duty to speak very frankly of what this 
Government has done and should seek to do in fulfillment of its obliga-
tion tG Mexico herself, as a friend and neighbor, and to American cit-
izens whose lives and vital interests are daily affected by the distress -
ing conditions which now obtain beyond our southern border. 
Those conditions touch us very nearly . Not merely because they 
lie at our very doors. That, of cours.e, makes us more vividly and more 
constantly conscious of them, and every instinct of neighborly interest 
and sympathy is aroused and quickened by them; but that is only one 
element in the determination of our duty . We are glad to call ourselves 
the friend of Mexico, and we shall I hope, have many an occasion, in 
happier times as well as in these days of trouble and confusion, to 
show that our friendship is genuine and disinterested, capable of 
s.acrifice and every generous manifestation. The peace , prosperity, and 
contentment of Mexico mean more, much more to us than merely an enlarged 
field for our commerce and enterprise. They rrean an enlargement of the 
field of self-government and the realization of the hopes and rights of 
of a nation with whose best aspirations, so long suppressed and 
disappointed, we deeply sympathize . We shall yet prove to the 
Mexican people that we know how to serve them without first thinking 
how we shall serve ourselves . 
But we are not the only friends of Mexico . The whole world 
desires her pe ace and progress; and the whole world is interested as 
never before . Mexico lies at last where all the world looks on. 
Central America is about to be touched by the great routes of the 
world's trade and intercourse running free from ocean to ocean at t he 
Isthmus . The future has much in store for Mexico as for all the States 
of Central America, but the best gifts can com~ to her only if she be 
ready and free to receive them and to enjoy them honorably . America, 
in particular .America north and south and upon both continents --
waits upon the development of Mexico; d that development can be 
sound and lasting only if it be the product of a genuine freedom, a 
just and ordered government founded upon law. Only so can it be peace-
ful or fruitful of the benefits of peace . Mexico has a great and 
enviable future , before her, if only she choose and attain the paths 
of honest constitutional government . 
The present circumstances of t he Republic, I deeply r egret to 
say , do not seem t o promi se even tre foundat i on of such a peace . We 
have waited many months, months full of peril and anxiety, for the 
conditions there to improve, and they have not improved . They have 
grown worse , rather . The territory in some sort controlled by the 
provisional authorities at Mexico City has grown smaller , not larger . 
The prospect of the pacification of the country, even by arms, has 
seemed to grow more and more remote; and its pacification by the 
authorities at the capitol is evidently impossible by any other means 
than force. Difficulties more and more. entangle those wh o claim to 
constitute the legitimate government of the Republic. They have not 
made good their claim in fact. Their successes in the f ield have 
proved only temporary. War and dis order, devastation and confusion, 
seem to threaten to beco:rre the settled fortune of the distracted 
country. As friends we could wait no longer for a solution which 
every week seemed further away. It was our duty at least to volunteer 
our good offices -- to offer to assist, if we might, in effecting 
some arrangement which would bring relief and peace and set up a 
universally acknowledged political authority there. 
Accordingly, I took t he liberty of sending the Hon. John Lind, 
for merly governor of Mi nnesota, as my personal spokesman and represent-
ative, to the City of Mexico, with the following instructions: 
Press very earnestly up on the attention of those who are now 
exercising authority or wielding influence in Mexico the following 
considerations and advice: 
The Government of the United States does not feel at liberty 
any longer to stand inactively by while it becomes daily more and 
more evident that no real progress is being made towards the establish-
ment of a government at the City of Mexico which the country will obey 
and respect. 
The Government of the United States does not stand in the same 
case with the other great GCJ1Ternments of the world in respect of what 
is happening or what is likely to happen in Mexico. We offer our good 
offices, not only because of our genuine desire to play the part of a 
friend, but also because we are expected by the powers of the world 
to act as Mexico's nearest friend. 
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We wish to act in these circumstances in the spirit of the 
most earnest and close interested friendship. It is our purpose in 
whatever we do or p~opose in this perplexing bad distressing si tua-
tion nnt only to pay the most scrupulous regard to the sovereignty 
and independence of Mexico -- that we t ake as a matter of course to 
which we are bound by every obligation of right and honor -- but also 
to give every possible evidence that we act in the interest of Mexico 
alone, and not in the interest of any person or body of persons who 
ma;y have personal or property claims in Mexico which they may feel 
that they have the right to press. We are seeking to counsel Mexico 
for her own good, and in the int erest of her own peace, and not for 
any other purpose whatever. The Government of t he United States would 
deem itself discredited if it had any selfish or ulter ior purpose 
in transactions where the peace, happiness, a nd prosperity of a whole 
people are involved. ·rt is acting as its friends hip for Mexico, not 
as any selfish interest dictates. 
The present situation in Mexico is incompatibl e with the ful-
fillment of international obligations on the part of Mexico, with the 
civilized development of Mexic o herself, and with t he maintenance of 
tolerable political and economic conditions in Central America. It is 
upon no common occasion, therefore, that t he United States offers her 
counsel and assistance. All .America cries out f or a settlement. 
A satisfactory settlement seems to us to be condi tioned on 
(a) An immediate cessation of fi ghting throughout Mexico, a 
definite armistice solemnly entered into and scrupulous}y observed; 
(b) Security given for an early and free election in which all 
will agree to take part; 
(c) The consent of Gen. Huerta to bind hi mself not to be a 
candidate for election as President of the Republic at this election; 
and 
(d) The agreement of all parties to abide by the results of 
the election and co-operate in the most loyal way in organizing 
and supporting the new administration. 
The Government of the United States will be glad to play any 
part in -this settlement or in its carrying out which it can play- honor-
ab}y and consistently with international right. It pledges itself to 
recognize and in every way possible and proper to assist the administration 
chosen and set up in Mexico in the way and on the conditions suggested. 
Taking all the existing conditions into consideration, the 
Government of the United States can conceive of no reasons sufficient 
to justify those who are now attempting to shape the policy or 
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exercise the authority of Mexico in declining the offices of friend-
ship thus offered. Can Mexico suggest any better way in which to 
show our friendship, and can Mexico give the civilized world a satis-
factory reason for rejecting our good offices? If Mexico can suggest 
any better way in which to show our friendship, serve the people of 
Mexico, and meet our international obligations, we are more than 
willing to consider the suggestion . 
Mr. Lind executed his delicate and difficult mission with 
singular tact, firmness, and good judgment, and made clear to the 
authorities at the City of Mexico not only t he purpose of his visit 
but also the spirit in which it had been undertaken. But the pro-
posals he submitted were rejected, in a note the full test of which I 
take the liberty of ley-ing before you. 
I am led to b elieve that they were rejected partly because the 
authorities at Mexico City had been grossly misinformed and misled upon 
two points. They did not realize the spirit of the Arrerican people in 
this matter, their earnest friendliness and yet sober determination that 
some just solution be found for the Mexican difficulties, and they did 
not believe that the present administration spoke through Mr. Lind, for 
the people of the United States. The effect of this unfortunate mis -
understanding on their part is to leave them singularly isolated and 
without friends who can effectually aid t hem . So long as the mis-
understanding continues we can only await the time of their awaken:i;ng 
to a realization of the actual facts. We can not thrust our good 
offices upon them. The situation must be given a little more time to 
work itself out in the new circumstances; and I believe that only a 
little while will be necessary . For the circum5tances are new. The 
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rejection of our friendship makes them new and will inevitably bring 
its own alterations in the whole aspect of affairs. The actual situ-
ation of the authorities at Mexico City will presently be revealed. 
Meanwhile, what is it our duty to do? Clearly, everything that 
we do must be rooted in patience and done with calm and disinterested 
deliberation. Impatience on our part would be childish, and would be 
fraught with every risk of wrong and folly . We can afford to exercise 
the self-restraint of a real]y great nation which realizes its own 
strength and scorns to misuse it,. It was our duty to offer our active 
assistance. It is now our duty to show what true neutrality will do to 
enable the people of Mexico to set their affairs in order again and 
wait for a further opportunity to offer our friendly counsels. The 
door is not closed against the resumption, either upon the initiative 
of Mexico or upon our own, of the ef fort to bring order out of the 
confusion by friendly co-operative action, should fortunate occasion 
offer. 
While we wait, the contest of the rival forces will undoubted]y 
for a little while be sharper than ever, just because it will be plain 
that an end must be made of the existing situation, and that very 
promptly; and with the increased activity of the contending factions 
will come, it is to be feared, increased danger to the noncombatants 
in Mexico as well as to those actually in the field of battle. The 
position of outsiders is always particularly trying and full of hazard 
where there is civil strife and a whole country is upset. We should 
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earnestly urge all .Americans to leave Mexico at once, and should as sist 
them t0 get away in every way possible -- not because we would mean to 
slacken in the least our efforts to safeguard their lives and t heir 
interests, but because it is imperative t hat they s houl d take noun-
necessary risks when it is physically possible for them to l e ave t he 
eountry. We should let every one who as sumes to exercise authority i n 
any part of Mexico know in the most u.nequivocal way t hat we shall 
vigilantly watch the fortunes of those Americans who can not get away, 
and shall hold t hose responsible for their sufferings and losses to a 
definite reckoning. That can be and will be made plain beyond the 
possibility of a misunderstanding. 
For the rest, I deem it nv duty to exercise t he author i ty 
conferred upon me by the law of March 14, 1912, to see to it that 
neither side to the struggle now going on in Mexico receive any 
assistance fDom this side of the border. I shall follow t he best 
practice of nations in the matter of neutrality by forbidding t he 
exportation of arms or munitions of war of any kind from the United 
States to any part of the Republic of Mexico -- a policy suggested 
by several interesting precedents and certainly dictated by many 
manifest considerati ons of practical expediency. We can not i n 
the circumstances be the partisans of either party to t he contest 
that now distracts Mexico, or constitute ourselves the virtual empire 
between them. 
I am happy to say that several of the great Governments of the 
world have given this Government their generous moral support in 
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urging upon the provisional authorities at the City of Mexico the accept-
ance of our proffered good offices in the spirit in which they were made. 
We have not acted in this matter under the ordinary principles of inter-
national obligation • .All t he world expects us in such circumstances to 
set as Mexico I s nearest friend and intimate adviser. Thi s is our 
immemorial relation towards her. There is nowhere aey serious question 
that have the moral right in the case or that we are acting in the 
interest of a fair set"tlement and of good government, not for tre pro-
motion of some selfish interest of our own. If further motive were 
necessary than our own good will towards a sister Republic and our own 
deep concern to see peace and order prevail in Central .America, t his 
consent of mankind to what we are attempting, t his attit ude of the 
great nations of the world towards what we may attempt in dealing with 
this distressed pe ople at our do rs, should make us feel t he more 
solemnly bound to go to the utmost length of patience and forbe arance 
in this painful and anxious business. The steady pressure of moral 
force will before many days break the barriers of pride and prejudice 
down, and we shall triumph as Mexico's friends sooner than we could 
triumph as her enemies -- and how much more handsomely, with how much 
higher and finer satisfactions of conscience and of honorl 
The New Democracy 
Ray Stannard Baker and 
William E. Dodd, PP• 45-51. 
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A NEW LATIN-AMERICAN POLICY ADDRESS 
(Delivered before The Commercitl Congress at Mobile, 
Ala., October 27, 1913. From Official Publication 
in Mr. Wilson's Files.) 
It is with unaffected pleasure that I find myself here to-day. 
I once before had the pleasure, in another southern ci w, of addressing 
the Southern Commercial Congress. I then spoke of what the future 
seemed to hold in store for this region, which so many of us love and 
toward the future of which we all look f orward with so much confidence 
and hope. But another t hen directed me here t his t ime. I do not need 
to speak of the South. She has, perhaps, acquired t he gift of speaking 
for herself. I came because I want to speak of our present and 
prospective relations with our neighbors to t he south. I deemed it a 
public duty, as well as a personal pleasure, to be here to express for 
myself and for the Government I represent t he welcome we all feel to 
those who repres.ents the Latin American States. 
The fu:ture, ladies and gentlemen, is going to be very dif ferent 
from this hemisphere from the past. These States lying to the south 
of us, which have always been our neighbors will now be drawn closer 
to us by innumerable ties, and, I hope, chief of all, by the tie of a 
common understanding of each other. Interest does not tie nations 
together; it sometimes separates them. But sympathy and understand-
ing does unite them, and I believe that by the new route that is just 
about to be 0pened, while we physically cut two continents asunder, we 
spiritually unite them. It is a spiritual union 'Which we seek. 
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I wonder if you realize, I wonder if your imaginations have 
been filled with the significance of the tides of corrurerce. Your 
governor alluded in very fit and striking terms to the voyage of 
Columbus, but Columbus took his voyage under compulson of circum-
stances. Constantinople had been captured by the Turks and all the 
routes of trade w.Lth the East had been suddenly closed. If there was 
not a way across the Atlantic to open those routes again, they were 
closed forever, and Columbus set out not to discover America, for he 
did not know that it existed, but to discover the eastern shores of 
Asia. He set sail for Cathay and stumbled upon .America. With that 
change in the outlook of the world what happened? England, that had 
been at the back of Europe with an unknown sea behind her, found 
that all things had turned as if upon a pivot and she was at the 
front of Europe; and since then all the tides of energy and enter-
prise that have issued out of Europe have seemed to be turned west-
ward across the Atlantic . But you w.i.11 notice that they have turned 
westward chiefly north of the Equator and that is the northern half 
of the globe that has seemed to be filled with the media of inter-
course and of sympathy and of common understanding. 
Do you not see now what is about to happen? These great tides which 
have been running along parallels of latitude will now swing southward 
athwart parallels 0f latitude, and that opening gate at the Isthmus of 
Panama will open the world t0 a commerce that she has not known before. 
A commerce of intelligence, of thought and sympathy between North and 
156 
South. The Latin American States, which, to their disadvantage, have 
been off the main lines, will now be on the main lines. I feel that 
these gentlemen honoring us with their presence to-day- will pr esently 
find that some part, at any rate, of t he center of gravity of the 
world has shifted. Do you realize t hat New York, for example, wi ll be 
nearer the western coast of South America t han she is now to the 
eastern coast of South .America? Do you realize that a line drawn 
northward parallel with the greater part of the western coast of South 
America will run only about 150 miles west of New York? The great 
bulk of South .Ame r ica, if you will look at your globes (not at your 
Mercator's projection), lies eastward of the continent of North 
America. You -will realize that when you realize that the canal will 
run southeast, not southwest, and t hat when you get into the Pacific 
you will be farther east than you were when you left the Gulf of 
Mexico. These things are significant, therefore, of this, t hat we are 
closing one chapter in the history of the world and are opening 
another, of great, unimaginable significance. 
There is @ne peculiarity about the history of the Latin .American 
States which I am sure they are keenly a,iare of. You hear of "concessions" 
to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear of concessions 
to foreign capitalists in the United Stat es. They are not granted 
concessions. They are invited to make investments. The work is ours, 
though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not ask them to supply 
the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, not a privilege;, 
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and states that are obliged, because thei r terri t ory does not lie 
within the main field of modern enterprise and ceti on, to gr ant 
concessions are in . this condition, that forei gn interests are apt to 
dominate their domestic affairs, a condit ion of aff airs alwa.,vs danger-
ous and apt to become intolerable. What t hese States are going t o see , 
therefore, is an emancipation f rom the subordinati on, which has been 
inevitable, to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the splendid 
character miich, in spite of these diff icul tie s, t hey have again and 
again been able to demonstrate. The di gni t y , the courage, t he se l f -
possession, the self-respect of t he Latin Amer ican States, their 
achievements in the face of all t hese adverse circumst ances , deserve 
nothing but the admiration an d applause of t he world. They have had 
harder bargains driven with them in the matter of loans than any other 
peoples in the world. Interest h been exacted of them that was not 
exacted of aeybody else bec aus e the risk was s aid to be gre at er; and 
t hen securities were taken t hat destroyed t he r isk -- an admir able 
arrangement for those mo were forcing the terms! I r e joi ce in nothing 
so nmch as in the prospect that they will now be emancipated f r om these 
conditions, and we ought to be the fir st to take par t in assis t ing in that 
emancipation. I think some of these gentlemen have already had occasion 
to bear witness that the Department of State in recent mont hs has tried 
to serve them in that wise. In the future they will draw closer a1:id 
closer to us because of circumstances of mich I wish to speak wi th 
moderation and, I hope, without indiscretion . 
We must prove ourselves their friends, and champions upon 
terms of equality and. honor. You can not be friends upon my other 
terms of equality. You cannot be friends at all except upon the 
terms of honor. We must show ourselves friends by compreh.ending 
their interest whether it squares with our own interest or not. It 
is a very perilous thing to determire the foreign policy of a nation 
in the terms of material interest. It not only is unfair to those 
with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own 
actions. 
Comprehension must be the soil in which shall grow all the 
fruits of friendship, and there is a reason and a compulsion lying 
behind all this -which is dearer than anything else to the thoughtful 
men of America. I mean the development of constitutional liberty in 
the world. Human rights, national · ntegrity, and opportunity as 
against material interests -- that , ladies and gentlemen, is the 
issue . I want to take this occasion to say that the United States 
will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest. 
She will devote herself to showing that she !mows how to make honor-
able and fruitful use of the territory she has, and she must regard 
it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are 
material interests made superior to human liberty ani national 
opportunity. I say this, not m th a single thought that anyone will 
daresay it, but merely to fix in our consciousness what our real 
relationship with the rest of .America is. It is the relationship 
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of a family of mankind devoted to the development of true constitutional 
liberty . We know that that is the soil out of which the best enterprise 
springs . We know that this is a cause which we are making in common 
with our neighbors, because we have had to make it for ourselves. 
Reference has been made here to-day to so:rre of the national 
problems which confront us as a Nation . What is at the heart of all 
our national problems? It is that we have seen the hand of material 
interest sometimes about to close upon our dearest rights and possess-
ions . We have seen material interests threaten constitutional freedom 
in the United States . Therefore we will now know how to sympathize 
with those in the rest of iAmerica who have to contend with such powers, 
not only within their borders but from outside their borders also . 
I know what the response of the thought and heart of .America 
will be to the program I have outli es, becanse America was created 
to realize a program like that . This is not .Am:::lrica because it has 
set up for a great population great opportunities of material 
prosper ity . America is a name which sounds in the ears of men 
everywhere as a synonym with individual liberty. I would rather 
belong to a poor nation that was free than to a rich nation that 
had ceased to be in love with liberty . But we shall not be poor if we 
love liber ty, because the nation that loves liberty truly sets every 
man free to do his best and he his best, and that me ans the release of 
all the spl endid energies of a great people who think for themselves . 
A nation of employees cannot be free any more than a nation of 
employers can be. 
In emphasizing the points which must unite us in sympathy 
and in spiritual interest with the Latin American peoples we are 
only emphasizing the points of our own life, and we should prove 
ourselves untrue to our own traditions if we proved ourselves untrue 
friends to them. 
Do not think, therefore, gentlemen, that the questions of the 
day are mere questions of policy and diplomacy . They are shot through 
with the principles of life . We dare not turn fran the principle that 
morality and not expediency is the t hing that must guide us and that 
we will never condone iniquity because it is most convenient to do so. 
It seems to ITB that this is a dclf of infinite hope, of confidence in a 
future greater then the past has been, for I am fain to believe that 
in spite of all the things that we wish to correct the nineteenth 
century that now lies behind us has brought us a long stage toward the 
time when, slowly ascending the tedious climb that leads to the final 
uplands, we shall get our ultimate view of the duties of mankind . We 
have breasted a considerable part of the climb and shall presently -- it 
may be in a generation or two -- come out upon those great heights where 
there shines unobstructed the light of the justice of God. 
The New Democracy 
Ray Stannard Baker and 
William F. Dodd, PP • 64-69 . 
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THE CALIFORNIA LAW -- MAY 19, 1913 
The People of the State of California do enact as follows: 
Section 1. All aliens elgible to citizenship under the laws 
of the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, and in-
herit real property, or any interest therein, in this state, in the 
same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the United Stat es, 
except as otherwise pr~vided by the laws of this state. 
Section 2. All aliens other than those mentioned in section 
one of this act may acquire, possess, enjoy and transfer real property, 
or any interest therein, in this state, in the manner and to the ex-
tend and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing between 
the Government of the United States and the nation or country of which 
such alien is a citizen or subject and not otherwise, and may in addi-
tion there to lease lands in this stat e for agricultural purposes for 
a term exceed~ng three years . 
Section 3. Any company, association, or corporation organized 
under the laws of this or any other state or nation, of which a 
majority of the members are aliens other than those specified in 
section one of this act, or in which a majority of the issued 
capital stock is owned by such aliens, may ac quire, possess, enjoy 
and convey real property, or any i nterest therein in this state, in 
the manner and to the extent and for the purposes prescribed by any 
treaty now existing between the Government of the United States and 
the nation or country of which such members or stockholders are 
163 
citizens or subjects; and not otherwise, and may in addition thereto 
lease lands in this state for agricultural purposes for a t er m not 
exceeding three years . 
Section 4. Whenever it appears to the court in any probate 
proceedings that by reason of the provisions of t his act any heir or 
devisee can not take real property in this state whi ch, but for s aid 
provisions, said heir or devisee would take as such, the court, in-
stead of ordering a distribution of such real property to such heir 
or devisee, shall order a sale of said real property to be made in 
the manner provided by law for probate sales of real property, and 
the proceeds of such sale shall be distributed to such heir or devisee 
in lieu of such real property. 
Section 5. Arry real property hereafter acquired in fee in 
violation of the provisions of this a t by any alien mentioned in 
section two of this act, or by any company, association or corpor-
ation mentioned in section three of this act, shall escheat to, and 
become and remain the property of the St ate of California. The 
attorney general shall i nstitute proceedings to have the escheat of 
such real property adjudged and enforced in the manner provided by 
section 474 of the Political Code and title eight , part three of t he 
Code of Civil Procedure. Upon the entry of final judgment in such 
proceedings, the title to such real property shall pass to the State 
of California. The provisions of this section and of sections two 
and three of this act shall not apply to any real property hereafter 
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acquired in the enforcement or in satisfaction of any lien now existing 
upon, or interest in such property so long as such real property so ac-
quired shall remain the property of the alien, company, association or 
corporation acquiring tre same in such manner. 
Section 6. Any leasehold or other interest in real property less 
than the fee, hereafter acquired in violation of the provisions of this 
act by any ali.ea mentioned in section two of this act, or by . any 
company, association or corporation mentioned in section three of this 
act, shall escheat to the State of California. The attorney general 
shall institute proceedings to have s~ch escheat adjudged and en-
forced as provided in section five of this act. In such proceedings, 
the court shall determine and adjudge the value of such leasehold, or 
other interest in such real property, and enter judgment for the state 
for the anount thereof together with costs. Thereupon the court shall 
order a sale of the real property covered by such leasehold, or other 
interest in the manner provided by section 1271 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Out of the proceeds arising from such sale, the amount 
of the judgment rendered for the state shall be paid into the state 
treasury and the balance shall be deposited with and distributed by 
the court in accordance with the interest of the parties therein. 
Section 7. Nothing in this act shall be construed as a 
limitation upon the power of the state to enact laws with respect to 
the acquisition, holding or disposal by aliens of real property in 
this state . 
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Section 8. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent, or in 




.ARTICLES I .AND XIV OF THE TREATY OF COMMERCE 
AND NAVIGATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. J ANUARY 
21, 19ll 
Article I 
"The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parti es 
shall have liberty to enter, travel and r eside in the territories of the 
other to carry on trade, wholesale an:l retailj to own or lease and 
occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses, and shops, to employ agents 
of their choice, to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, 
and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the 
same ter ms as native citizens or subjects, submitti ng themselves to t he 
laws and regulations there established. 
11 They shall not be compelled, under any pretext whatever, to 
pey any charges or taxe s other or higher t han t hose t hat are or may-
be paid by native citizens or subjects . 
11 The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties 
shall receive, in the territories of the other, the most constant pro-
tection and security for their persons and property, and shall enjoy 
in this respect the same rights and privileges as are or may be granted 
to native citizens or subjects, on their submitting themselves to the 
conditions imposed upon native citizens or subjects . 
"They shall, however, be exempt in the territories of the other 
from compulsory military service either on land or sea, in the regular 
forces, or in the national guard, or in the militia; from all contri-
butions imposed in lieu of personnel service, and from forced loans or 
military exactions or contributions. 
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Article XIV 
"Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Treaty, the 
High Contracting Parties agree that, in all that concerns commerce 
and navigation, any privilege, favor or immunity which either 
Contracting Party has actualzy granted, or IlBY hereafter grant, to 
the citizens or subjects of the Contracting Party gratuitously, 
if the concession in favor of that other State shall have been 
gratuitous, and on the same or equivalent conditions if the con-
cession shall have been conditional. 11 
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June 24, 1953 
Dear Mr . Mathers : 
The receipt is acknowledged of your letter, postmarked 
June 18, 1953, in -which you request to be furnished with micro-
films of the papers of William Jennings Bryan while Secretary of 
State, 1913- 1915, specifically covering tre period from March 4, 
1913, to April 30, 1913 . 
As we previously advised you in our letter of March 9, 1953, 
we cannot undertake the selection of documents for private investi-
gators. The arrangerrent of the correspondence of the Department of 
State for this period precludes an estimate for microfilm of all 
Bryan's correspondence as Secretary of State . It is not segregated 
but is classified under many headings and countries . The published 
volumes of the Papers Relation to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States for the ye ars 1913- 1915, as well as the supplements 
for 1914 ~nd 1915 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920-
1924, 1928) contain much of Bryan 's correspondence . This publica-
tion should be available in the lar-ger libraries in your vicinity . 
Among the records of the Department of State in the National 
Archives is a series of correspondence between President Wilson and 
Secretary Bryan covering the period 1913-1915 . This correspondence is 
contained in four binder t ype volumes, consisting of approximately 
385 pages to a volume . There are but four letters in this series 
between the specific period cited by your, that is, March 4 - April 
30, 1913, three of which are rather routine and the fourth pertaining 
to a letter written by the President of the American Jewish Committee, 
Louis Marchall, to President Taft in January 1913 pertaining to Jews 
in the Balkan peninsula and conditions in the Near East . These four 
letters consist of a total of 12 pages. Negative microfilms are 
furnished at the rate of $3 . 60 per 100 pages estimated to the 
nearest 100, the minimum charge for any order under 100 pages being 
$3 .60. 
The records of the Department of State referred to can be 
made available for examination by you or your legal representative 
in the search rooms of the National .Archives . For your information 
there is enclosed herewith a copy of "Regulations For The Public 
Use of Records In The Nation Archives" . 
Very truly yours, 
Carl L. Lokke, Acting Chief Archivist 




The following information was obtained from the Congressional 
Record, 66 Congress, 2nd Session, Vol . 59, p. 3219-4316. The follow-
ing resolution was submitted by Mr . Swanson on August 13, 1914. 
'Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), 
that the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty 
between the United States and Norway, looking to the advancement of 
the cause of general peace, signed at Washington June 24, 1914. 1 
'Mr . Jones submitted the following amendment : 
'Add at the end of the resolution the following : 
'Provided, that the Senate advises an::l consents to the ratifi-
cation of said treaty with the understanding, to be made part of such 
ratification, that the treaty does not authorize the submission to or 
investigation by said international commission of any question which 
affects the aimission of aliens into the United States, or the admission 
of aliens to the educational institutions of the several States, or the 
territorial integrity of the several States or of the United States, or 
concerning the question of the alleged indebtedness or moneyed obli~ 
gation of any State of the United States , or a.ey question which depends 
upon or involves the maintenance of the traditional attitude of the 
United States concerning American questions, commonly described as the 
Monroe Doctrine, or other purely governmental policy. 1 
The amendment failed . 
Call of roll resulted in 44 in favor of resolution and S against. 
Those who voted in affirmative were: 
'Messrs . Ashurst, Bankhead, Brady, Bryan, Burton, Camden, 
Clarke of Arkansas, Gallinger, Gronna, Hitchcock, Hughes, Johnson 
Kern, Lea of Tennessee, Lee of Maryland, Lewis, Lippitt, 1'1ccumber, 
Martine of New Jersey, Nelson, 0 1Gorman, Overman, Page, Perkins, 
Pittman, Pomerene, Ransdell, Saulsbury, Shafroth, Sheppard, Shields, 
Simmons, Smith of Maryland, Smoot, Sterling, Stone, Swanson, 
Thompson, Thornton, Vardaman , Walsh, West, White, and Williams 
44 . I 
' Those who voted in the negative are : 
'Messrs . Borah, Bristow, Fall, Jones, and Poindexter -- S. 
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Seventeen other treaties followed: 
The Senate then: 
'Ordered, that the injunction of secrecy be removed from the 
treaties for the advancement of the cause of general peace with 
Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Persia, Costa 
Rica, Venezula, Uruguay, .Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, together 
with the resolutions of ratification of and the report of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations on the same, and 
1That the said treaties be printed, with amendments.' 
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APPENDIX H 
AMERICAN NEUTRALITY - AN APPEAL BY 
THE PRESIDENT 
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Presented in the Senate, August 19, 1914. From Original Copy in 
Mr. Wilson 's Files . 
}zy- Fellow Countrymen: I suppose that every thoughtful man in 
America has asked himself, during these last troubled weeks, what 
influence the European War may exert upon the United States, and I 
take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point 
out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon 
us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech 
and c onduct which will best safeguard t he Nation against distress 
and disaster. 
The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon 
what American citizens say and do. Every man who really loves America 
will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the 
spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. 
The spirit of the Nation in this critical matter will be determined 
largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public 
meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon 
what ministers utter in their pulpits, and men proclaim as their opinions 
on the street. 
The people of the United States are drawn from macy nations, and 
chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that 
there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them 
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with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some 
will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous 
struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and diffi cult to alley 
it. These responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy respon-
sibility, responsibility for no less a thing than that the people 
of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty 
to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor 
and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be 
divided in camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved 
in the war itself in impulse and opinion if not i n action. 
Such divisions amongs t us would be fatal to our peace of mind 
and might seriously stand in the way of t he proper performance of 
our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding 
itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the 
counsels of peace and accommodation , not as a partisan, but as a 
friend. 
I venture, therefore, my fellow country-men, to speak a 
solemn, word of warning to you against th.at deepest, most subtle, 
most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of 
partisanship out of passionately taking sides. The United States 
must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that 
are to try men I s souls. We must be impartial in thought as well 
as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon 
every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one 
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party to the struggle before another. 
J\'.ly thought is of .America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the 
earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this 
great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our 
thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of 
peculiar trial a Nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine 
poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the 
efficiency of dispassionate action; a Nation that neither sets 
in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and 
which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinter-
ested and truly serviceable for t he peace of the world. 
Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraints 
which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and 
lasting influence for :p3ace we covet for them? 
The New Democracy 
Ray Stannard Baker and 
William E. Dodd, pp. 157-159. 
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THE FIRST "LUSITANIA" NOTE 
Telegram from Secretary W. J. Bryan to Ambassador James 
W. Gerard, May 13, 1915. From Official Publication in 
Mr. Wilson's Files. 
Department of State, 
Washington, May 13, 1915. 
Please call on t he Minister of Foreign Affairs and after 
reading to him this communication leave with him a copy. 
In view of recent acts of the German authorities in viola-
tion of American rights on the high seas which culminated in the 
torpedoing and sinking of the British steamship Lusitania on May 
7, 1915, by which over 100 American citizens l0st their lives, it 
is clearly wise and desirable that the Government of the United 
States and the Imperial German Government should come to a clear 
and full understanding as to the grave situation which has resulted. 
The sinking of the British passenger steamer Falaba by a 
German submarine on March 28, through which Leon C. Thrasher, an 
American citizen was drowned; the attack on .April 28 on the American 
vessel Cushing by a German aeroplane; the torpedoing on May 1 of the 
American vessel Gulflight by a German submarine, as a result of 
which two or more .American citizens met their death; and, finally, 
the torpedoing and sinking of the steamship Lusitania, constitute a 
series of events which the Government of the United States has 
observed with growing concern, distress, and amazement. 
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Recalling the humane and enlightened hitherto assumes by the 
Imperial German Government in matters of international right and 
particularly with regard to the freedom of the seas; having learned 
to recognize the German views and the German influence in the field 
of international obligation as always engaged upon the side of justice 
and ~umanity; and having understood the instructions of the Imperial 
German Government to its naval commanders to be upon the same plane 
of humane action prescribed by the naval codes of other nations, the 
9overnment of the United States was loath to believe -- it can not now 
bring itself to believe -- that these acts, so absolutely contrary to 
the rules, the practices, and the spirit of modern warfare, could 
have the countenance or sanction of that gre at Government. It feels 
it to be its duty, therefore, to address the Imperial German Government 
concerning them with the utmost fr anlrness and in the earnest hope that 
it is not mistaken in expecting action on the part of the Imperial 
German Government which will correct the unfortunate impressions which 
have been created and vindicate once more the position of that Govern-
ment with regard to the sacred freedom of the se as. 
The Government of the United States has been apprised that the 
Imperial German Government considered themselves to be obliged by 
the extraordinary circumstances of the present war and the measures 
adopted by their adversaries in seeking to cut Germany off from all 
commerce, to adopt methods of retaliation which go much beyond the 
ordinary methods of warfare at sea, in the proclamation of a war 
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zone from which they have warned neutral ships to keep awa:y. This 
Government has already taken occasion to inform the Imperial German 
Government that it cannot admit the adoption of such measures or 
such a warning of danger to operate as. in any degree an abbreviation 
of the rights of .American shipmasters or of American citizens bound 
on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent 
nationality; and that it must hold the Imperial German Government to 
a strict accountability for 'any infringement of those rights, inten-
tional or incidental. It does not understand the Imperial German 
Goverrunen.t to question those rights. It assumes, on the contrary, 
that the Imperial German Government accept, as of course, the rule 
that the lives of noncombatants, whether they be of neutral citizen-
ship or citizens of one of the nations at war, can not lawfully or 
rightfully be put in jeopardy by t he capture or destruction of an 
unarmed merchantman, and recognize also, as all other nations do, 
the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and search to 
ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent 
nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral 
flag. 
The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to 
call the attention of the Imperial German Government with the up~ost 
earnestness to the fact that the 0bjection to their present I?Bthod of 
attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the destruction of 
commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, 
and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is 
182 
practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a 
merchantman of sea and examine her paP.ers and cargo. It is practically 
impossible for them to make a prize of her; and, if they can not put 
a prize crew on board of her, they can not sink her without leaving her 
crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats . 
These facts it is understood the Imperial German Government frankly 
admit. We are informed that in the instances of which we have spoken 
time enough for even that poor measure of safety was not given, and 
in at least two of the cases cited not so much as a warning was 
received. Manifestly submarines can not be used against merchantmen, 
as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of 
many sacred principles of justice and humanity. 
American citizens act withilh their indisputable right in taking 
their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate business calls 
them upon the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be 
the well-justified confidence that their lives -will not be endangered 
by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged inter-
national obligations and certainly in the confidence that their own 
Government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights. 
There was recently published in the newspapers of the United 
States, I regret to inform the Imperial German Government, a formal 
warning , purporting to come from the Imperial German Embassy at 
Washington addressed to the people of the United States , and stating, 
in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exertised his 
right of free travel upon the seas would do so at his peril if his 
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journey should take him within the zone of waters within which the 
Imperial German Navy was using submarines against the commerce of 
Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful but very 
earnest protest of his Government, the Government of the United 
States. I do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the 
attention of the Imperial German Government at this time to the 
surprising irregularity of a cormnunication from the Im~erial German 
Embassy at Washington addressed to the people of the United States 
through the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that 
no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can 
possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as 
an abatement of the responsibility for its commission. 
Long acquainted as this Government has been with the character 
of the Imperial German Government and with the high principles of equity 
by which they have in the past been actuated and guided, the Government 
of the United States can not believe that the commanders of the vessels 
which committed these acts of lawlessness did so except under a mis-
apprehension of the orders issued by the Imperial German naval 
authorities. It takes it for granted that, at least within the 
practical possibilities of every such case, the commanders even of 
submarines were expected to do nothing that would involve the lives 
of noncombatants or the safety of neutral ships, even at the cost of 
failing of their object of capture or destruction. It confidently 
expects, therefore, that the Imperial German Government will disavow 
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the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that 
they will make reparation so far as reparation is possible for injuries 
which are wi.. thout measure, ani that they will take immediate steps to 
prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the 
principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Government have in 
the past so wisely and so firmly contended. 
The Government and people of the United States looks to the 
Imperial German Government for just, prompt, and enlightened action 
in this vital matter with the greater confidence because the United 
St ates and Germany are bound together not only by special ties of 
friendship but also by the explicit stipulations of the treaty of 
1828 between the United States and the Kingdom of Prussia. 
Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in case of the 
destruction of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy 
international obligations, if no loss of life results can not justify 
or excuse a practice, the natural and necessary effect of which is to 
subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and immeasurable 
risks o 
The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government 
of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the 
performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the 
United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free 
exercise and enjoyment . 
Bryan 
The New Democracy, Vol. I 
Ray Stannard Baker and 




THE SECOND LUSITANIA NOTE, June 9, 1915 
The following information was obtained from Foreign Relations of 
United States, 1915, Supplement: 
Your excellency's note, in discussing the loss of American 
lives resulting from the sinking of steamship Lusitania, adverts 
at sorm iength to certain information which the Imperial German 
Government has received with regard to the character and outfit 
of that vessel, and your excellency expresses the fear that this 
information mqy- not have been brought to the attention of the 
Government of the United States. It is stated in the note that 
the Lusitania was undoubtedly equipped with masked guns, supplied 
with trained gunners and special ammunition, transporting troops 
from Canada, carrying a cargo not permitted under the laws of the 
United States to a vessel also carrying passengers, ani serving, 
in virtual effect, as an auxiliary to the naval forces of Great 
Britain. Fortunately, these are matters concerning which the 
Government of the United States is in a position to give the 
Imperial German Government official information. Of the facts 
alleged in your excellency's note, if true, the Government of 
the United States would have been bound to take official 
cognizance in performing its recognized duty as a neutral power and 
in enforcing its national laws. It was its duty to see to it that 
the Lusitania was not armed for off ensive action, that she was not 
serving as a transport, that she did not carry a cargo prohibited 
by the statutes of the United States, and that, if in fact she was 
a naval vessel of Great Britain, she should not receive clearance 
as a merchantman; and it performed that duty and enforced its 
statutes with scrupulous vigilance through its re gularly con-
stituted officials. It is able, therefore, to assure the Imperial 
German Government that it has been misinformed. If the Imperial 
German Government should deem itself to be in possession of con-
vincing evidence that the officials of the Government of the United 
States did not perform these duties with thoroughness, the Govern-
ment of tre United States sincerely hopes that it will submit 
that evidence for consideration. 
Whatever may be the contentions of the Imperial German Govern-
ment regarding the carriage of contraband of war on board the 
Lusitania or regarding the explosion of that material by the 
torpedo, it need only be said that in the view of this Government 
these contentions are irrelevant to the question of the legality 
of the methods used by trn German naval authorities in sinking 
the vessel. 
But the sinking of passenger ships involves principles 
of humanity which throw into the background any special 
circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the 
cases, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German 
Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknow-
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ledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic 
discussion or of international controversy. Whatever be tre 
facts regarding the Lusitania, the principal fact is that a 
great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, 
and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot 
in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so 
much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women, and 
children were sent to their death in circumstances unparallel in 
modern warfare. The fact tha:t more than one hundred American 
citizens were among those -who perished made it the duty of the 
Government of the United States to speak of these things and 
once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the 
Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which 
the Government of the United States conceives t hat it has 
incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable 
principle upon which that responsibility rests. The Government 
of the United States is contending for something much greater 
than rrEre rights of property or privileges of commerce. It i s 
contending for nothing less high and sacred that the rights of 
humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting 
and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of 
those under its care and au thori y . Only her actual resistence 
to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the 
purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the sub-
marine any justification for so much as putting the lives of 
those on board the ship in jeopardy. This principle the Govern-
ment of the United States understands the explicit instructions 
issued on .August 3, 1914, by the Imperial German Admiralty to 
its commanders at sea to have recognized and embodied, as do the 
naval codes of all other nations, and upon it every traveler 
and seaman had a right to depend. It is upon this principle of 
humanity as well as upon the law founied upon this principle t hat 
the United States must stand. 
The Government of the United States is happy to observe that 
your excellency's note closes with the intimation that the Imperial 
German Government is willing, now as before, to accept the good 
offices of the United States in an attempt to come to an under-
standing with the Government of Great Britain by which the 
character and conditions of the war upon the sea may be changed. 
The Government of the United States would consider it a privilege 
thus to serve its friends and the world. It stands ready at any 
time to convey to either Government any intimation or suggestion 
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the other may be willing to have it convey and cordially 
invites the Imperial German Government to make use of its 
service in this way at its convenience. The whole world 
i s concerned in anything that may bring about even a partial 
accommodation of interests or in any way mitigate the terrors 
of t he present distressing conflict. 
In the meantime, whatever arrangement may happily be made 
between the parties to the war, and whatever mey- in the opinion 
of the Imperial German Government have been the provocation or 
the circumstantial justification f or t he past acts of its 
commanders at sea, the Government of the United States confidently 
looks to see the justice and humanity of the Government of 
Germany vindicated in all cases where Americans have been 
wronged or their rights as neutrals invaded. 
The Government of the United States therefore very earnestly 
and very solemnly renews the representations of its note trans-
mitted to the Imperial German Government on the 15th of Mey, and 
relies in these representations upon the principles of humanity, 
the universally recognized understandings of international law, 
and the ancient friendship of tre German nation. 
The Government of the United States can not admit that the 
proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been 
warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an 
abbreviation of the rights ei t ber of American shipmasters or of 
American citizens bound on l awful er rands as pass engers on 
merchant ships of belligerent nationality. It does not under-
stand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. 
It underst ands it, also, to accept as es tablished beyond 
question the principle t hat t he l ives of non-comba;tants can 
not lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture 
or destruction of an ·unresisting merchantman, and to recognize 
the obligation to take sufficient precaution to ascertain 
whether a suspected merchantman is in fact ©f belligerent 
nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under 
a neutral flag. The Government of the United States therefore 
deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Govern-
ment will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles 
into practice in respect of the safe-guarding of American lives 
and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be 
done. 
Lansing . 
